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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume III Published in December, 1943 Number 4

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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

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The ANTIOCH REVIEW

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EDITORIAL

NO ONE CAN DOUBT NOW that our war is civil as well as global. In Europe and in the Pacific our armies move toward military victory. But in America the common civilians, the administration, and now even our servicemen are losing one battle after another to a triumphant reactionary bloc in Congress—an uneasy and "unholy alliance" of southern Democrats and northern Republicans. The object of this reactionary phalanx is national embarrassment and federal destruction. When in the summer it wiped out the National Resources Planning Board and hamstrung the Office of War Information and the Federal Security Administration, the loss seemed difficult to bear. But in the perspective of later events, it would seem to be merely a skirmish before the main engagement. It is clear now that the reactionaries consider inflation—when they consider it at all—as unimportant as a bad joke. And in their mad pursuit of the *status quo* no obstacle shall stop them, not even a fundamental right of those who risk their lives for their country—the right to vote.

Late in November in a bill continuing the life of the Commodity Credit Corporation consumer subsidies were smashed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 278 to 117. Was any alternative method of controlling inflation brought forward by the Republican-southern Democratic bloc? No. Was inflation an issue? Don't be silly; as a matter of fact, an amendment tying a subsidy program to maintenance of the Little Steel formula—once a bloc *sine qua non*—was completely repudiated. How were the fifteen million Americans on fixed incomes to pay the increased food prices made automatic without subsidies? Nobody in the bloc had any idea. The bloc seized the quickest weapon at hand, the big farmers' request for higher prices, to hit the administration over the head, and millions of consumers were going to have to lump it.

The next day the House gave a thumping O. K. to a wholly inadequate wartime tax bill. The inflationary gap between national income and income taxes. The inflationary gap between national income and the and the value of consumer goods, taxes, and war bond sales had been variously estimated as between $17 billions and $25 billions. The Treasury Department had asked for a modest $10.5 billions. The House ignored the Treasury and came up with $2,139,300,000. Chairman "Muley" Doughton of the Ways and Means Committee called the inflationary gap a "statistical abstraction" and worried over "too heavy a tax burden" (business couldn't stand it). Yesterday the majority argument had been that there was so much loose money in the country it didn't matter how high food prices climbed. But today the majority argument had it that money was insufficient to pay more than nominal new taxes. Who was loony now?

Early in December the Senate put on the third act when it voted, 42 to 37, to turn over the soldier vote in 1944 to the mercies of each of the 48 states. The Republican-southern Democratic bloc took their stand on the Constitution, on states rights, on opposition to "bureaucracy" and federal centralization, and on "preservation of America as we have known it." The true cause was a very literal and personal interpretation of the last. Republicans voted to save their party banner, for they knew from unpublished polls that 61 per cent of the soldiers lean today toward the administration. And southern Democrats feared that poll-tax restrictions would eventually be upset and that formerly disfranchised southern citizens would presently vote them out of power. How the southern wind blew may be gathered from such items of the debate as the following: Senator Eastland, one of the southern sponsors of the bill, threw suspicion upon the personnel of the present Supreme Court; and Senator Smith of South Carolina referred sarcastically to our soldiers as "precious boys."

Thus, willy-nilly, were American soldiers forced to trade their votes for a mess of states rights. Seven states do not provide for absentee votes in primaries, three others do not permit any voting from outside the country. Nearly all states require application for absentee ballots by mail previous to voting, and nearly all have a time limit between application and polling date so short that soldiers on far-flung battle fronts cannot possibly meet it. Only eight state legislatures hold regular sessions before November, 1944. Senator Barkley called the Senate recommendation that

the states ease their voting provisions "a pious resolution approved by a ladies aid society." To Senator Guffey the whole proceeding was the "greatest vote steal in history." Certainly not since the Civil War have state rights exacted such a price in fundamental democracy.

What to do about it? The situation calls for a mass uprising of American voters and consumers. They must take time out for political effort. Inflation is not a partisan issue; it affects everyone. This and other facts should be driven home to your Representative, your Senators, to the chairmen of strategic committees. Congressmen, believe it or not, are people; if you get beneath their skins they bleed. Already the antisubsidy battalion has suffered a few wounded and a few missing; and the people's wrath has done it.

As for the soldier's right to vote, parents and other relatives of servicemen should inform them and members of Congress how they feel about it. And if it comes finally to state control, governors must be petitioned to call special legislative sessions to give the soldiers their opportunity at the franchise. A few votes in 1944 can cut a lot of ice.

Above the Mason and Dixon line the main effort must be the primaries and the national election of 1944. An essential part of that effort must drive toward separation and isolation of northern collaborators from the southern phalanx. Those who have consistently joined that phalanx on major legislation must be retired from public life.

There is danger that the 1944 election will be considered chiefly presidential. Quite as important will be the make-up of the new Congress. Herein lies the value of labor's new political program. It works from the ground up. Join it. Become a ward heeler; ring doorbells, crank the mimeograph, learn how to influence voters. Take a hand in choosing your local candidate and in working for him.[1] In many districts the primaries will be more important than the main election. All this with the thought that in 1945, as never before in our time, we shall need a Congress that knows what the national score is.

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[1]The political facts of life necessary for individual political participation will be found in "Political Primer for All Americans," obtainable from the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 718 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington 6, D.C., for $.05.

SOCIALISM ACROSS THE BORDER—CANADA'S C. C. F.

By DAVID LEWIS

SOME TIME AGO Samuel Grafton, one of America's most enlightened journalists, visited Canada and, on his return to the United States, wrote: "Canada is the most reactionary country yet unconquered by Hitler." Without commenting on the correctness of Mr. Grafton's appraisal at that time, I believe his judgment would be quite different if he visited Canada today. There has recently been a shift in political thinking in Canada which places it first in progressive promise on this continent.

Political lines in Canada are becoming clearly drawn. More, perhaps, than in any other English-speaking country, the political issue debated from every platform, on the editorial page of every Canadian newspaper, and over the air is so-called "free enterprise" versus socialism. The defenders of capitalism are frightened. They are organizing a propaganda campaign the like of which this country has never seen. The object of this campaign and the cause of capitalism's scare is the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation of Canada, commonly known by its initials as the C.C.F.

The C.C.F. was founded in 1932, at the bottom of the depression, as Canada's democratic socialist movement. At first it spread across the country like a religious crusade, but after the general election of 1935, which gave the new party relatively small gains, its progress remained stationary. It grew to a position of important strength in two provinces, British Columbia and Saskatchewan, but elsewhere in the country it remained a relatively weak and struggling third party. This condition continued until 1942. For the past two years, however, the growth of the C.C.F. has been so rapid throughout the country as to fill the progressive forces with new hope and the Canadian Manufacturers' Association with despair.

It began with a federal by-election in February, 1942. The Conservative Party had chosen a new leader, Mr. Arthur Meighen, who had re-

signed from the Canadian Senate to take the position. In order to give him a seat in the House of Commons, one of the sitting Conservative members had resigned and a by-election was called. The contest took place in a traditionally tory constituency in tory Toronto. There were just two candidates: Mr. Meighen and the C.C.F. standard-bearer, a high school teacher. The result surprised Canada and stunned the Conservatives. The C.C.F. candidate defeated the tory leader—an ex-Senator, an ex-Prime Minister of Canada—by a whacking majority. But this was only the beginning.

In the past two years there have been thirteen by-elections in Canada, six federal and seven provincial. The C.C.F. has contested them all and has won nine of them, four federal and five provincial. Except for one federal seat, the C.C.F. victories were all gains from the capitalist parties and they were spread over all five provinces west of Quebec. On August 4, 1943, there was a provincial election in Ontario, Canada's most populous province. The C.C.F. had not had a single member in the previous legislature. The results of the election gave the C.C.F. thirty-four members, as against thirty-eight for the Conservatives, fifteen for the Liberals, two Communists and one independent. The most recent Gallup Poll showed the C.C.F. to be the largest political party in Canada, having the support of 29 per cent of Canada's electorate, the Conservatives and Liberals having 28 per cent each. And the growth of the C.C.F. continues. Few political observers have any doubt that this young party is likely to have the largest block of members in the Canadian Parliament after the next election, although not many expect it to have a clear majority.

One important point about the growth of the C.C.F. is both characteristic and significant. An analysis of the support given the party shows that it comes from all major classes of the people—industrial workers, farmers, middle class, and men in uniform. As is to be expected, labor forms the strongest single base for the C.C.F., but it has widespread support also among the farmers and middle class. In fact, as we shall see later, the C.C.F. grew in major part out of the farmer movements of the three prairie provinces. In Saskatchewan it has been the official opposition for a number of years and is fully expected to form the government after the next provincial election. The farmers in central and eastern Canada have a more conservative and individualistic tradition; they are

less willing to combine with labor in support of the democratic socialist program of the C.C.F. However, even in their ranks the party is winning an important place and the C.C.F. is confident about its growth among the farmers of Ontario and the maritime provinces.

The thing which most astonished old politicians in Canada about the results of the Ontario provincial election was that the men and women in uniform gave the C.C.F. the largest vote of all parties in the field. This was significant for two reasons. First, it has always been assumed that soldiers would follow the chauvinistic drum-beaters, and the C.C.F. has been outspoken in its condemnation of all imperialism, with particular reference to the British variety with which Canada is more directly concerned. The vote of the armed services in Ontario showed that the tory type of false patriotism no longer influences them as it used to do. Secondly, all political parties are conscious of the decisive part which the fighting men and women must play in postwar political struggles. The soldier vote in Ontario is an omen of hope for the C.C.F. and for Canada.

What, then, is the nature and program of the C.C.F.? One thing can be said immediately: in a basic characteristic the C.C.F. is typical of labor parties in the English-speaking world. It is empirical. Its body of doctrine is neither corpulent nor rigid; it consists of general socialist objectives expressed in determined but flexible terms.

The best clue to the nature of the C.C.F. can be found in the manner in which it was formed. Canada is a young country not only in the terms in which the United States is young, but also in terms of its traditions as a national entity. In it the American and British influences have been colliding with each other for two centuries and only recently has a national synthesis begun to emerge. This has been as true in the political as in other fields. The majority of organized unions in Canada are branches of international organizations with headquarters in the United States. Thus labor had for a long time been under the Samuel Gompers influence and was lukewarm toward independent political action. On the other hand, the experience of labor in other British countries had its effect, too, and half-hearted attempts at the formation of labor parties based on the unions were made before, and particularly after, the First World War.

The first effective radical movements in Canada began, however, with the farmers in the west. Here one can trace another United States

influence, with its history of protest movements in the middle and far west, from the Populists down. Canadian farm organizations after the last war combined economic and political functions. They were highly successful producer co-operatives, which they still remain; they were effective pressure groups, as they still are; and they also entered the political field as farmer parties. Immediately following the last war the farmer parties scored singular victories. They won power in two provinces—Ontario and Alberta—and elected sixty-five members (out of 245) to the federal Parliament under the general name of the Progressive Party. Most of these sixty-five members soon deserted the new party and joined the Liberal Party. None of the farmer parties had any basic social philosophy and they were therefore an easy prey to the blandishments of the seasoned politicians.

Thus when the depression hit Canada, there were throughout the country a large number of local and provincial farmer, labor, and socialist parties, unconnected one with the other. The socialist groups were small and ineffective and—an invariable concomitant—rigidly doctrinaire. Together these multifarious parties wielded some influence but as a force in the country they did not count. Canada had almost no social legislation when 1930 came and the Conservative Government, which took power that year, showed no inclination to make even elementary provision for the growing army of unemployed and depressed farmers. The Canadian people became really restless for the first time. The bewitching ghost of Horatio Alger was finally buried together with the illusions which it had evoked. Intellectual circles began to think seriously about fundamental social change and a Canadian counterpart of the Fabian Society was formed—the League for Social Reconstruction.

Out of these events the C.C.F. was born in the summer of 1932. It is a measure of the empirical astuteness of its founders that they did not form a new party but united into a federation all the existing labor and farmer parties. By this means they accomplished several desirable ends at the same time. They continued on bases which had already been laid and to which a large number of people had become accustomed, instead of presenting something entirely new. They avoided rivalry with established organizations and absorbed them instead. But most important of all, they achieved at one stroke organizational unity between labor, the farmers,

and the middle class. Instead of a labor party having to woo the farmers and a farmer party having to court labor, both entered the marriage on an equal footing. This did not eliminate the natural differences between the partners but placed them in the right perspective of the common interests of the family as a whole.

This was the first important accomplishment of the C.C.F. and is one of the major reasons why it survived the early years of painfully slow growth and has registered such success recently. On the basis of the Canadian census of 1931, the class structure in Canada was, roughly, as follows:[1]

Class	*No. of Families*	*Per Cent of Population*
Working Classes	815,000	42.5
Farm Classes (Including fishermen, farm workers, etc.)	598,700	31.2
Middle Classes (Including small and medium business people, professional, technical, managerial, white collar workers, and independent industrial workers)	492,000	25.7
Sub-Total	1,905,700	99.4
Well-To-Do ($10,000 a year or more, including finance, industry, and professions)	10,500	0.6
Total	1,916,200	100.0

The results of the 1941 census are not yet available in usable form, but the general picture is almost certainly the same, although there is probably some reduction in the agricultural population relative to the other two classes. It is clear from the above table that a people's political party in Canada must have its supporters among all three classes or it is almost certain to fail. This remains true even though the working class must be the driving partner. The founders of the C.C.F. learned from the experiences of Europe where the farmers and middle class became fertile groups for fascism, partly because they had, for one reason or another, remained outside the labor and socialist parties.

[1]Table is taken from *Make This YOUR Canada,* by David Lewis and Frank Scott (1943), p. 96.

The newly formed party took a whole year before it finally adopted its official program which is known as the Regina Manifesto. (It was adopted at the first regular national convention of the party held in Regina, Saskatchewan, in the summer of 1933.) In this document lies the second major reason for the strength of the C.C.F. It has been referred to, and we believe justly, as one of the best political tracts in the English language. Again in characteristic fashion, the Manifesto is a combination of traditional socialist analysis and intelligible Canadian issues and language. It avoids soporific jargon and begins its historical analysis with, as it were, yesterday instead of beginning with the class struggle in the Garden of Eden. It builds on the moral indignation of a people with a good democratic tradition and sound self-respect. It comes not as the avenger and destroyer of the sinners, but as the builder and architect of a new society.

The C.C.F. is a socialist party, says the Manifesto, and democratic socialism is avowedly its objective. Thus the Manifesto states:

> We aim to replace the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government, based upon economic equality, will be possible. . . .
>
> We believe that these evils can be removed only in a planned and socialized economy in which our natural resources and the principal means of production and distribution are owned, controlled, and operated by the people.

The Manifesto concludes, after outlining an emergency program to deal with the immediate crisis, with this pledge:

> No C.C.F. Government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative Commonwealth.

In action the C.C.F. has lived up both to the firmness of its socialist determination and to the realism shown at the time of its formation. Without ever bending or hiding its ultimate objectives it has always hit out hard on immediate issues. Its leaders have been careful to maintain a balance between the farmers, workers, and middle class. Irrespective of the relative strength of these groups in the party at any time or in any region, a conscious attempt is always made to include all in the thinking and action of the C.C.F. The party is determined to speak for all the

people of Canada whose basic social ends range them equally against capitalist economic concentration and political reaction.

Partly due to the influence of the farmers and partly due to the nature of Canadian farming, the C.C.F. believes that the family is a desirable basis for Canadian agriculture and expressly does not propose to socialize farm land. I once heard Reinhold Niebuhr say in a group discussion that, unlike the relation between the industrial worker and his tools, the farmer has an organic affinity with the land which he tills. This is undoubtedly true and is a truth of profound importance. Without for one moment questioning the great accomplishments of the collective farms in the Soviet Union, it is nevertheless a historical fact that collectivization was achieved in that country only after the severest coercion and mass suffering. Not only is such a process to be avoided wherever possible, but it is extremely doubtful whether any amount of coercion could successfully achieve such collectivization in a country like Canada. In any case, the C.C.F. believes that socialization of land is both undesirable and unnecessary, unless there develops a concentration of ownership in land similar to that which has taken place in industry and finance. Canadian farmers are extremely intelligent as a class and politically literate and articulate. Most of them are relatively small farmers; there are almost no large capitalist landowners like those in the southern and western United States. The C.C.F. therefore favors the retention of the family farm, coupled with a state-assisted and state-directed program of co-operative ownership and use of farm machinery and supplies, and co-operative processing and marketing of agricultural products. The capitalist press has done and is doing everything possible to persuade the farmer that the C.C.F. is just fooling him, that at the first opportunity it will take his land away from him. Gradually, however, Canadian farmers are beginning to see the reasonableness, truth, and common sense of the C.C.F. program and wherever the fear can be removed, progress is made rapidly.

The C.C.F., like every other movement in Canada, is faced with a particular situation in a province which comprises more than a third of Canada's population. Quebec, the province of French Canada and the citadel of the Catholic Church, has not yet accepted the C.C.F. to the extent that the rest of Canada has. No adequate analysis of the situation in

Quebec is possible in this article, but some outline of the problem is essential in any discussion of political trends in this country.

The French Canadians believe that they are the only real Canadians. In a certain, though not necessarily important, sense they are right. They were the original settlers in Canada. Their present generation has no sentimental contact with or loyalty to any other country. Their forefathers left France before the French Revolution. The Third Republic was frowned upon by the Church. French Canadians felt little attachment to the freethinking France of the past century and a half. They have no ties of blood or sentiment with Britain; the imperialist tie irks them. The majority of English-speaking Canadians, on the other hand, still talk of their motherland as being some country outside Canada—Britain or one of the central or east European countries. This psychological difference between French and English Canada is basic to an understanding of events in this country, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy.

In this situation lies the major cause of some of the difficulties which Canada has had about her participation in the war. Our country entered the war simultaneously with Britain and more than two years before any other on the American continent. A small section of the Canadian people supported the war from the start because of an appreciation of the issues at stake. The majority of English Canada, however, were concerned much less with the issues involved than with the fact that Britain had declared war. They were part of the British Commonwealth; the old country was at war; instinctively they wanted to stand by her side. French Canadians, on the other hand, had no such instinctive response. Their old country was Canada, not Britain; their continent was America, not Europe. They could not understand why Canada should have been at war when the United States and the other American countries were still neutral. They refused, for a long time, to take seriously protestations about the defense of democracy; they saw only another result of what they believe is Britain's hold on Canada. That they were right only to a minor extent, that the Canada which they loved so much was itself at stake, were rational propositions which they were not in a mood to consider. Although this situation has changed fundamentally with the developments of the war, it is still one of the potent factors in the political unrest which characterizes present Quebec.

Added to the psychological causes of strain in the Canadian nation are economic pressures which capitalist development has produced. Quebec has been retained as one of the low-wage areas of Canada and the people of the province have, on the whole, a lower standard of living than other provinces with comparable resources. The Quebec educational system has in the past stressed classical and religious instruction and paid little attention to technical training for participation in industry and business. Thus not only have French Canadian *workers* felt aggrieved by the treatment of the system but the middle and upper classes have also cause for resentment, for proportionately few of them have achieved positions of dominance in the business world. It was easy and perhaps inevitable that French Canadians should have given sympathetic ear to demagoguery which cried that they were being exploited as a race by the English and the Jews; that they were being milked by the rest of Canada .

Many other factors cannot here be discussed. But the two which have been outlined have produced social attitudes in Quebec which are relevant to our story. The passionate Canadianism of the French Canadian has made him anti-imperialist. Not that his opposition to imperialism is based on any clear understanding of its implications or of the contendng forces which it lets loose. It is simply that his own objection to what he considers to be outside domination has made him sympathetic to the idea of abolishing all outside domination everywhere. Secondly, the growing protest against economic conditions in Quebec has made the French-Canadian an antimonopolist. Again, this attitude is not due so much to his perception of the evils of capitalist concentration as to simple experience of exploitation by huge corporations—almost all of them headed by English-speaking people. The hatred of the corporations induced by economic suffering is thus fanned by racial prejudice, and conversely the racial differences are aggravated by exploitation. Quebec's anti-imperialism and antimonopoly render its people ready to listen to the C.C.F., which, as a socialist movement, also condemns imperialism and monopoly. The process of industrialization in the province has been immensely accelerated by the war expansion. More and more French Canadians are leaving the unmodern environment of Quebec peasant life and entering the industrial centers. The organization of the workers is also proceeding at a much faster rate and the reactionary labor policy of the Canadian government

is doing more to educate the country's workers in the need of independent political action than all the speeches and pamphlets on the subject.

Thus the objective conditions in Quebec are rapidly developing in a C.C.F. direction. For the immediate present, however, the protest in Quebec has taken the form of a dangerous kind of nationalism and the political stage is filled with corporatist prophets of French-Canadian liberation in the *Herrenvolk Geist*. The organizational expression of this development is the Bloc Populaire Canadien, which is headed by several very rich French Canadians and supported by noisy and neofascist youthful elements. But all indications point to the near-certainty that this movement will not last past the end of the war. The developments in the rest of Canada are having a great influence on affairs in Quebec and the characteristically negative and truculent character of Quebec nationalism will, we believe, crack under the strain of postwar demands by the people.

A major difficulty in the path of the C.C.F. in Quebec was the opposition of a number of the Catholic clergy to socialism. In the earlier days of the C.C.F. some members of the Catholic hierarchy criticized its program as incompatible with catholicism. There was never any formal condemnation of the party, but there was a great deal of moral intimidation. However, this phase seems to be disappearing. Recently the Bishops of the Catholic Church of all Canada met and made public a pronouncement which has been generally interpreted as lifting any official objection to Catholics becoming members of the C.C.F. There are, of course, strong elements in the Church which still remain bitterly opposed to the idea of giving the C.C.F. a chance and they are using every verbal device to destroy the value of the Bishops' declaration. However, widespread argument on the subject is itself of tremendous value. And the C.C.F. is using whatever resources it has in Quebec to educate the people to recognize that the moral ends of democratic socialism are compatible, and even identical, with the ethical bases of all religions, including Catholicism. The results have given the C.C.F. great hope.

In short, the situation in Quebec is in flux. The French Canadians have definitely broken with the old parties. For the moment many of them are turning toward the extreme form of French Canadian nationalism. Simultaneously, however, there is a significant movement toward genuine liberalism and the chances of the progressive forces are poten-

tially very great. The C.C.F. is appealing to the people in the province that just as Canada cannot do without Quebec so there can be no Quebec without Canada, and the appeal for unity of all the people against their common enemy is bearing fruit.

The war is revolutionizing the Canadian economy and it is also revolutionizing Canadian social thinking. Relative to her population, Canada is becoming a strongly industrial nation. Her contribution to the arsenal of the United Nations has been tremendous. In order to achieve this contribution she has had to expand her prewar industries and to build new ones on a scale undreamed of earlier. A similar expansion has, of course, taken place in the United States and other countries. But it is likely that in relative terms Canada's industrialization has been greater than elsewhere.

Relevant to our present discussion is the fact that this development has taken place almost entirely under monopoly control. The war economy has aggravated and intensified the process of concentration of capital which had already reached an advanced stage before the war. Further, the capitalist class in Canada has refused to give labor any position of power or any share in the control of the economy. On the contrary, the workers still have to struggle bitterly for the elementary rights of organization and union recognition. Capitalist rule in Canada is unrelieved by any significant concession to labor. In this respect it is perhaps no different from the United States, but it *is* different from the other British countries, where labor is playing an increasingly important role. Here again Canada shows the result of the dual influence to which it is always subject.

This situation has driven Canadian labor to think of direct political action. In September of this year, the Canadian Congress of Labor—the central union body which comprises the Canadian branches of C.I.O. unions as well as a number of national organizations—passed a resolution recognizing the C.C.F. as the political arm of labor and recommending to its constituent unions to affiliate with the C.C.F. Thus one labor body in Canada has definitely abandoned the traditional policy of "no politics." This is an event of historic importance in Canada. There are now a number of important unions in Canada which are already affiliated with the C.C.F. The process is continuing. The rank and file union member in

Canada is becoming politically conscious and the C.C.F. is his home. This development may be of value to labor in the United States in its attempts to launch into political action. I know that American labor leaders are watching Canada with interest and, in some cases, with envy.

The people of Canada are learning the lessons from their war experience and in their own way. They recall the Canada of the depression years and they look at Canada today. Instinctively they sense that the difference is due, in major part, to the presence of a national objective in our economic effort today and to the application of at least some measures of planning. The C.C.F. has driven this lesson home. It has shown how by defining a national objective in peace, by expanding and democratizing the instruments of planning and control which we have fashioned for war purposes, and by replacing private ownership and profit by social ownership and the motive of need, the same miracles in production and even greater miracles in distribution can be achieved for the purposes of peace.

This realistic and topical approach has impressed the people of Canada. They are becoming much less frightened by the traditional bogeys. A growing number of them is scared by neither the word nor the concept of socialism as preached by the C.C.F. The C.C.F. is passionately democratic and is opposed to every form of dictatorship for Canada. It believes that the democratic process can be made dynamic, that it can succeed fully in the most desirable way if it is used with firmness and determination. All indications are that the people of Canada share this faith and this determination. This kind of fundamental reconstruction is in line with their traditions and with their basic moral and religious concepts.

In spite of the rapid and continuing growth of the C.C.F. it would be illusory to draw any facile conclusions about the immediate future in Canada. C.C.F. leaders realize that a party of the people, based on a program of democratic socialism, begins to meet real opposition only after it has become an important force. It is precisely the final phases that present the greatest difficulties. It is precisely the last sector of the people, which it is necessary to win in order to achieve a democratic majority and power, that is most susceptible to the pressure and intimidation of capitalist propaganda. Thus the battle has only just been joined. But events in

Canada give promise of success for the C.C.F. in the not too distant future.

How the C.C.F. will rise to its opportunity when it achieves power, whether it will be able and determined enough to overcome the ruthless opposition of a capitalist class cornered, desperate, and cunning, only time will tell. There is increasing confidence in Canada that the Canadian socialist movement will succeed in building the co-operative commonwealth in its country precisely because of its determination to use the power and to expand the institutions of democracy.

There is evidence that the C.C.F. has learned from the experience of similar parties in Europe and from the history of democracy itself. There is a growing realization that democracy must be firm in its own defense, and a determination that the enemies of democracy shall not be allowed to use it as a weapon for its own destruction. The C.C.F. is determined to use only the democratic method both before and after achieving power. Grounded in the masses of Canada's people, it believes it will have all the moral and legal sanctions necessary to deal with any attempt to sabotage the laws it will democratically introduce. It has faith in the strength and ability of a dynamic democracy to rebuild Canada.

CANADA LOOKS TO THE POSTWAR

By EATON MAXWELL

THE DYNAMIC CONCEPTION behind Canada's imaginative and courageous approach to a total conversion of its resources for war—price and wage ceilings, severe income taxes and compulsory savings, the control of basic investment and production policy by government, and the government's direct participation in the operation of a wide variety of industrial enterprises—has already laid strong foundations for any Canadian preparations that look toward planning for the peace. Almost without notice the lessons of the war's economic experience have formed a base upon which Canadian thinking for the postwar may be able to erect the structure of a "new" conception that hopes to give full employment and rising living standards, and prevent the social and economic tragedies of boom and depression.

As the fifth year of war begins, Canadians inevitably are becoming postwar conscious. That consciousness owes something to the feeling that there is now a foreseeable end to the war, but it owes more to the impact of the Beveridge Report and its basic assumptions of postwar price and employment stability, to the even more significant studies of the National Resources Planning Board in the United States, and not the least to a duet of Canadian reports on social security and health insurance presented in March, 1943, to two committees of the House of Commons and thus to the people of Canada.[1] Already many Canadian groups, official and unofficial, are thinking and working on questions of the switch-over from wartime control to peace readjustment to insure the highest possible rate

[1]Report on Social Security (1943) by L. C. Marsh. Presented to the Committee on Social Security, House of Commons, by Hon. Ian MacKenzie, Minister of Pensions and National Health. See *Proceedings,* Special Committee on Social Security, House of Commons (March 16, 1943).

Report of Advisory Committee on Health Insurance and Proposed Draft Bill for Promotion of Physical Fitness for the People of Canada. See *Proceedings, ibid.*

of employment and production. They recognize the profound need of a social will and purpose able to provide the driving force of a popular conviction to command political decisions for the full use of resources in the peace to the same intense degree that war has provided the stimulus for challenging political and economic decisions since 1940. The transition will find, in all probability, its operating premise in the established pattern of war experience.

Yet in terms of actual work done on postwar problems, the Canadian government probably has devoted less of its energies and expert personnel than Britain, the United States, or Australia. This stems directly from the reluctance of the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues to encourage any distraction from the main job of war-making. Today, however, that reluctance is slowly giving way. Since January, 1943, significant administrative shifts in the government's reconstruction agencies—bringing these close to the office of the Prime Minister himself—and the mounting intensity of the work of several committees of the House of Commons and Senate concerned with inquiries in reconstruction, all suggest the steady yielding of official policy to a clear popular demand.

Meanwhile since 1940, a few solid steps already have been taken. A departmental Committee on Reconstruction—as distinguished from two Parliamentary committees in the House and Senate—has been working for over two years operating as an advisory group to the Cabinet. So far it has functioned on a very limited scale. Its membership is made up of nongovernment personnel from business, labor, agriculture, science, and the universities; its chairman is Dr. Cyril F. James, Principal of McGill University and sometime Professor of Banking at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Commerce and Finance. There is doubt, however, whether its composition is of a strength to command enough respect to be effective. Its fact-finders make up hardly more than a skeleton staff. Hence the committee has limited itself to marking out the broad lines of inquiry. It has been compelled to farm out to social scientists in the university and business world most of its specific research needs. In the last year and a half, about seventeen reports have been prepared by the committee on a great variety of problems, particularly those problems implicit in any scheme aimed at a measure of extensive economic control and planning—meat packing, the building trades, changes in the lo-

cation of Canadian industry, demographic movements in relation to agriculture, nutritional standards, administrative technique in the operation of public works, planning the St. Lawrence waterways, and others. In addition the committee has encouraged interdepartmental discussion in Ottawa on many subjects in order to get some general agreement on research for postwar planning and to encourage preparation of draft legislation to meet certain immediately foreseeable postwar needs.[2]

More immediately practical results are now being obtained from the studies and recommendations of the General Advisory Committee on Rehabilitation, an interdepartmental group appointed to advise on the whole question of the rehabilitation of returned servicemen. Already it has supervised the return to civil life of over 75,000 discharged soldiers, sailors, and airmen. But this committee recognizes that its work is on the secondary level of administration and that the fundamental rehabilitation task is making jobs available to the thousands who will flock back after the war. Meanwhile, it has effected the passage of legislation extending the benefits of the Unemployment Insurance Scheme to servicemen, providing also industrial retraining and vocational guidance, the completion of interrupted education, farm settlement, and other concrete benefits.[3]

More important, perhaps, has been allocation of the power to plan and to organize studies of postwar problems to the most powerful single advisory body of the government—the Advisory Committee on Economic Policy. This committee is composed of the most important ranking civil servants in Ottawa from every department having any interest in the problems of economic policy. The committee, whose chairman is an extremely capable Canadian professor of economics, W. A. Mackintosh, is beginning to make substantial inroads into what otherwise might have been the province of the Reconstruction Committee. Yet the tangible results of the Advisory Committee's work so far probably would be hard to define, for its real purpose lies in evolving a *point of view* that may

[2]For a detailed statement of the committee's work, see the evidence of its chairman before the Special Committee on Economic Re-establishment and Social Security, Senate of Canada, *Proceedings* (March 31, 1943) pp. 1-5.

[3]Robert England, *Discharged, a Commentary on Civil Re-establishment of Veterans* (1943).

become the basis of much administrative and political decision; but what that point of view is today probably is not known even by the committee itself.

Then, too, some international postwar studies have been carried on by the Canada-United States Joint Economic Committee that sprang to life under the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941. However, except for a bit of preliminary research on a few common problems, notably tariffs, the setting up of more technical subgroups on joint war production and foodstuffs, and some casual talk (on a high policy level) of economic collaboration in general, its work has not progressed as rapidly nor as concretely as originally had been hoped.[4]

II

Yet out of all this groping for patterns the silhouette of some kind of a plan is emerging. The keystone in the arch of official and popular thinking seems to embrace the concept that the postwar world must be built on men's faith in each other, on the giving of employment to all, on the raising of living standards, on the satisfactions of cultural and community life, and on the participation of all peoples in some kind of world order based on the twin pillars of "power and morals."[5] It is a concept that, in these general terms, probably commands the support of every major political group in Canada—at least until the planners begin to spell out the details. These groups realize that, in order to effect a *reasonably stable transition to a peacetime economy,* certain guesses must be made about the Canada to be, the Canada emerging when the last gun has been fired.

First, then, what is likely to be the physical position of the belligerents at war's end? Great sections of middle and eastern Europe and probably even of western Europe may be industrially a shambles and agriculturally disorganized. There will be added the desolation or deterioration of vast food and other raw material-producing areas in Russia, Poland, and Greece, in the Balkans, and even in Germany and Italy. And a large part of the Far East from Burma to Korea may be in a poor position to produce

[4]For a detailed summary of the various provincial and municipal bodies doing some work on postwar questions see *Monthly Letter,* Royal Bank of Canada, April, 1943.

[5]E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939* (1940), pp. 287-307. I have taken Professor Carr's phrase for all that it could mean.

raw materials to say nothing of goods on anything approaching a normal scale.

Second, it must be assumed that with the Allied victory there will be formulated terms of peace likely to make possible the attempt to build a brave new world. It will have to be assumed that with the peace there will come a freer exchange of "capital"—of factory machinery, raw materials, and engineering skill—with possibly a continuation of the movement towards regional and local industrialization that has been going on in many European, South American, and Asiatic countries for the last twenty-five years or more. That process will continue, it is believed, and we must help it despite the risk that at some later period such help may mean competition between new South American, Danubian, and Asiatic products and the manufactured goods of older industrial communities such as Britain, the United States, and Sweden.

Further, it is most probable that for a few years Canada and the United States will have to provide Europe and Asia with foodstuffs, other raw materials, and machinery in large quantities and on a "relief" basis. This would require some kind of special financing mechanism by the home government, reimbursing such relief sales by Canadian producers. Will the fiscal devices be taxation or loans? That question depends on how high the general level of economic intelligence has been raised by years of war-making and of facing fiscal realities. For the effect of these shipments would be the same as when Canada now ships to Britain and the United Nations on a credit, "gift," or lend-lease basis, with the possibility of ultimate repayment about the same as the United States' experience with its loans to the Allied powers in the last war. But whatever the fiscal devices, a high level of production in butter, cheese, bacon—probably even of wheat—as well as in machine tools, steel products, and electrical supplies may still be necessary in Canada for European and Asiatic relief and reconstruction after the war.

If such conditions ultimately present themselves to postwar Canada, the diversion of Canada's national income to such relief or credit shipments may, for a time, be as large as the diversion arising from the twice-made—in 1942 and 1943—billion dollar "gift" to Britain and the United Nations. But since these "gifts" have helped Canada approach full employment very rapidly, Canada has lost little except the goods that might

have been taken in exchange for the guns, planes, and tanks "given" to Britain and the Allies. The effect of postwar relief decisions may mean that many of the industrial, agricultural, mineral, and other controls now in force in Canada for war purposes, as well as a high level of taxation and savings, may have to be continued in modified form.

Connected with and collateral to these main questions of economic policy are such issues as tariffs, quotas, bilateral trade arrangements, import and export controls, and foreign exchange regulation. These are economic matters and techniques which directly are affected by—and in turn influence—Canada's general external position, as a great exporting and importing nation with a total volume of foreign trade now in excess of $4,000,000,000 (at least sixty-five per cent is with the United States).[6] There will be other questions at war's end having a more specifically local or national character. Here will be such matters as price and wage controls, rationing and allocation in Canada of raw materials and consumer stocks, the disposition of hundreds of millions of dollars of government plant and equipment built for war production, the demobilization of three quarters of a million highly-skilled soldiers, and the re-employment in peacetime industry of thousands of skilled workmen, all tied to the great issue as to where and with whom will rest the making of investment policy, the kind of capital investment that gives employment on a large and continuous scale.

Finally, underlining all of these intricate problems, is a basic constitutional question for Canada. In wartime it may have been possible for a federal government, through a doctrine of federal emergency power, legally to deal with almost every federal and local phase of the Canadian economy. But it will be a vastly different matter when the war is over and when the same legal basis will no longer be present to prevent the reassertion of a Canadian kind of state rights—a claim that has bedevilled social legislation by the central government in Canada for over a generation.

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[6]The exact trade figures are now an official secret but Canada's external trade rose from 2½ billions in 1940 to 3 billions in 1941 and to about 4 billions in 1942. Of the latter, 65 per cent was with the United States, 25 per cent with Britain, and 10 per cent with the rest of the world. Of the 2.7 billions with the United States in 1942 only 8 per cent was for consumers goods. The rest was for war supplies, finished and unfinished.

From what can be understood of the thinking in the key departments, some of the main economic issues likely to be faced by Canada are now receiving serious study, their implications are being recognized, and soon they may be translated into terms suitable for the education of both popular opinion and political leadership.

In foreign exchange control, for instance, progressive Canadian thinking would appear to run along the following lines. At present the world's money markets are disturbed, with neither "Bancor" nor "Unitas" as yet accepted by the nations (let us not debate here as to whether either is desirable); there also exist the future uncertainty in Canada's export markets, sharply varying balances of trade between Canada and, say, the United States,[7] the freezing of Canada's sterling credits, and the dependence of Canada on the United States for critical industrial supplies. So long as all of these will continue as part of the daily experience of Canadian business life, some government machinery will have to be maintained after the war's end to control most, if not all, capital movements to and from Canada and, in particular, to regulate the use of Canada's supply of United States dollars. It would seem highly probable therefore, that foreign exchange regulation—now operating for the war—will remain for a time in the period of postwar adjustment, even though substantial changes might be necessary to meet the new objectives of peacetime.

Some measure of import control may have to be continued to stop any dissipation of necessary foreign exchange, particularly United States dollars, and perhaps to encourage Canadian importers to buy from those countries, like Britain, that owe Canada great sums. Then, too, as a supplementary measure in aid of the domestic price ceiling—if it is continued after the war—certain import controls may have to be maintained, particularly against a high-price exporting nation. Finally, import controls may be used to get a more flexible tariff system and to prevent any serious inroads being made on growing peacetime industries that may have a clear economic value and that soon would be absorbing some of

[7]Through the operation of the Hyde Park Agreement and continued sales of gold to the United States, Canada has had a favorable trade balance with the United States in recent months for the first time in many years—much to the displeasure of the United States Treasury which to many Canadians seems to prefer to have its Allies as debtors. See dispatch, *Montreal Gazette*, April 6, 1943.

the Canadian labor supply; although any such policy would have to be worked out within the larger scheme of reviving international trade. The use of export licenses may be confined almost exclusively to preventing the export from Canada of those supplies of which there is a shortage —such as oil, gas, or rubber—or an impending shortage in Canada.

At war's end, the total wage bill and general purchasing power of the Canadian people may well be higher than at any time in Canadian history. There may be found perhaps a national income produced in excess of $9,000,000,000 or $10,000,000,000 compared with $4,800,000,000 in 1940 and $6,000,000,000 in 1941 and the $7,700,000,000 in 1942. At the same time, as Canada's war effort comes closer to the outer edges of total war, sharp shortages in all types of consumer goods will have become commonplace. Yet because every Canadian will have a job of some kind, the situation, when peace comes, may very well be complex and contradictory. There may very well be a huge national income, a huge national buying power, not all of which can be drained off by taxation, war loans, or war savings; and at the same time there will exist real scarcities in scores of consumer goods items—clothes, fuel, luxuries, household supplies.

Clearly under these conditions it would be dangerous to release all price controls. The government must keep a general price ceiling, releasing these controls, however, in individual cases, *one by one,* where the supply problem has been restored to relatively "normal" conditions, until a kind of balance is established between national income and the production of consumer goods.

Undoubtedly, Canadian employers will be tempted to cut wages and dismiss employees the very instant that war orders are a thing of the past and the atmosphere of wartime pressure is over. But if that temptation is yielded to, it quickly would create a state of deep labor unrest, and it will have to be thwarted by the detailed preparation beforehand, both by industry itself and by government, of schemes to handle *transitional* unemployment. Yet a certain amount of transitional unemployment is bound to take place and here there is hope that the Unemployment Insurance Scheme will be prepared to take care of that slack for the readjustment period.

At the same time, the National War Labor Board enforcing the wage ceiling, and National Selective Service controlling manpower, will have

become, by the end of the war, the center of a great employment service and exchange system, having the power, theoretically, to direct the uses to which almost all Canadian labor is put and to say who gets what jobs. Such power will give a unique administrative opportunity to government in developing re-employment facilities.

One serious gap in the machinery regulating the relations of workmen and employers will have to be filled before the transition period of war to peace begins. There is now no federal legislation to provide a legal basis for compelling union recognition and collective bargaining. Such machinery may well have to be introduced if the many industrial tensions in the transition period are to be successfully overcome.

As a companion piece to any developing scheme aimed at a progressive labor policy in the transition years, suggestions already have been made to the government by the unions that there should soon be worked out detailed labor-training schemes for Canada's peacetime needs. The experience being gained now in the emergency war labor-training programs of the Department of Labor, of the provincial governments, and of private industry itself, will without doubt provide the groundwork for plans to fill the specialized labor needs of growing peacetime industries.[8] But fundamentally any solution to Canada's labor problem after the war will depend upon how completely the Dominion is able to release the productive forces of the nation to give the widest possible employment. This raises the basic question of a program of public and private investment aimed at creating the most diversified opportunities for the achievement of full peacetime employment.

In agriculture, Canada may expect great changes. The shift on many farms from cereal production, particularly wheat, to meats, bacon, cheese, vegetables, soybeans, and sugar beets, for war purposes, is one of the most significant developments on the Canadian land today. That trend speaks for itself in the following statistics showing the change in the character of farm income in Canada from 1938 to 1942.[9]

[8]Under the Emergency Training Scheme the government has already trained 189,949 workmen from 1940 to February, 1943 (Wartime Information Board, "Canada At War," April, 1943, p. 49).

[9]Cash Income from The Sale of Farm Products 1938-1942 (Dominion Bureau of Statistics).

(Thousands of Dollars)

	Grains, Seeds & Hay	Veg. & other Field Crops	Live Stock	Dairy Products	Fruits	Other Farm Products	Total
1938	223,899	47,062	177,107	118,939	21,863	64,599	653,509
1939	251,608	63,572	200,231	113,817	17,368	64,617	711,213
1940	220,589	52,814	260,982	127,063	17,100	74,952	753,500
1941	223,702	67,814	339,166	165,399	18,625	84,157	898,863
1942	232,972	82,254	408,117	224,373	24,517	110,725	1,082,958

Doubtless that development should help to solve, in part, the long-time lack of balance in Canadian agriculture, particularly in western Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and certain parts of Alberta, where prairie conditions permitted during the last war an artificially expanded wheat economy and where these changes in the character of farm cash income have, since 1939, been the most striking. The various war agencies supervising the war food program and food export have been slowly educating western Canada to refinements in diversified farming. By war's end it does not seem unlikely that the West will have had a minor revolution in the nature of its agricultural production, a revolution that will have taken its eggs out of the single basket of the grain crop and distributed them over many crops and many yields.

It is not unlikely to expect that various degrees of rationing, priorities, and allocation may have to be continued in the case of some classes of foodstuffs and in many key industrial supplies. The method to be used by the government here will already have been well organized throughout the war, and the new peace problem, as with so many other wartime controls, will be how to carry on to meet the new objective—that of a stable switch-over from war to peace. Indeed, a new kind of scarcity may arise in many consumers' goods that will now once more slowly make their appearance on store shelves. Thus it may be necessary to ration goods of which there is a "decreasing scarcity"—electrical appliances, radios, cars, and the like—for which there is a huge potential demand created through wartime savings and war-made depreciation.

At the end of the war, perhaps no more difficult question of immediate political importance will press for decision than the disposal of scores of great and small war plants built by the government. Since July,

1940 over $900,000,000 of public funds—compared with over fifteen billions in the United States—have been poured into new plants, equipment, extensions, buildings, and improvements in order to provide the facilities to make a wide variety of war supplies which either never before were made in Canada, or were produced on a negligible scale. The effect of this huge program is to give the Canadian government and the Canadian people, through the Department of Munitions and Supply, control over vast quantities of machinery and equipment and over scores of new factory buildings. Up to the present the planning of these plants, from an architectural and engineering point of view, has seldom if at all considered any postwar uses for the common good. It is being proposed that some liaison should now be worked out between the various groups engaged on postwar problems and the Department of Munitions and Supply in order to encourage giving thought to the use that these plants may be put after their war purpose has been served. There is, however, a curious reluctance on the part of the Department to concern itself with the issue.

Clearly, this whole capital expenditure program will leave the Canadian people, through their government, with a great reserve of personnel having managerial and technical experience in many fields. It would be a mistake to permit these productive units with their highly trained personnel to become disorganized and lose the training for teamwork that takes so long to develop. There is need for foresight and preparation and a conscious acceptance of the idea of government participation in peacetime investment and production.

IV

Perhaps more troublesome, administratively, is Canada's postwar problem of federal power. In the federal system in Canada, based upon the British North America Act—Canada's Constitution—certain specified powers have been allocated to the Dominion and others to the provinces, with the "residue" left to the Dominion. Practically all of the economic controls now in operation, in some aspects, would seem to be within the scheme of provincial authority over "property and civil rights." The customs tariff, export and import control, all forms of taxation, unemployment insurance, banking, foreign exchange regulations, and a certain limited authority over businesses having a national, international, or

interprovincial character, and those under the Dominion Companies Act, are, of course, clearly legitimate areas of federal legislation. But for the rest, were it not for a doctrine of "emergency power" validating the War Measures Act—which delegates to the executive the widest of legislative powers—these controls would today probably be beyond the power of the Canadian government.

Thus the whole legal structure of Canada's war economy rests on a simple and perhaps a fragile constitutional prop. For that doctrine of emergency power first was laid down in 1884 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—Canada's court of last resort—and was based upon the constitutional duty of the federal government to maintain "peace, order and good government." But the Privy Council held, in a famous case in 1922 (*Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Company vs. The Manitoba Free Press*), that the War Measures Act has effect only for that period during which the Governor-in-Council—the executive in federal Canada—by proclamation, has declared "a state of war, real or apprehended" to exist. Whether such a state of war, real or apprehended exists, however, would seem to be a "justiciable" matter for the courts. Thus, if the Governor-in-Council should fail to proclaim such a state of war to have ended, within a reasonable time after the armistice, the courts might very well upset any or every part of the administrative program of social and economic control set up under a War Measures Act that now no longer, according to the judges, had a legal basis in a "state of war, real or apprehended."

The patriotism of wartime might provide an ideal atmosphere in which to introduce, after a Dominion-Provincial Conference, a series of amendments to Canada's Constitution, amendments that would provide for granting certain powers to the Dominion Parliament under emergency conditions *short of a state of war* or, as was proposed in Australia, for a stated period after the armistice. These amendments would try to cover such matters as the price and wage ceiling, agricultural production and supply, rationing and allocation of all types of goods and materials, the control of industrial equipment as well as of the movement of labor, and so on along the scale of economic power. Of course these changes would have to be passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom since Canada has not yet insisted upon having its own amending powers—although it is doubtful if the United Kingdom would dare refuse a re-

quest that came from the federal government. Any good constitutional lawyer in Canada probably would agree that the amendments could be drafted in reasonably simple terms and that their effect might well be to give the Dominion all the emergency powers it now has under the War Measures Act for a substantial postwar period.

A second approach is being proposed by those who fear the breakdown of federation through overcentralization. They argue for the preparation of agreements among all the provinces and the Dominion while the war is on, agreements to permit the federal government to carry on with certain controls over the economic life of the nation for an "indefinite" period after the war; but now it would be on a voluntary basis with enforcement left in the hands of the provinces where parallel rules would be enacted. This second method is bound, however, to be loose, administratively awkward, and legally quite open to question.

There can be no doubt that a series of amendments to the British North America Act giving certain powers to the federal government exercisable under emergency conditions, or for a stated period, or forever, is the better, more sensible approach towards having such switch-over constitutional power ready when it is needed. Feeling is growing in Canada that some attempt should be made to draft amendments to be placed on the shelf, ready to be called down into operation when needed.

V

A constitutional repair job would, however, only clear the decks for executive action by the federal government. It would only provide the sanctions to enforce a policy. But there would have to be a policy. That policy for Canada in the postwar is now in the making. The unending expansion of war production has thrown unemployment out of the working experience of Canada. And, too, that process has demonstrated that a continuing high rate of employment is physically possible—despite well-established views as to the nature of the business cycle. Moreover, for that high level of war employment Canadians are paying a negligible price. For although the great flow of Canada's wartime public spending (in 1942, 4.4 billions out of a national income estimated at 7.7 billions) has been made possible only through a severe tax and savings loan with concurrent reductions in civilian buying power, supplemented by sharp

and restricted controls on prices, wages, the free movement of labor, as well as on the use of war materials, transportation, and plant; nevertheless the actual living standard for workers, farmers, and the middle class by and large has substantially improved. And yet all of this has been possible despite the diversion of much more than one-half of a nation's energies, skills, materials, and facilities to the production of war goods that do not help that living standard one whit.

That great fact is a daily lesson burning deeply into the consciousness of many Canadians. They no longer will accept as an answer to any future decline in employment and national income—their own income—"no money and no markets." The plain truth is, of course, that the war has been substituted for the "market" and that because this is so an infinite number of complex problems at home and abroad, problems of *incentive,* of cost, of competition, of taxation, of pressure groups, all have been disposed of with one sweep of the war-maker's blade. But what will happen when peace returns, when the war yields its place again to the market as the dominant drive and objective in the workings of the Canadian economy—indeed of every nonsocialist economy? What will then justify a high rate of public spending? What will that spending be directed to? Will it be in competition with, or complementary to, private investment? What incentives will there be for business readily to accept a heavy excess profits tax, price control, government supervision of costs, restrictions on production and on foreign trade, government-owned-and-operated production units, most, if not all of which, may be required by any large-scale social planning? What incentives will convince the Canadian consumer and taxpayer to accept a high rate of taxation, the diversion of a large section of the national income to public spending, the maintenance of a huge civil service personnel to carry on the peacetime program? Will the taxpayer be educated to the inescapable premise that public spending must be borne out of taxation to bring full employment and prosperity?

These are broad questions that immediately will present themselves once the market takes the place of the war, when goods and services will again answer to the appetites of civilians. These are questions that will go to the very root of the debate over the volume and character of public spending necessary to help speed up an investment rate that will give

maximum employment, and they are issues that will have to be faced courageously and on the plane of political action, for they are the kind of problems to which can be given no simple administrative answers.

There is no easy answer to this deep need for transmuting the social unity and drive of war into peacetime terms and peacetime values. But perhaps the answer lies somewhere between the war-making memories of the Canadian people, the lessons learned by political leadership, and the confidence of technicians, particularly the economists, in the peacetime validity of their wartime skills. Somewhere in this interplay between leaders, technicians, and socially aware masses may be the developing reply to the challenge of having a peace as prosperous as war-making has been, at least for North America, three thousand miles and more removed from enemy planes and shells.

But Canada will not be alone in that search for a workable postwar pattern. Every nation in the context of its own culture, economic organization, and political traditions will be seeking stability and security; and while the world is not yet an economic unit—not to speak of the political—indeed very far from it, so many of its regions are dependent on each other in so many ways that a pattern is not likely to evolve and to work in one state if it stumbles and fails in the others interlaced with it. The danger for Canada as for other nations in the first rush of postwar planning may well be in the drift toward economic nationalism that such pattern-making often inspires. Yet for a nation so heavily committed to trade with the world for its prosperity, any such severe nationalism would inevitably be pattern-making for a fall.

But just as profound psychological changes will be needed in Canada and in other states to translate at home the economic and administrative lessons of war into peace planning, so deep changes will be required to effect a more or less workable international society, out of the *ad hoc* collaboration of war-making. To be workable therefore a postwar pattern of Canadian society may have to incorporate, as well as be part of, the larger decisions of the international community. And there are postwar groups in Canada who firmly believe in this and are working politically toward that end.

HEALTH UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY TENT

By JAMES RORTY

AGAIN, AS IN 1938 when the National Health Conference laid the groundwork for the first National Health Bill, the Roosevelt administration has flashed the green light for compulsory health insurance. The introduction, a year before the 1944 election campaign, of the Wagner-Murray-Dingel Bill, embodying a series of amendments to the Social Security Act which total up to a fairly comprehensive and unified program of federal compulsory health insurance, may be interpreted to mean that what is left of the New Deal is still wriggling. Appraised in more realistic terms, it may also signify that Mr. Roosevelt thinks the labor votes to be had by staging a drive to widen the security front on the health sector will more than balance the entailed opposition, not only of the American Medical Association and its drug, surgical equipment, and embarrassingly faithful cultist allies, but also of the nonprofit Blue Cross hospitalization insurance plans and the commercial insurance companies, which during the past five years have also acquired a considerable vested interest in the business of purveying health security.

The chances are that Mr. Roosevelt is right in these calculations. Moreover, if a re-elected Democratic administration does not bring health insurance under the expanding tent of our security legislation, it is quite possible that its Republican successor will do so. Compulsory health insurance is not a radical measure. It is in fact long overdue, having been in the cards at least since 1934 when the opposition of the A.M.A. forced its exclusion from the first Social Security Act.

Officially, the position of organized medicine with respect to compulsory health insurance and other major changes in the organization and distribution of medical care is still a resounding "Never!" In practice, however, this intransigence has been progressively softened to a "Well, hardly ever" by a number of expedient compromises. Denied entrance through the front door of state or federal legislation, health insurance has infiltrated through a dozen cellar and attic apertures: The Blue Cross

hospitalization insurance plans which now serve over 12,000,000 subscribers; medical cooperatives, which are being pushed by the Cooperative League of the U.S.A. and the foundation-subsidized Medical Administration Service, Incorporated; private group practice organizations offering prepayment contracts like the Ross-Loos Clinic in Los Angeles; voluntary health insurance plans organized and controlled by state and local medical societies, such as the California Physicians Service and the Michigan Medical Service; war-nourished developments like Henry Kaiser's Permanente Hospitals in Vancouver and Oakland.

True, these developments are voluntary, and involve no government intervention—if one excepts the action of the Department of Justice which, in the case of the Group Health Association of Washington, D.C., stepped in to say that organized medicine must stop persecuting medical cooperatives. But the net result of these voluntary efforts has been on the one hand to hasten the obsolescence of individualistic fee-for-service practice, and on the other to provide experience, parallel with that of other countries and pointing to the same conclusion, namely, that a compulsory system is ultimately necessary, both to reach the lower income groups of the employed population and to raise and control administrative standards.

The Wagner-Murray-Dingel Bill is designed to accomplish precisely these objectives. It spreads a federal tent, fiscal and administrative, over almost the whole population with respect to security against unemployment, sickness, disability, premature death of the breadwinner, and old age. But it does not necessarily deal a death blow to voluntary efforts to improve health administration and health security. On the contrary, it may be argued with some reason that its almost too general and flexible provisions not only permit, but to some extent encourage, the survival and growth of existing voluntary health insurance organizations.

II

The bill widens the present coverage of commercial and industrial workers to include agricultural workers, domestic servants, self-employed persons, most employees of nonprofit institutions and some government employees—an estimated 15,000,000 persons added to the present total. An obvious defect in the earlier legislation is remedied by the provision of temporary and permanent sickness and disability benefits at any age over 18. Medical care and hospitalization are provided for all insured

persons and their dependent wives and children. States, counties, and cities may enter into contracts with the Social Insurance System to provide medical care and hospitalization for public employees and their dependents; also to provide the same services for public assistance cases. Similarly, workmen's compensation cases may be provided medical and hospital care by reimbursement contracts with the federal insurance system. The authorized hospitalization and medical care includes general practitioner and specialist care, laboratory and X-ray "workups," appliances, and eye-glasses—except when limited by rulings of the Surgeon General's office and the Social Security Board, which are jointly charged with the administration of the health provisions of the act. Medicines, except during hospitalization or in connection with laboratory benefits, are excluded. Dentistry is also excluded. Both these benefits, however, may be provided later, after suitable study, but it is suggested that they may have to be paid for in part by the beneficiaries. Benefits are paid for out of a "Medical Care and Hospitalization Account" which pools contributions of 1½ per cent of earnings up to $3,000 a year received from employees, equal contributions from employers and 3 per cent from the self-employed. (Government makes no contribution at the outset, but the bill authorizes such contributions when necessary to carry out the program.) These contributions total 3 per cent of the earnings of insured persons up to the taxable amount of $3,000 a year.

The Social Security Board is made responsible for administering the financial provisions of the health program, and the United States Public Health Service for administering the professional and technical services. National advisory councils are provided for both the Social Security Board and the Surgeon General. The latter is chairman of the "National Advisory Medical and Hospital Council" and appoints its members from panels submitted by professional and other organizations concerned with medical care and education, hospitals, or the need for health sources. The act presents a large grant of power to the Surgeon General. In practice, however, this could be exercised only with the support and concurrence of the advisory council. For example, the council would have to be consulted with respect to the standards of service to be expected of the hospitals and the amounts paid for such services, which the law says must range from $3 to $6 a day.

An amount equalling one per cent of the sums paid out in total benefits (except unemployment benefits) or two per cent of the amount spent for medical care and hospital benefits, is to be used annually for grants-in-aid to nonprofit institutions engaged in research or in professional education. This last is an admirable provision which would have the effect of liberating medical education from its present dubious and dangerous dependence on philanthropic and commercial subsidies.

Most students of the subject agree that the new Wagner Bill represents a considerable improvement over earlier American proposals and that in modified form it stands a good chance of ultimate enactment. It would net a considerable *quantitative* increase of the medical and hospital care given to the masses of the American people. A considerable *qualitative* improvement of the medical care also might be effected under the act, depending both upon the form in which it is ultimately passed and upon later administrative decisions. It is important to realize, however, that the bill as it stands represents neither "socialized medicine" nor a comprehensive, planned attack upon the problem of improving the health levels of the American people. That is not the way a pressure group democracy, based on a vested interest economy, attacks its problems. We find it almost impossible to plan directly for health or for anything else. The Wagner Bill attempts to accomplish as much as possible while yielding only so much as is unavoidable in appeasing the vested interests affected, under the tent of a broadened social security enactment in the administration of which the government necessarily and on the whole desirably extends its present powers and responsibilities. What is likely to happen and where the public interest lies in the matter will appear if one examines the positions occupied by the several major vested interests in the health field, starting with the American Medical Association.

III

At the June, 1943 meeting of the A.M.A.'s house of delegates, the outgoing president, Brigadier General Frederick W. Rankin, warned his colleagues, by implication at least, that the association's past intransigence with respect to changes in the organization of medical care was no longer practicable. There are, he said, "tremendously forceful socio-economic trends which are involved and deeply concerned with the na-

tion's medical problems" and these trends are directed toward "some form of national health service as an integral function of the state." To recognize this, said Dr. Rankin, "must not be regarded in the light of apostasy."

The incoming president, Dr. James E. Paullin, was more specific, declaring that the "trend of medical practice inclines toward the establishment of the hospital and medical center as the source for the distribution of medical care." This trend, of course, was well established even before 1930, when the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care recommended that doctors be organized in groups around hospitals—and was promptly denounced by the editor of the A.M.A. *Journal* for advocating "socialism and communism inciting to revolution." Since then the complexity and expensiveness of medical technology, especially with respect to diagnostic procedures, has steadily increased, so that what Ray Lyman Wilbur's committee recommended as desirable eleven years ago is today coming about as a matter of practical necessity, under the stringencies and pressures of the war emergency. Nevertheless, for an A.M.A. president to acknowledge this *fait accompli* represents real progress—of which, in fact, there has been much more in recent years than one would suppose if one took seriously the continuing thunder of Dr. Fishbein in the *Journal*.

Editorializing on the Wagner Bill in his issue of June 26, 1943, Dr. Fishbein asserted that the measure makes the "Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, whoever he might be, a virtual 'gauleiter' of American medicine. Indeed, it is doubtful if even Nazidom confers on its gauleiter the powers which this measure would confer on the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service. . . ."

This blast was followed by the publication of a booklet sponsored by the A.M.A.'s propaganda front, the National Physician's Committee for the Extension of Medical Services. "Abolishing private medical practice, or $3,048,000,000 of political medicine yearly in the United States" shouts this astonishing document.

> For the doctor, state medicine means abject slavery; the necessity of catering to the ward committeeman or the precinct captain rather than to the needs of human beings who are his patients. . . . They [the doctors] can demand a continuation of the practice of medicine under the Christian concept of the sanctity of human personality—The American Way—with continuing progress in the science of medicine and the art of medical practice; or they can refuse to be

concerned and refuse to assume their part of the responsibility. . . . The decision means—Free Men—or—Slaves! WAKE UP—DOCTORS OF AMERICA!

For years laymen have wondered why the presidents of the American Medical Association customarily express themselves like civilized people, whereas at the same time Dr. Fishbein and his aides are permitted to turn out the kind of all-out rabble-rousing that would be considered in bad taste by a trade association of patent medicine manufacturers selling in the Bible Belt. The explanation would appear to lie in the fact that Drs. Rankin and Paullin, however conservative they may be, represent the traditional responsibility and discipline of a great profession, whereas Dr. Fishbein and the National Physicians' Committee represent, for all practical purposes, the allied commercial interests of the highly profitable *Journal* of the A.M.A. and its powerful and wealthy advertisers of drugs, medical and surgical equipment and appliances, foods, vitamins, cigarettes, and other tonics and sedatives. Neither the professional integrity nor the economic status and security of the medical profession are threatened by the Wagner Bill; on the contrary, judging from the experience of the British with compulsory health insurance, both are likely on the whole to be definitely advantaged. What *is* threatened is the A.M.A. *as a business and as a political machine,* powered by the huge annual income from *Journal* advertisers. These advertisers in turn are threatened by any disturbance of the *status quo* of our health and sickness economy.

This explains the virulence with which the Wagner Bill is attacked by the National Physicians' Committee, whose war chest, it is important to know, is handsomely supplemented by the contributions of drug and medical equipment advertisers in the *Journal* and in the state medical journals. It explains too the disarming provisions of the Wagner Bill with respect to medicines; they are not included in the benefits. It explains, finally, the bizarre National Conference on Planning for War and Postwar Medicine, staged at the Waldorf in New York on March 15, 1943 by Dr. Fishbein and his trade association allies, including the American Drug Manufacturers Association, the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, and the American Surgical Trade Association. This conference, which was essentially a kind of preventive occupation of the "planning" area by the vested interests affected, was chiefly remarkable

for its resolute avoidance of any serious discussion of planning and for the careful exclusion from its deliberations of all the government, foundation, and liberal medical experts who have devoted their lives to the subject. At the banquet which concluded the conference, the bill of fare included breast of guinea hen by Oscar and the following ripe and gamey tidbits by Dr. Fishbein:

"Do those who have gone forth to save democracy want to come back to the America, to the England, or to the China that they know, or do they want a new world to result from this conflict?"

By way of answering his rhetorical question, the advertising genius of the A.M.A. quoted a recent tear-jerking advertisement and then proceeded to show what a really accomplished and uninhibited copywriter can do.

"Every one of us," he intoned,

> wants to save all that was good in prewar America. We want above all the principle of free choice and freedom of opportunity. The very basis of the American democracy has been that principle of free choice—free choice of the school one attends, the church in which one worships, the store in which one purchases, the hospitals in which one receives hospital care, the physician, the dentist, or the lawyer whom one consults. . . ."

IV

Among those who have gone forth to save democracy are the 50,000 doctors who are now serving the armed forces; to this number it is possible that another ten or fifteen thousand will be added before we are through. It is perhaps his anxious awareness of these soldier-doctors, and the dubious influences and dangerous thoughts to which they may be subjected, that causes the brooding editor of the *Journal* to grow nostalgic for the America that was, and will not be again.

They are young men, practically all of them under forty-five. Many of them have gone or will go directly from their interneships into the Army and Navy. Thousands of them have had little or no experience of private practice. In the teaching hospitals they practiced group medicine of a high order, with all its advantages of generous laboratory workups and readily available consultations. In the Army and Navy they are again practicing collective group medicine, often of excellent quality. They are using government equipment, dispensing government medicines, and

being paid government salaries. When the war is over they may not be interested in making American medicine safe for Dr. Fishbein's politico-economic machine, especially if they are offered salaried security and a chance to practice first-rate modern medicine on the staffs of the health centers which, according to President Paullin of the A.M.A., will play an important role in the distribution of postwar medical care.

Gloomily, some of Dr. Fishbein's trade association allies are beginning to apprehend that something like this may happen. Pointing out that the young doctor returning from the war will constitute more than a majority of the A.M.A., *Drug and Cosmetic Industry* in its March, 1943, issue, remarks: "These men will have become used to obtaining a living from the government. . . . They have adjusted themselves to a lower income and may expect it to continue after the war. . . ."

The attitude of the returning soldier-doctors will depend partly upon the nature of their experience while in the armed forces, partly upon the quantity and quality of the jobs available after the war in the collective forms of medical practice, and partly upon the effectiveness of the insurgent medical leadership which has been gaining ground inside the A.M.A. for the past decade. In general, the medical liberals seem to be supporting the Wagner Bill with only minor reservations. The oldest and largest of these groups is the Committee of Physicians for the Improvement of Medical Care, now headed by Dr. Channing Frothingham of Boston and Dr. John Peters of the Yale School of Medicine. The committee has congratulated Senator Wagner, declaring, "The medical provisions of the bill seem to the Committee broadly conceived in a spirit of service. With its general provisions the Committee is in accord. . . . It provides a framework and a basis for discussion from which it is sincerely hoped that a constructive program for improved medical care of the American people may be developed."

The gulf between this moderate language and the dithyrambic exhortations of the National Physicians' Committee for the Extension of Medical Services scarcely requires comment. The medical liberals have on their side not only better intellectual morals and manners, but also the emerging logic of the new medical technology and the probable pattern of our postwar economy. In the interest of realism, however, it must be added that thus far these liberal medical groups have experienced the

traditional reward of virtue. The chief trouble is that they have no war chest, whereas in 1942 the gifted Dr. Fishbein sold over a million dollars' worth of advertising space in the *Journal* alone. As for the National Physicians' Committee for the Extension of Medical Services, the sky, judging from the extraordinary expensiveness of its propaganda literature, is the limit. It has sent its propaganda leaflets to each of the 175,000 doctors of the country; its newspaper syndicate has flooded the press with handouts; recently it announced a new edition of a million copies of its pamphlets.

V

In 1938, when the then rampant New Dealers issued their first call for action on the health front, the Blue Cross hospitalization prepayment plans, developed during the depression as a means of rescuing the voluntary hospitals from threatened insolvency, were still embryonic and experimental. Only after repeated pressure had been brought to bear by the American Hospital Association and the American College of Surgeons, had the A.M.A. given grudging consent to the extension of this voluntary hospitalization insurance. It hoped that this concession might set up a buffer state against the agitation for compulsory health insurance. It feared that if the plans were permitted to insure their subscribers against the cost of hospital bed and board, they might progressively extend this coverage to include not only all hospital costs, but eventually surgical and medical care both in and out of the hospital.

As it turned out, both the hope and the fear proved justified. By the middle of 1943 there were 77 plans, scattered from coast to coast, and serving over 12,000,000 subscribers. The more aggressive plan directors are widening the coverage to include surgical care while in hospital, and even office and home medical care offered in collaboration with local medical societies. The Hospital Service Plan Commission of the American Hospital Association sets standards for the approval of the Blue Cross plans and operates a central promotional and propaganda bureau which is beginning to talk about an "American Way" of achieving health security, this being the progressive extension of voluntary health insurance until it covers the total population with complete medical care, the participation of medical indigents in the system to be subsidized by federal, state and

local tax funds.[1] Spokesmen for the plans have denounced the Wagner-Murray-Dingle Bill as a needless and dangerous usurpation by federal authority of a job which the plans have well started and may be expected to finish. This, for example, is the position taken by John R. Mannix, Executive Director of the Michigan Hospital Service, which after a late start zoomed up to a total of nearly a million subscribers in July, 1943,

[1]Mr. C. Rufus Rorem, Secretary of the Hospital Service Plan Commission of the American Hospital Association, has been kind enough to supply me with the following paragraphs in which the position of the Blue Cross Plans is stated authoritatively:

> "The Blue Cross Plans have no 'interest' other than distribution of adequate hospital care to the American people. They are community-service agencies through which the people pay *their own* hospital bills, with *their own* money, in *their own* institutions. For the hospitals of America have been constructed by voluntary contributions and taxes from the self-supporting members of the population.
>
> "The Hospital Service Plan Commission has twice formally recognized (March, 1942 and September, 1943) the necessity of federal grants-in-aid: for hospital service to public assistance beneficiaries and other medically indigent; for construction of hospital facilities in sparsely settled or low-income areas, and those with critical shifts in population. The first provision is in the Wagner bill; the second is a federal policy under the Lanham Act.
>
> "The Blue Cross Plans do not oppose adequate distribution of hospital services and their costs. But they urge that the government use all practical methods, administrative and fiscal, to encourage the expansion of nonprofit voluntary insurance against the total costs of hospitalized illness, which are catastrophic, and which represent, on the average, half the direct expenditures by families for health service."

Space does not permit extended debate with Mr. Rorem, but the following observations would seem pertinent: The hospital plans have been initiated by the voluntary hospitals and primarily in the interest of the voluntary hospitals. Theoretically democratic control is provided by the representative of the "public" on the directorate of the plans. Actually, the subscribers have no effective voice in the management of the plans or in the fiscal and other arrangements with the hospitals that supply the service *except* when they are sufficiently well organized, as in Detroit, to demand and get proper representation. Theoretically, the voluntary hospital is the community's instrument, subject to the community's control expressed through democratic means. Actually, the policies of the voluntary hospital are likely to be dominated by the ruling hierarchy of the local medical society, which is rarely either enlightened or liberal in its social attitudes, and which is certainly not democratic. An institution doesn't have to make a profit in order to be a vested interest.

making it the second largest in the country, the largest being New York's Associated Hospital Service. In the October, 1942 *Hospitals* Mr. Mannix writes: "It is our prediction that with the support of hospital trustees and executives and the medical and allied professions, all the people of this country will be relieved of the financial burden of hospital, medical, dental, and other health care within a reasonably few years through Blue Cross and companion health plans." On the record thus far, Mr. Mannix's optimism would seem extreme. The best the Blue Cross plans can claim is a gain of 200,000 new subscribers a month, or two per cent of the population a year.

Mr. Mannix is regarded in Detroit and elsewhere as one of the ablest of the Blue Cross Plan administrators. Yet nowhere would his prediction encounter greater skepticism than in his home town, and specifically from the U.A.W. - C.I.O. officials who have been chiefly responsible for putting the plan over in Detroit, where forty per cent of the U.A.W.-C. I. O.'s members are subscribers. The fact is that the U.A.W. - C.I.O.'s health committee has never regarded the Michigan Hospital contract, even when supplemented by the surgical-care benefits provided by the affiliated Michigan Medical Service, as either good enough or inexpensive enough to provide satisfactory health protection for the U.A.W.-C.I.O. members and their families. It was merely the best the union's health committee could do at the time, after bargaining back and forth between the Blue Cross officials and the representatives of the commercial insurance carriers favored by the automotive manufacturers. By dint of this bargaining the union exacted substantial concessions, including C.I.O. and A.F.L. representatives on the board of directors of the Hospital Service and, more importantly, the employment of five representatives of the U.A.W. - C.I.O. to serve on the staff of the jointly administered services and handle the grievances of union subscribers, of which there have been no lack. In its report adopted at the 1942 U.A.W. - C.I.O. convention, the position of the union health committee is stated as follows:

> The Committee believes that the basic principles of the Blue Cross Hospital Service Plans, upon which most nonprofit medical service plans are also based, make this type of plan second only to union-owned and operated cooperative hospitals and clinics. Until such time as the union is in a position to realistically contemplate construction of its own hospital and medical service institutions, the committee is actively working for the expansion and refinement

> of the Blue Cross Plans and the medical service plans which subscribe to Blue Cross principles. In this manner we are conditioning the union membership to the advantages of the group hospital and medical service procedures and, at the same time, training a corps of union personnel in the organized distribution of hospital and medical care. In short, the union is simply using the best available institutions dealing in hospital and medical care to obtain immediate benefits for our people and to prepare our union for the anticipated day when it will be able to organize its own plan for health protection.

Significantly, the U.A.W. - C.I.O., like the C.I.O. as a whole, is backing the Wagner-Murray-Dingel Bill unreservedly. So is the A.F.L. Neither organization has any illusions about the ability of voluntary health insurance, under Blue Cross or other auspices, to provide adequate health protection for the working population of America. Both want hospital and medical care brought under the social security tent and paid for by compulsory employer-employee contributions supplemented ultimately by federal subsidies. But how and by whom this care should be provided is another matter. A clue to labor's ideas on this point is offered by the U.A.W. - C.I.O.'s Medical Research Institute in Detroit.

This is another of Walter Reuther's babies, strangled during the Homer Martin period of internecine union warfare, but revived about a year ago, under the direction of Dr. James E. Davis, a former professor of pathology at Wayne University, who in the past has repeatedly earned the confidence of the union by his willingness to testify in workmen's compensation cases. The Institute is essentially a diagnostic clinic, financed by the contributions of U.A.W. - C.I.O. locals. But it does more than diagnose individual union members and provide service in accident compensation cases; it also measures the prevalence of industrial disease, as indicated by the sample of automotive workers it examines, and it investigates, through the health committee of its affiliated locals, the industrial health hazards in the automotive industry. These studies provide a valuable reference file on shop conditions whenever the U.A.W. - C.I.O. is negotiating a union contract with an employer. In addition the Institute provides actuarial and other experience, plus training for a steadily expanding nucleus of union-employed physicians—all highly useful whenever it becomes possible and expedient for the union to build its own hospitals and organize and staff its own medical services.

What makes the Detroit story doubly important is that there are automotive plants and U.A.W. - C.I.O. locals in every major industrial city in America. If organized labor succeeds in building its own complete health service in Detroit, whether inside or outside of a federal compulsory health insurance fiscal tent, it will undoubtedly undertake to do the same thing elsewhere; as a matter of fact, plans toward that objective were discussed at a midsummer convention of the U.A.W. - C.I.O. health committee in Detroit.

Detroit is one of the two major centers of mobilization on the health front. The other is the West Coast, where Henry Kaiser's Permanente Hospitals in Oakland and Vancouver are building health almost as brilliantly and unconventionally as his shipyards are building cargo boats. The story has been told in detail, first by Mr. Kaiser himself and his medical lieutenant, Dr. Sidney Garfield, in their testimony before the Senate Sub-Committee on Labor and Education and again by Paul De Kruif in his recently published *Kaiser Wakes the Doctors*. Kaiser's doctors are salaried and organized as teams of specialists. Forty per cent of the costs are paid for out of workmen's compensation money, the rest by a 50-cents-a-week payroll checkoff. The combined income not only pays for practically unlimited medical and hospital service for over 100,000 of Kaiser's employees, the majority of whom are bad medical risks, being aging and 4-F men or women; it also is amortizing the cost of Kaiser's new modern hospitals so fast they will be paid for in two years, after which the Permanente Foundation will have a considerable surplus income to be applied to new hospital buildings, research, and education. Medical care for the families of employees is provided by the California Physicians Service, which utilizes health centers established in Kaiser's housing developments.

Kaiser thinks his formula, which involves and requires full management-labor collaboration, can be applied nationally. To that end he has urged the creation of a medical R.F.C. for the financing of hospitals and group practice medical services all over the country. Like the spokesmen for the Blue Cross plans, with which vested interest Kaiser seems destined ultimately to collide, the West Coast Master Builder is against the kind of government intervention represented by the Wagner-Murray-Dingel Bill. Yet under the terms of the bill there is nothing to prevent the Sur-

geon General and the Social Security Board from contracting for service with the Permanente Hospitals; this is equally true of the U.A.W.-C.I.O.'s Medical Research Institute, the Michigan Medical Service, and all the Blue Cross Hospitalization plans for that matter.

All of these voluntary developments, of course, have been greatly aided by full wartime employment and wartime wages. None of them meets the problem of distributing health care to the tens of millions of low-income people who are not charity cases but who can't afford the still-too-high voluntary health insurance premiums. And none of them, valuable and promising as they are in many respects, represents a comprehensive program of positive health planning and health building. Nor, as already indicated, does the Wagner-Murray-Dingle Bill supply this lack, as its authors are doubtless quite aware.

The bill's chief merit, in fact, is that it is of this world, and worldly. It is "practical." And the half or quarter-loaf reforms which it envisages would not, so far as I can see, seriously obstruct the maturing forces which some day will give us the whole loaf of optimum health for all our people. In a subsequent article I hope to make some attempt to appraise these forces and chart the direction in which they seem likely to operate.

SENATORIAL STRATEGY, 1919-20: WILL IT BE REPEATED?

By WALTER JOHNSON

WHEN, ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1939, the world was plunged into war for the second time in twenty-five years, many people turned their thoughts to the problem of creating some agency that in the future would have sufficient power to maintain world peace. Shortly after the United States entered the war, President Roosevelt told Congress that the American people were not going to be satisfied with just winning the war, but that they wanted to "maintain the security of the peace that will follow." Increasingly, more and more people have felt that if the United States had joined the League of Nations in 1919 or 1920 there would have been a strong possibility that now there would not be a war ravaging the earth. In a very blunt fashion Prime Minister Winston Churchill told the American Congress on December 26, 1941, that this war need not have happened had the peace-loving nations worked together during the past twenty years. In the light of this statement, why did the United States abstain from the league? Why did the United States shirk its responsibility as a major power and generally follow an irresponsible course in world affairs?

Unfortunately the Versailles Treaty, in which the League of Nations was incorporated, was not debated in the United States Senate purely on its merits. Instead of a reasonable atmosphere to discuss this proposed method of ending wars, the air of the Senate was one of bitterness, partisanship, and hostility. Some Senators, like Henry Cabot Lodge, had a deep personal hatred for Woodrow Wilson; some Senators were personally piqued that the President had not included any members of their body on the Peace Commission; some partisan Republicans did not want to pass a peace treaty drawn up by a Democratic President since this might insure a Democratic victory in 1920. Then, of course, certain Senators were influenced by their constituents: many German-Americans were opposed to the treaty because in their opinion it was too severe on Germany; many

Italian-Americans were against the treaty because Italy had not been given Fiume; many Irish-Americans looked upon the treaty as an English plot to control the world and were particularly furious at England at that moment because of England's suppression of the Irish revolution; reactionaries were opposed to the treaty because it was not severe enough toward Germany; and, on the other hand, a number of liberals opposed the treaty because they felt that it was too harsh toward Germany.

When President Wilson presented the Versailles Treaty to the Senate on July 10, 1919, the Senate did not divide into two groups, one for the treaty and the other against. Instead, four groups were formed: (1) a pro-treaty group, composed of 43 Democrats and one Republican, who were for ratification without any qualifications; (2) the "mild reservationists," made up of about 15 Republicans, who were warmly for the treaty but desired reservations of a mild character; (3) the "strong reservationists," consisting of about 20 Republicans, who favored ratification but with "strong" reservations; and (4) the "irreconcilables," 12 Republicans and 3 Democrats, led by William E. Borah, who were opposed to ratification under any conditions.

The vast majority of the Senate, 80 out of 96, were for the treaty, although groups two and three wanted certain reservations. The problem of strategy was to present the question in such a way that the three groups favorable to the treaty could unite. The tragedy was that the treaty "failed of ratification not because a constitutional majority desired to reject the treaty but because the different groups in favor of the treaty were unable to agree on the conditions of ratification." When the two votes on ratification occurred (November 19, 1919, and March 19, 1920) the treaty was defeated not by its enemies, the "irreconcilables," but by its most ardent friends. On both occasions when the treaty with reservations came to a vote, the reservationists voted for it and the "irreconcilables," in combination with the administration Democrats (group 1), voted against it. The administration Democrats did not want to defeat the treaty. They only wanted to defeat the treaty with reservations in order that a vote could be had under more acceptable conditions. In so doing they were acting on the advice of President Wilson, who wrote to Senator Hitchcock just before the first vote was taken: "I sincerely hope that the friends and the supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge resolution of

ratification. I understand that the door will then probably be open for a more genuine resolution of ratification."

A majority of the Senators, then, desired to accept the treaty, but they could not devise the strategy necessary to bring this majority together on the vote. This favorable majority was backed up by a majority of the American public who, too, wanted to accept the treaty and entrance into the League of Nations. The *Literary Digest* conducted a poll of newspapers in April, 1919, and found that 718 were for ratification, 478 were for ratification with conditions, and only 181 were against ratification. For a long time, the idea of a league of nations had been growing in the United States. Theodore Roosevelt, speaking before the Nobel Prize Committee in 1910, advocated a League of Peace to prevent war from breaking out. After the outbreak of the World War, he wrote that "the great civilized nations of the world which do possess force, actual or immediately potential, should combine by solemn agreement in a great world league for the peace of righteousness." President Wilson was also thinking along the same lines in the fall of 1914. He told a friend that "all nations must be absorbed into some great association of nations whereby all shall guarantee the integrity of each so that any one nation violating the agreement between all of them shall bring punishment on itself automatically." Ex-President Taft expressed much the same opinion in October, 1914.

So many Americans were in agreement with these distinguished leaders that there was formed on June 17, 1915, a Committee for a League to Enforce Peace. Within a year the league had branches in almost every congressional district in the country. The organization felt that it was desirable for the United States to join a league of nations. Senator Lodge publicly gave his support to the proposal in 1916, as did Woodrow Wilson. On January 22, 1917, President Wilson told the Senate that one of the things necessary for permanent peace was a league of nations. On January 8, 1918, in his message to Congress setting forth the fourteen points on which he thought that the peace should be based, Wilson included a general association of nations to give "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike" as the last point.

When Wilson sailed for Europe in December, 1918, to attend the peace conference, he did not have, however, a completely united country

behind his desire to make a peace that would be permanent. In the mid-term Congressional elections, the Republicans had gained control of the Senate by a majority of two. Wilson, on October 25, 1918, had publicly asked the voters:

> . . . If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Representatives. . . .

He pointed out that he wanted this because a Republican Congress would divide the leadership of the nation. The Republicans in Congress had been prowar but antiadministration, and this was no time for divided leadership. Furthermore, the election of a Republican majority in either house of Congress would be considered abroad to be a repudiation of his leadership. Theodore Roosevelt denounced this appeal and repudiated Wilson's Fourteen Points. Other Republicans like Charles E. Hughes, William H. Taft, and Will Hays, chairman of the Republican National Committee, stated they did not agree that Wilson's control of the government should be unhampered nor was it necessary for the country's welfare. In the months that followed, when Taft fought shoulder to shoulder with Wilson against the leadership of his own party in the Senate for the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, one leading writer has pointed out that Taft "must have wondered whether it might have been better to have given Wilson the continued control for which he asked. Wilson was destroyed in the conflict with a Republican Congress which followed the election of 1918. . . ."[1]

The election of a Republican Senate in 1918 should not necessarily be taken as evidence that the nation thereby repudiated Wilson's leadership. A majority of the people had long been Republican and Wilson had been elected in 1912 when the Republican party had split into two wings. In each of the elections from 1914 to 1918 the Republicans had slowly regained seats in Congress. When it is remembered that there is usually a

[1]Page 37 of D. F. Fleming, *The United States and the League of Nations 1918-1920* (G. P. Putnam Sons, 1932), upon which I have drawn for a number of details stated above.

Appeals similar to Wilson's had been made before. Lincoln in 1864 had warned the people against "swapping horses in midstream"; McKinley on October 11, 1898 had asked for the election of a Republican Congress as had Governor Theodore Roosevelt and H. C. Lodge (Fleming, pp. 48-49).

reaction against the party in power at a midterm election when the Presidency is not at stake, the election of 1918 was not a great victory for the Republicans nor a great defeat for the President.[2]

As soon as the Armistice celebration had quieted, Senators Knox, Poindexter, and Reed attacked the proposal of a league of nations. Former Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana had through his correspondence been urging the defeat of a league of nations for some time. He wrote Theodore Roosevelt and Will Hays that the Republican Party would be injured if Wilson's plans were not opposed. He wrote Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican majority leader and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, that the future of the party was in his hands and that its prospects would be "seriously, perhaps fatally, injured by the acceptance of Mr. Wilson's international plan, or any variation of it." With the Democrats winning prestige for the successful prosecution of the war, some Republican politicians felt that they could not permit that party also to write a successful peace, or victory for the Republicans in 1920 would be impossible.

When Congress reassembled in December, partisan attacks were made on the way the war had been conducted and on Wilson's decision to attend the peace conference in person. Wilson's failure to include any Senator in his peace commission rankled in the breasts of some Senators.

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[2]Charles P. Howland, *American Foreign Relations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), pp. 239-246, in analyzing the result in each of the thirty-seven senatorial contests writes:

"The forces which determined the several elections were sometimes local, sometimes general. They included support for or hostility to prohibition; the tendency of the business interests, large and small, to back the Republican party; pressure for a high tariff in industrial districts; objection on the part of food producers and distributors to the fixing of food prices, especially as the South had profited enormously from unregulated cotton prices; resentment in the states where General Leonard Wood was popular that the administration had not permitted him to go to France; the attitude of the Non-Partisan League or of its anti-agrarian opponents, and the enthusiastic support by the women of those who had appealed for their new suffrages. There was virtually no issue contested and properly discussed which arose out of the policies that were the cause of our entering the war, of the degree of efficiency with which it was conducted, of the aims announced for the United States by its official spokesman, or of the effort which the United States was to put forth in the making of a durable peace."

In the next three months, the small group of irreconcilables, unalterably opposed to the League of Nations, seized the initiative in the Senate and assailed the idea of internationalism. The majority of Republicans who favored the league in some form or other remained quiet, and the country at large gained the impression that the peace was becoming a partisan issue.

Just what the role that Henry Cabot Lodge was playing in these months and those to come is not entirely clear. His apologists claim that he was honestly for a league of nations, with reservations. There is evidence, however, to demonstrate that he was out to kill the league under any circumstance, and that he considered the best way to accomplish this was through attaching reservations to the covenant. Lodge was a partisan Republican willing to sacrifice ideals or anything else to party loyalty. From 1893 to 1924, as a member of the Senate, he never departed from strict party regularity. In addition to party regularity, he hated Woodrow Wilson. Until Wilson's entrance into politics, Lodge had been known as "the scholar in politics," but this title, probably much to the bitterness of Lodge, then passed to Wilson. According to the estimate of Nicholas Murray Butler, "The figure that made the least appeal throughout all these years was that of Henry Cabot Lodge. He was able, vain, intensely egotistical, narrow-minded, dogmatic, and provincial."

Lodge was a master of parliamentary technique. By 1919 no one knew better than he the devices to be used to kill a treaty in the Senate. That Lodge would oppose a treaty drawn up by a Democratic President, and one whom he personally hated, seems obvious. In his public statements on the treaty, Lodge avoided any evidence of hostility toward the President. As Republican leader, it would have been unwise to have attacked the President. But in the book that Lodge wrote in 1925, justifying his conduct against the league, "his hatred for Wilson shines forth in its full intensity."[3]

Some of Lodge's personal associates, including a grandson, believe that Lodge sincerely was for the United States entering the league with reservations. Yet his daughter, who claimed to be close to him during the struggle, has stated:

[3]W. S. Holt, *Treaties Defeated By the Senate* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 263.

> My father hated and feared the Wilson league, and his heart was really with the irreconcilables. But it was uncertain whether this league could be beaten straight out in this way, and the object of his reservations was so to emasculate the Wilson pact that if it did pass it would be valueless. . . . My father never wanted the Wilson league, and when it was finally defeated, he was like a man from whom a great burden had been lifted.[4]

Lodge, in his book, *The Senate and the League of Nations,* admitted that he had told Senator Borah, the leader of the irreconcilables, that "any attempt to defeat the treaty of Versailles with the league by a straight vote in the Senate, if taken immediately, would be hopeless, even if it were desirable" and that the thing to do was "to proceed in the discussion of the treaty by way of amendment and reservation."

There is other information to indicate that Lodge used reservations as a method of killing the league. According to Senator James E. Watson, Lodge planned to defeat the league through this technique. Watson said to Lodge, when the latter was planning the fight against the league:

> "I don't see how we are ever going to defeat this proposition. It appears to me that eighty per cent of the people are for it. Fully that percentage of the preachers are right now advocating it, churches are very largely favoring it, all the people who have been burdened and oppressed by this awful tragedy of war and who imagine this opens a way to world peace are for it, and I don't see how it is possible to defeat it." He turned to me and said, "Ah, my dear James, I do not propose to try to beat it by direct frontal attack, but by the indirect method of reservations." "What do you mean by that?" I asked. "Illustrate it to me." He then went on to explain how, for instance, we would demand a reservation on the subject of submitting to our government the assumption of a mandate over Armenia, or any other foreign country. "We can debate that for days and hold up the dangers that it will involve and the responsibilities we will assume if we pursue that course, and we can thoroughly satisfy the country that it would be a most abhorrent policy for us to adopt." . . . Senator Lodge then went on for two hours to explain other reservations, and went into the details of the situation that would be thus evolved, until I became thoroughly satisfied that the treaty could be beaten in that way.[5]

There is also evidence that Lodge desired to kill the treaty by attaching reservations unacceptable to Wilson, in order that the responsibility for the defeat would then fall upon the President. Lodge wrote later:

> There was another object which I had very much at heart, and that was that if we were successful in putting on reservations we should create a situation

[4]*The New York Herald Tribune,* March 7, 1930.

[5]James E. Watson, *As I Knew Them* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1936), pp. 190-191.

where, if the acceptance of the treaty was defeated, the Democratic party, and especially Mr. Wilson's friends, should be responsible for its defeat, and not the opponents of the treaty who were trying to pass it in a form safe for the United States.

As yet, evidence in the form of letters or memoirs, has not come to light which would definitely indicate that the irreconcilables knew that Lodge was fighting for them from the camp of the reservationists. However, Lodge was close to them during the fight and consulted with them on most major decisions. When former Senator Beveridge urged a more aggressive policy on Lodge to defeat the league, he replied agreeing with the ends sought but differing as to the method to obtain them.

The initial plans to attack the league were made by Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt in December, 1918. Although no draft of the league covenant had as yet been published, these two men planned to attack whatever league proposal the President brought home. On the floor of the Senate on December 21, Lodge made a speech, intended for the ears of the Allies, in which he warned that if certain "extraneous provisions" —i.e. The League of Nations—were to be found in the treaty of peace, then they would be struck out or amended by the United States Senate.

The text of the covenant of the league was first published in American papers on February 15, 1919. Immediately, the small minority of irreconcilables rallied to the attack. There can be no question that the majority of Republican Senators wanted the United States to join the league. They saw some shortcomings in it, but they felt that it was bigger than the shortcomings. The most active Senators in debate, however, were the opponents of the league. Lodge, as Republican leader, had a difficult time in preserving party unity, but he struck upon a device to accomplish this. On March 3, in the Senate, he introduced a resolution signed by thirty-seven Republican Senators and Senators-elect of the next Congress to the effect that the peace treaty should be signed immediately and that the question of a "league of nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should then be taken up for careful and serious consideration." The real purpose of the round robin was to commit more than one-third of the Republican Senators to a policy of united, partisan action on the treaty. This policy was a victory for the irreconcilables, since one of them, Senator Brandegee, had first suggested it to Lodge. Although this was a victory for the irreconcilables, it was not a complete one. In order to gain

the signatures of many Republican Senators, a statement had to be inserted in the resolution that the signers could not accept the constitution of the league "in the form now proposed." If changes were made, many of the signers were still free to accept the league.

When Lodge was discussing future plans, shortly after this round robin, with Borah, he had to admit that "the vocal classes of the community, most of the clergymen, the preachers of sermons, a large element in the teaching force of the universities, a large proportion of the newspaper editors, and finally the men and women who were in the habit of writing and speaking for publication, although by no means thoroughly informed, were friendly to the league as it stood, and were advocating it." A month later Lodge admitted that a majority of the people favored the league. Outstanding Republicans outside the Senate, like former-President Taft and A. Lawrence Lowell, were actively campaigning for the league. When the covenant of the league was changed by the peace conference to meet the principal American objections, it was possible for the signers of the round robin to accept the league. Senator Hitchcock, the acting Democratic leader, had written Wilson: "A number of Republican Senators who signed Lodge's manifesto on the League of Nations will, in my opinion, vote for it nevertheless, if it is a part of the peace treaty. A still larger number will give it support if certain amendments are made." Taft and Lowell wired Wilson along the same vein, and the American delegation at Paris secured the consent of other nations to changes on certain points. These points were: (1) a recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by name; (2) exclusion of domestic questions like immigration and the tariff from the league's jurisdiction; (3) right of withdrawal from the league; (4) right to refuse to accept a mandate over territory.

When the new Congress met in special session on May 19, 1919 the irreconcilable Republicans gained a great advantage. The Republicans controlled the Senate by a majority of two, and thus they would have a majority on each committee. In control of the Committee on Foreign Relations, they could delay or hasten action on the treaty. When the composition of the committee was announced, of the ten Republican members six were openly irreconcilable. The other four were Lodge, the chairman, who was really irreconcilable; McCumber, the most outspoken Re-

publican for the league; and two party regulars, Harding and New, who would follow the party leaders. Lodge seems to have deliberately packed the Republican membership of the committee with men hostile to the League. Thus he gained the power to keep the treaty in the committee's hands, while a campaign was launched to arouse public sentiment against the league. Millionaires H. C. Frick and Andrew W. Mellon contributed money, and a propaganda campaign consisting of mailings and speaking tours was started. The following advertisement is an example of their propaganda campaign:

Americans, Awake!

Shall We Bind Ourselves to the War Breeding Covenant?
It Impairs American Sovereignty!
Surrenders the Monroe Doctrine!
Flouts Washington's Warning!
Entangles Us In European and Asiatic Intrigues!
Sends Our Boys To Fight Throughout the World by Order of a League!
The Evil Thing With a Holy Name!

While this minority was working against the league, evidence continued to pile up of the great support that the league had among the people. Thirty-two state legislatures endorsed the league and two others made a conditional endorsement. Thirty-three governors of states, also, had endorsed a league of nations.

On July 10, the day after he returned from France, Wilson presented the treaty of peace to the Senate. The Committee on Foreign Affairs kept it in their hands for two months. They had to delay in this way in order to defeat the treaty, because, as one of the irreconcilables, Senator Moses, later said, if the rules of the Senate had permitted a quick vote, "the Versailles Treaty would have been ratified without reservation." In order to stall, the committee read the treaty aloud line by line. This required two weeks. Then, the next six weeks were devoted to permitting representatives of national groups that felt that the treaty was not fair to their homeland to vent their rage. It was natural for the irreconcilables to stir up this opposition to the treaty among foreign elements in the United States.

On September 10, the Committee on Foreign Relations presented its majority report to the Senate. The irreconcilables realized by now that they could not persuade the majority of the Republicans in the Senate to

reject the treaty. Not one of the irreconcilables signed a report calling for rejection. Instead, they followed the advice of Lodge and proceeded "by way of amendment and reservation." With Lodge, Harding, and New, they recommended forty-five amendments and four reservations to the covenant of the league. The minority report, filed by six of the seven Democratic members, urged acceptance of the treaty without change. Senator McCumber, the tenth Republican on the committee, filed his own minority report in which he rebuked the partisanship of the majority:

> . . . Not one word is said, not a single allusion made, concerning either the great purpose of the League of Nations or the methods by which those purposes are to be accomplished.
>
> Irony and sarcasm have been substituted for argument and positions taken by the press or individuals outside the Senate seem to command more attention than the treaty itself. It is regrettable that the animosity which centers almost wholly against the League of Nations provisions should have been engendered against a subject so important to the world's welfare. It is regrettable that the consideration of a matter so foreign to any kind of partisanship should be influenced in the country, as well as on the floor of this Senate, by hostility toward or subserviency to the President of the United States. No matter how just may be any antagonism toward President Wilson, the aspirations and hopes of a wounded and bleeding world ought not to be denied because, under the Constitution, the treaty must first be formulated by him.

The majority report did not reflect the sentiment of the Senate. While the treaty was in committee, the debates on the floor of the Senate had demonstrated that the majority of the Republicans were going to vote for entrance into the league. Some wanted strong reservations, others mild, but both groups wanted acceptance of the treaty. The irreconcilables had failed to hold a majority to rejection, and admitted this in their majority report. Now their approach was to hold all Republicans together by a program of amendments or reservations. The Wilson Democrats had two courses of action. They might reach an agreement with the mild reservationists and detach them from the other Republicans, or they could refuse any concessions and possibly win some Republican Senators who would be willing to give up any reservations rather than have the treaty rejected.

It was this last course of action that they decided to follow. Wilson publicly made no suggestion that he might accept mild reservations. To

his Senate leader, Hitchcock, he gave a list of reservations that he would accept if necessary, but Wilson took no public step to win the support of the mild reservationist Republicans. Wilson apparently felt that either it was not necessary to accept any reservations, or he was afraid that concessions so early might lead to further demands. In September, the President started on a tour of the nation to arouse the people to vigorous support of the league. On this tour he collapsed and returned to Washington, broken and paralyzed. With his collapse, the most powerful protagonist of the league could fight no more.

The debate in the Senate, following the reports of the Committee on Foreign Relations, was one replete with a great deal of demagoguery. The opponents of the league pandered to popular and national prejudices. They stated that the United States would become entangled in the broils of Europe; that the United States would lose its national sovereignty; that the league was a device for the British Empire to rule the world, since the Dominions as well as Great Britain had a vote; that the majority of countries in the league would be Catholic and thus the league would be under the Pope. They also tried to rally support by denouncing English activities in Ireland and the wrongs done to China in Shantung.

In October the voting began on the amendments. The mild reservationists joined with the almost solid Democratic membership, and all the amendments were defeated. On November 7, the voting began on the reservations, and then the mild reservationists joined with the rest of the Republicans to attach these to the treaty. When the treaty with fourteen reservations came to a vote on November 19, it was rejected by a vote of 39 to 55. Ratification was supported by the reservationist Senators and was opposed by the irreconcilables in combination with the Wilson Democrats, who voted for rejection in hopes of getting final ratification later on just the question of the league as it stood in the treaty of peace. McCumber, just before the vote was taken, pled with the administration Democrats to accept what could be obtained rather than lose everything, but Wilson sent a letter to them to vote against the treaty with reservations. Wilson did this in expectation that a favorable vote could be obtained without any reservations, and also that if the United States placed conditions on its entrance to the league, other nations might do the same and the league would be greatly weakened.

The Senate's action came as a shock to the nation. As one authority has written, "It seemed absurd that the national policy adopted should be the one advocated by only seventeen Senators. Common sense revolted at seeing the votes of seventy-eight Senators to enter the League nullified because they could not agree among themselves on the terms of entry." Immediately the Senate voted to reconsider the question in the next session. The bewilderment of the people at the action taken by the Senate can well be imagined from the observations of Ida Tarbell, who made a speaking tour of the west in the interests of the league in the summer of 1919:

> As the days went by, I sensed a growing bewilderment at the fight against the league. These people had listened for years to people they honored urging some form of international union against war. They had heard Dr. Jordan and Jane Addams preaching a national council for the prevention of war, President Taft advocating a league to enforce peace. In many of these towns there had been chapters of these societies. . . . With such a background, was it strange that many people in the Northwest should have been puzzled that the Congress of the United States was seemingly more and more determined that we should not join this first attempt of the civilized world to find susbtitutes for war in international quarrels?

When the demand swept the country for a compromise between the league Democrats and the reservationists even Lodge felt compelled to go into a conference on the question. He did so, however, from his own admission with no idea of compromising. He refused to admit that the treaty had been defeated because of verbal differences between the pro-league groups. According to Lodge, the difference between those who supported the treaty and those who opposed it was "not verbal, but vital and essential." By this he could only have meant that the difference between the irreconcilables (of which he really was one) and the administration Democrats was vital, because the difference between the reservationists (strong and mild) and the administration Democrats was one only of a verbal nature or at least of strategy.

A bipartisan conference met to discuss a method of common action between the reservationists and the Wilson Democrats. This conference failed, however, to work out a plan of action. The irreconcilables and the reservationists voted together to add reservations to the treaty, which were without essential changes from those of November 19. In spite of the fact that they voted for adding reservations to the league, on the ques-

tion of ratification of the treaty with these reservations, there was no doubt but that the irreconcilables would vote against. The question was whether enough Democrats would realize that there was no alternative but to vote for reservations or the treaty would be defeated. Again, however, Wilson wrote a letter from his sickbed urging his followers to oppose the treaty with the reservations. He still had faith that the public wanted the league, and he was willing to wait for the approaching presidential election to serve as a popular referendum on the subject.

The vote on March 19, 1920, on the question of ratification of the treaty with reservations, resulted in a majority of the votes cast being for the ratification, but not the requisite two-thirds majority, forty-nine being in favor and thirty-five being opposed. Some Democrats who had voted against in November voted *for* this second time, but there were still enough administration Democrats who carried out Wilson's desire that they vote against, and the treaty was defeated. For the second time, the responsibility for the defeat lies not alone with the irreconcilables but with the league's warmest friends. If Wilson had not been quite so uncompromising in his position, the treaty with reservations could easily have passed.

This possibility greatly disturbed some of the irreconcilables. One of them mentioned to Lodge that Wilson might accept the reservations and then the country would be in the league. Lodge's reply was:

> ". . . you do not take into consideration the hatred that Woodrow Wilson has for me personally. Never under any set of circumstances in this world could he be induced to accept a treaty with Lodge reservations appended to it!" "But," I replied, "that seems to me to be rather a slender thread on which to hang so great a cause." "A slender thread!" he answered "Why, it is as strong as any cable with its strands wired and twisted together."[6]

That Lodge carefully estimated and studied Wilson at every step can be seen from Lodge's own book. After admitting that there was a possibility that the treaty might pass with the reservations, he observes that ". . . I also felt convinced that President Wilson would prevent the acceptance of the treaty with reservations if he possibly could. I based this opinion on the knowledge which I had acquired as to Mr. Wilson's temperament, intentions, and purposes." On the final page of his book Lodge repeats this same thought: "As the strenuous days which were filled by the con-

[6]James E. Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

test over the League of Nations passed by, almost every one bringing its difficulty and its crucial question, I made no mistake in my estimate of what President Wilson would do under certain conditions."

Although President Wilson called for the presidential election of 1920 to serve as a great national referendum on the question of the league, it did not serve this purpose. The league was actively debated during the campaign, but the majority of seven million for Harding cannot be translated into a majority of seven million against the league. The Republican platform was ambiguous, but it did advocate entrance of the United States into an international association of nations. In the platform committee there was a spectacular fight between the proleague Republicans and the irreconcilables. There was a move to adopt a plank favoring the league with the Lodge reservations, but Lodge prevented this plank from being included. This action of Lodge's tends to prove that he always had been an irreconcilable and had used reservations only as a technique to defeat the league.

During the campaign, Harding interpreted the plank on some occasions to be proleague and on other occasions to be antileague. This equivocal stand was, of course, designed to confuse the voters and muddle the issue. Near the end of the campaign Harding seemed more and more to favor an international league. All this time the Democrats were campaigning for the League of Nations without reservations. Outstanding Republicans like former-President Taft and Herbert Hoover campaigned for Harding and made it plain that they considered support for Harding equivalent to support of the League of Nations. On October 14, 1920, thirty-one leading Republicans, including Elihu Root, Charles E. Hughes, Henry L. Stimson, Herbert Hoover, and William Allen White, issued a public statement that a vote for Harding would be the surest way of indicating that the citizen favored joining the league.

Probably thousands of voters took these men at their word. In the light of their statement and the, at times, proleague stand of Harding, many proleague citizens undoubtedly voted for the Republican candidate. Calvin Coolidge, in a post-election statement, observed:

> I doubt if any particular mandate was given at the last election on the question of the League of Nations and if that was the preponderant issue. In the South, where there was decided opposition to the league, they voted the Democratic ticket. And as far as the League of Nations was concerned in the

> North, the vote was with equal and even greater preponderance in favor of the Republican ticket. Of course, many men voted thus who were in favor of the league. With them it became simply a question of supporting the Republican or Democratic party. So you can't say that there was a preponderance of votes against the League of Nations.

The entire story of the fight in the Senate and in the campaign of 1920 demonstrates that the American people never had the opportunity squarely to vote for the League of Nations. During the present World War, there is great discussion of the need of an international association of nations. The American people should remember that it will be the Senate that will pass on the treaty of peace. They must see to it that Senators of the Lodge type do not manipulate the majority and so confuse the issue that there is never the opportunity of a clear vote for or against internationalism. They must see to it that the Senators for internationalism are not divided over what strategy to follow, and then permit division over strategy to play into the hands of the opposition. The public should also remember that although a sincere belief in isolationism motivated certain irreconcilables like Borah, others like Lodge were moved primarily by party considerations and personal hatred. The people should see to it then that the question of a lasting peace does not degenerate again into a petty and partisan dispute. With the full knowledge that a refusal by the United States to join an international organization after this war means international chaos and further wars, the people should make sure that a small minority of Senators does not violate the will of the majority as it did in 1919 and 1920.

That the strategy of 1919 and 1920 may be repeated in the next year or two is only too apparent. Already the individuals that are opposed to the United States cooperating with other nations to maintain world peace are warning the people that such a step will endanger the sovereignty of the United States. They are, also, stating as their predecessors did in 1919 and 1920 that the United States would have only one vote in an international structure while each dominion within the British Empire would have one vote. This, they allege, would make such an international structure a device for the British Empire to rule the world. Warnings against creating a "super state" are heard from such senators as Brooks of Illinois, mouthpiece of the *Chicago Tribune*.

Once again, however, the isolationists, or nationalists as they prefer to be called, realize they cannot defeat American entrance into an international organization by a direct attack. Instead they are following the policy of dividing the proponents of internationalism by using the emotional words "sovereignty," "entangling alliances," "meddling," and "super state." The Republican Postwar Advisory Council, which met at Mackinac Island, Michigan, in September, 1943, reflected the bitter fight between the nationalists and internationalists for control of the Republican Party by adopting a statement reminiscent of the Republican platform of 1920. The meeting went on record as favoring "responsible participation by the United States in postwar cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world." On the adoption of this resolution internationalists and nationalists warmly clasped each other and praised the declaration. Internationalists like Senator Austin of Vermont and Governor Baldwin of Connecticut interpreted it as an endorsement of American membership in a United Nations Council. Clare Hoffman of Michigan and other similar voices of confusion hailed it as a ringing affirmation of "American sovereignty" and "constitutionalism"—meaningless terms except that they are steps to obstruct a lasting peace. In order to maintain party harmony, just as in 1920, a vague pronouncement was adopted.[7] To make sure that a lasting peace will not be betrayed again, the people should elect to office only those members of the Grand Old Party who will not follow the strategy once used by Henry Cabot Lodge and thus wreck hopes for a peaceful world.

In the fall of 1944 a president and one-third of the United States Senate will be elected to office. As a result of the midterm election of 1942 the Republicans came close to gaining a majority in the Senate. If in 1944 the Republicans gain control of the Senate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be in their hands. Since the Senate operates on the basis

[7]Something similar happened with the passage of the Connally postwar resolution by the Senate on November 5. We owe a debt of gratitude to such Senators as Ball and Pepper who fought to prevent passage of the originally weak resolution until the Moscow Pacts came out and an assertion from them could be incorporated in the resolution. But how much does passage of the resolution guarantee? Some of those Senators who voted for the amended resolution said that they considered it meaningless and that it did not commit them in the future.

of seniority, a Republican Senate would automatically place in the key positions on the Foreign Relations Committee Hiram W. Johnson, Arthur Capper, Arthur H. Vandenberg, and Gerald P. Nye, none of whom has displayed any convincing belief in real internationalism. The memory of the Lodge sabotage of the League of Nations in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1919 should make the citizen pause and realize that an unwise vote in the fall of 1944 may start a chain of events that could lead to a repetition of 1919 and 1920.

A repetition of 1919 and 1920 would mean disaster for the United States. In the "One World" of the present, as Wendell Willkie has so aptly phrased it, only constant strife and turmoil faces a nation that refuses to work with other nations for the common good. Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, realizing this, expressed the aspirations of the common man for true internationalism based on freedom and justice when he said, "We shall fight for a complete peace as well as a complete victory. The People's Revolution is on the march, and the Devil and all his angels cannot prevail against it. . . . Strong in the strength of the Lord, we who fight in the people's cause will never stop until that cause is won."

SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

By M. C. OTTO

ALL HUMANISMS have one thing in common. It is the ideal of realizing mankind's completest development. From here on they diverge. The most far-reaching disagreement turns on the question whether man is or is not absolutely distinct from everything else in the hierarchy of earthly existences. It is at this point that the designation of one humanism as scientific takes on significance.

What does scientific mean in this connection? It means that human beings are viewed naturalistically. They are placed in the natural world along with the lower animals, plants, rocks, minerals, and star clusters. Their intellectual, moral, and aesthetic powers, their ideas of decency, their feelings of good will, all they are and aspire to be is looked upon as the consummation of a long evolution from the animal status. Scientific humanism is a form of naturalism.

This is part of the answer. The rest of it is that the scientific humanist is wholeheartedly committed to the use of scientific method. He favors its extension to moral and social problems of every kind, and he believes that a correct understanding of scientific procedure permits this to be done. As a rule this procedure is so narrowly defined that it cannot be applied to human beings in their actuality, to human interests as they are experienced, or even to the world of which human beings are aware. Take Sir Arthur Eddington's example of the elephant sliding down a grassy hillside. From the viewpoint of physics the elephant fades out and is replaced by the reading of the pointer indicating a certain mass. The hillside disappears and its place is taken by the reading of a plumb line against the divisions of a protractor. In the same way the descent becomes a pointer-reading on the seconds' dial of a watch. The result is, says this professor of astronomical physics, that what really slides is a bundle of pointer-readings, and the sliding is a function of space and time measures. There is simply no elephant to slide down a hill and no hill for an elephant to slide down. "The whole subject matter of exact science," as thus conceived, "consists of pointer readings and similar indications."

Ordinarily, when we think of science, it is this kind of science we think of. Our notion of scientific method is our notion of what goes on in physical or chemical laboratories, including what we believe to be the special kind of subject matter dealt with in them. Consequently, we conclude that if man is to be studied scientifically he must be reduced to a mindless, indeed lifeless, concourse of material entities, to atoms, electrons, or even to more abstract elements. And a purely material assemblage or a pattern of abstract entities is certainly anything but human.

Suppose, however, that we broaden our idea of science, as in the end I think we must, to take in every field of knowledge where a sufficiently painstaking effort is made to establish conclusions on a thorough-going examination of relevant fact. In that case the word scientific takes on a meaning to correspond. We may then say that a method of investigation is scientific to the extent that it exemplifies the ideal of objective verification. Objective verification is of course a kind of technical shorthand. It has to be broken down into a statement of particulars, and I shall presently attempt to enumerate those particulars. But before undertaking to do this it may be well to note that a certain broadening in the meaning of scientific has taken place in the development of science itself.

There appears to be general agreement that for the most perfect exemplification of scientific method we must go to physics. From there on down through chemistry, physiology, biology, and the rest, factors are thought to intrude which render the investigation, from the standpoint of exactness, more and more impure. For that matter, even physics is impure when compared with mathematics. Shall we say then that, strictly speaking, there is but one science? Some have made just this claim. And many who do not say so, act as if they believed it, for they try their best to bring the material with which they deal into the closest possible resemblance to that of physical science, even though in the attempt they completely distort their proper subject matter.

This surely creates more problems than it solves. For one thing, if physics, chemistry, physiology, biology are not sciences, what are they? Yet if the meaning of scientific need not be limited to the exactest science, but may designate types of investigation which fall short of scientific methodology in its purest form, what ground is there for arbitrarily ruling out any type of inquiry that aims at objective verification? For another thing, if we insist upon holding to the conventional conception of

scientific, in what terms shall we make a proper and much needed distinction between loose and rigorous thinking in the solution of problems not dealt with by the natural sciences?

In line with this revised conception, here are five requirements of objective verification:

1. Formulation of only such problems as can be solved by an appeal to facts in the external world. 2. Gathering of facts and, so far as possible, all obtainable facts pertinent to the problem. 3. The subjection of facts, inferences, hypotheses, generalizations, to a test admitted to be decisive, publicly applicable, open to the scrutiny of friend or foe. 4. Progressive building up of verification in which different investigators participate. 5. Recognition of the provisional result of even the most exacting demonstration, hence the relativity of all knowledge.

Of these requirements, the one of chief significance is the third. Probably all the others would follow from the appeal to a "publicly applicable" test, rigorously interpreted. Of course everybody who engages in an investigation worthy of the name appeals to facts and uses criteria to determine what knowledge his facts yield. Not everybody, however, appeals to the kind of facts or uses the kind of criteria of knowledge which can be judged by others than the investigator himself. On the contrary, certain claims to the possession of truth, regarded as the highest truth at that, are frankly declared to rely on criteria which are and must be strictly private. Moreover, there are so-called facts and truths which have logical force providing they can count on a "will to believe." They are powerless to convince a critic who demands to be "shown." In contrast with attitudes likes these, scientific method calls for willingness to try conclusions by the application of a test that is recognized as definitive whatever may be the hopes or fears of investigator or critic.

A simple description of scientific procedure by a man of science will make all this clear. It occurs, as it were incidentally, in a discussion by Lewis G. Westgate of a geological problem, and seems to me admirably put:

> Science is a growth, a series of approximations; as it advances some old views are discarded, new views introduced. The discarded views are seen in the light of fuller knowledge to be in error. Inadequate approximations would be a better characterization; they were the best formulation the earlier science could make.

The individual worker

> builds on the work of his predecessors, sometimes on their errors. By his own field work and thought he corrects some of these errors and adds new material. . . . His published results bring the matter out into the open for discussion and criticism by his fellow workers. His errors can be challenged by other facts unknown to him. His statements may suggest other studies, which may or may not corroborate his views. And so science advances by a process of trial and error, ever working toward a more truthful generalization.

There it is: the collection of data or facts in the outside world; the suggested solution brought out into the open to be tested by critical thinking and active field work; the development of a conclusion supported by cooperative examination and verification; the recognition of the approximate truth of the best established position. Now why should anyone doubt the feasibility of adapting this technique to every field where problems are to be solved? The difficulty of its application grows, to be sure, with the irreducible complexity of certain problems, and with the presence in men of prejudicial habits of thought or feeling which interfere with objective inquiry. But this in no way invalidates the claim that, properly understood, scientific method is applicable to areas from which it is conventionally thought to be barred.

Summarizing this phase of our study we may say that the scientific humanist sees no valid ground for believing men and women to be isolated or insulated creatures in nature. On the contrary, he regards them as strictly integrant to the great complexity of things, living and nonliving, which is commonly spoken of as the world. In conformity with this naturalistic interpretation the scientific humanist rejects both pure Reason and Revelation as sources of light for the understanding of human nature or the art of life. For his part he tries to emulate as best he can in his own field of interest the temper of mind and the workmanship of scientists.

II

We turn now to the other word in the title—humanism. I was just saying that the scientific humanist looks upon man as belonging altogether to the order of nature. I did not say that he thinks man identical with the lower animals, not to speak of lifeless matter. The fact is that no other humanist so consistently exalts man, or looks with equal generosity upon his *humanitas,* upon those attributes which differentiate man

from all other living creatures. In a word, the scientific humanist does not lose any of his interest in the human aspect of human nature because he aspires to be scientific in his thinking.

Critics make short work of this avowed dual responsibility. Few of them think it worth while to examine the position. They simply rely upon derogatory names as if these had power to kill. The critics acknowledge that science has a large place in modern life. Sometimes they even advise that education should by all means introduce the student to some knowledge of science. But what do they expect from science? This is their answer: "From scientific investigation we may expect an understanding of scientific knowledge. We are confusing the issue and are demanding what we have no right to ask if we seek to learn from science the goals of human life and of organized society." Rarely do we find anything beyond this bare assertion. Any attempt to extend scientific method beyond the physical substance of things is dubbed "the cult of scientism," a "cult" that "does a disservice to both science and civilization." Perhaps that should kill scientific humanism on the spot, or even better, cause it to crawl off to die in some out-of-the-way corner.

It is, however, an interesting and happy fact that people will try to do, and sometimes succeed in doing, things they are told cannot be done. Either they do not know or do not believe that the things are impossible. The scientific humanist is one of those people. In spite of reiterated arguments purporting to show that the very attempt is irrational, he persists in trying to extend scientific thinking to every kind of individual and social problem. And what is more, he succeeds. Let us consider two or three great human goals or ends, observe how he reinterprets them, and then decide whether his view is as sterile culturally as the opponents charge.

III

Among the great goals of man's long endeavor is truth. In one of his poems Stephen Crane tells of two travelers. The first traveler calls truth a rock, a mighty fortress, and claims that he has often been to it, even to its highest towers. The second traveler likens truth to a phantom, which, though he has long pursued it, has always eluded his grasp. "And I believed the second traveler," says the poet.

This disjunctive proposition—that truth is either absolute or there is no truth at all—puts before us an article of popular theory as widely held, I believe, as any that could be mentioned. Now a little observation of people shows that they hold to this disjunction in a curious manner. If a man feels sure that a belief is true, and another feels as sure that the contrary is true, and neither of them knows of any way to adjudicate the disagreement, both of them will as a rule agree that a thing may be true for one person and untrue for another. In doing so each takes the position that truth is absolute and, at the same time, that there is no truth at all. For surely a type of truth which rests solely upon personal conviction is about as variable as you please. Between such truth and truth as a shadow or a phantom there is nothing to choose.

The scientific humanist refuses to play fast and loose with truth in this manner. He places too high a value on it to let it go at that. Convinced that it is important for men to have *true* ideas, and that *un*true ideas do them harm, sometimes irreparable harm, he thinks it necessary to reach a better conception of the truth situation. And as he looks about he discovers that the truths men live by are not in either of the classes referred to by Stephen Crane. They are not true in any *absolute* sense, yet are not mere *fantasies,* either. They are as true as the tests by which they are established are reliable; no more true, but also no less true. That is what is meant by calling truth relative; it is dependent truth.

Many persons seem to think that relative truth means less than truth; a sort of truth; pseudo-truth. What it actually means is *related* truth; truth in the contexts of some kind of ongoing experience and in conformity with the kind of measure used in that context. For instance, there is no *absolute* quart, pound, or inch floated down from heaven to some receptive spirit, and no one thinks there is; yet no one takes the position that quarts, pounds, inches may be anything anyone pleases. We insist upon having true measures of value where quarts, pounds, inches are used in our dealings with one another. And if any dispute arises, we can go to the place where the master-standard is on exhibition.

That we have accurate weights and measures for meat, groceries, milk, potatoes, gasoline, cloth, boards, and such things, and not for what we call spiritual attainment or for measuring progress in the good life, is an accident of our history. We have done "field work" in the one case and

not in the other; we have appreciated the advantage to all concerned of specific and common means of verification in buying and selling, while we have generally remained satisfied with abstract, individual, frequently purely verbal verification in ethics, religion, and philosophies of life. Possibly this proves that most of us think more highly of the business of buying and selling than we do of mental development and growth in character. Or the explanation may be that it is considerably easier to come to an agreement on tests of quantity than of quality.

At any rate, the scientific humanist takes the position that when something is spoken of as true it is presumed to measure up to the test by which the true is distinguished from the untrue in some field of operation. He therefore does not spend time trying to make contact with Truth as a spiritual essence which hovers above the earth out of reach of human contamination. He labors to invent and put into practice better and better truth tests, especially in areas of human interest where the need to do this has received and still receives little attention. He does "field work" in the service of social idealism. In his effort to improve truth tests he shows his scientific bent; his humanistic bent is shown in the determination to extend the use of such improved truth tests to all the phases of individual and communal experience where the better potentialities of human beings may either turn out well or come to naught.

This buckling down to the task of furthering the true as against the false in the big and little affairs of everyday, although it is not highly regarded by the devotee of absolute and abstract Truth, happens to be the kind of truth-concern upon which progress in the attainment of truer beliefs, attitudes, and ideas depends. Truth from this point of view is a collective name for a sum of particular truths, as true as they are and no truer. Since the scientific humanist consistently endeavors to improve the standard of the true precisely where there is greatest need that this be done, it should be obvious that truth has a place of unusual honor in scientific humanism.

IV

Another of the great human goals is moral character. In that impressive book, *The Dawn of Conscience,* J. E. Breasted undertakes to show how the idea of right, as distinguished from wrong in the ethical sense,

had its origin in Egypt 4,000 or more years ago. Early in occidental history authority in the realm of moral ideas and ideals was taken over by church religion. In the course of time secular life took it away again. But long association with theology left its mark. The belief, not to say illusion, for which this association is responsible, that morality must be defined and vitalized "from on high," is still with us. Likewise the alleged antagonism between character and wants or desires. Innumerable people continue to believe that there is something shameful, if not pathological, about desires. What they spontaneously think of when they hear the word moral or immoral is sex. Sex desire, taken to be the most unruly, leaps to the foreground of the mind because the inherited conception of morality is essentially the mastery of desire by something in man higher than desire.

The scientific humanist does what he can to liberate himself from this prejudice against desires. He accepts with hope the fact that men and women have wants and desires. He believes that the human energies called desires are the only driving power we have to help us toward the good life—the happy life as well as the noble life. The good life involves more than desires: intelligence, knowledge, imagination, and at its best, creativeness of a high order. But desires are the life of the whole business. Not to recognize this openly and frankly has no end of unhappy results. Desires are made to work themselves out surreptitiously, abnormally. Maliciousness, coarseness, brutality can cloak themselves in sanctity. The fanatic gets the opportunity to step forth as moral dictator.

Does the scientific humanist then refuse to divide desires into good and bad? In one sense, yes; in another sense, no. Anything a person wants he wants because it appears good. That is why he wants it. I say "appears," rather than "is," for no better reason than to avoid immediate disagreement. Whether it is wants or needs or obligations he goes out for, he believes them good to have. If he believed them bad to have he would not want them. However, every one soon finds out, and finds out again and again, that the wanted, the good, can not be isolated from antecedents and consequences. These antecedents and consequences may in certain cases not be wanted at all. And sometimes upon reflection the not-wanted aspect so outweighs the wanted that the offering as a whole fails to appeal and so is not regarded as good. And every person soon finds out that his

own wants and the wants of others overlap in ways to further or to thwart each other. It turns out, moreover, that every individual is interested in wants of other individuals, wanting some of them satisfied and some not. Thus the wanted and the not-wanted are frequently tied up in one package.

A desire is morally bad when the desirer insists on having what he wants in disregard of his want's unwanted concomitants. A desire is bad when the desirer insists upon having what he wants no matter what holes he tears in the fabric of human interdependence without which no life can approach all-over satisfactoriness.

This interpretation of character and the good life implies that everybody is desirous of finding life as livable as possible; that the goal of life, to put it in a word, is happiness. Is this a valid assumption? There are those who deny it. Alexander Meiklejohn, for example, contends that the objective is not happiness but a personal quality which he calls "excellence." His moral philosophy is socially conscious, clean and fine-spirited, free from the conceit of learning, high-minded and intentionally austere. I introduce a quotation from his book *What Does America Mean?* in order to sharpen the humanistic argument for the dignity of desires.

In Mr. Meiklejohn's view, "It is not imperative that any individual, or any nation, or even the race itself, should continue to be happy, should even continue to exist. It is imperative that so long as we live, we do so with taste and intelligence, with fineness and generosity." And the reason is this: "Many things are worse than unhappiness. But nothing is worse than being contemptible." The scientific humanist agrees with the college student who, having read Mr. Meiklejohn, made this comment: "Yes, let us include among our desires the desire for taste, intelligence, fineness, generosity, for they are helps in the production of happiness. Many things are worse than being contemptible. But nothing is worse than being unhappy. The worst thing about being contemptible is that it makes you so damn unhappy."

Looking back over this section, it is obvious that the analysis is oversimple. Possibly it is not too simple for the present purpose, which is to spotlight the distinctive element in the moral attitude from the standpoint under review. No desire liveth to itself or dieth to itself. At bottom the difference between the moral and the immoral or nonmoral attitude is

the presence in the former, and its absence from the latter, of scrutiny and appraisal of desires with regard to their effect upon what was just called all-over satisfactoriness. Satisfactoriness may of course be envisaged broadly or narrowly; may be restricted to pleasurable excitement, physical convenience, social prominence, the exercise of power, or include appreciation of art, music, literature, religion, philosophy. It may be bounded by the welfare of the self or the family, or be touched by interests as wide as the world. While the practical necessity of acting will inevitably impose limits, the measure of moral personality is sensitiveness to the consequences of desiring what is desired. Naturalistic in outlook as scientific humanism is, and thus at pains to vindicate desires, it is, being also humanistic in outlook, at equal pains to emphasize the need for criticism and discipline. The ideal is that desires shall spring up spontaneously, freely, and differently in response to the richest, most various goods, and that this dynamic exuberance shall be matched by well developed habits of critical appraisal and intelligent choice.

We conclude, then, that the moral ideal here outlined cannot fairly be described as a cheap, superficially conceived, or easily realized ideal. To commit oneself to it is to undertake a difficult, complicated, often elusive assignment. Even moderate success in it calls for thoughtful application and takes time. One may know at a given moment what it is one wants, but whether it would still be wanted were there a looking before and after, whether the wanted is also, when well considered, the wantable, that is not so easy to be clear about. Still, with some people it becomes second nature to seek a genuinely richer, worthier, happier life-experience, and they show remarkable expertness in discovering the right means and ends. It would be a long step in advance if public education naturally introduced the young to this way of life and prepared them for effectiveness in it. There are teachers who do just that, and some day they may be the majority. Some day, too, the world of affairs may encourage instead of discourage moral progress. And while in some respects each one must define and realize the good life for himself, no one can attain his moral growth except in reciprocal relationship with other human beings, so that there is the additional problem of making our way together toward a social arrangement which provides the indispensable opportunities.

All this is part of the scientific humanist's moral program. It is an ironical fact that the humanist who regards it as essential that all wants be related to disciplined taste, and who is everlastingly stressing the need for informed criticism of the self and of society, should be accused of working against moral idealism and moral integrity.

V

Now what of man's religious interest? Does this humanism unite the religious and the scientific outlooks? The answer depends, as answers so often do, on how the terms are defined. We have adopted a meaning for *scientific* and shall have to do likewise for *religious*.

No simple description can do justice to religion even as this has been formulated and practiced in the Occident. But a central feature of our whole religious tradition is its positive relation to the supernatural. To be religious has meant to seek companionship with a friendly being believed to abide behind or within the drift and waste of temporal events. Possibly there is actually a continuity between the "Friend behind phenomena" that men seek, to borrow Gilbert Murray's idea, and "the pack which a dog tries to smell his way back to all the time he is out walking." "It is a strange and touching thing," says Mr. Murray, "this eternal hunger of the gregarious animal for the herd of friends who are not there." "And it may be," he continues, "it may very possibly be," that our religious searchings are at bottom "the groping of a lonely-souled gregarious animal to find its herd or its herd leader in the great spaces between the stars."

Well, if this reliance upon a Cosmic Friend is what religion must be, because that is what religion in our region of the world has been, then scientific humanism can touch religion as a line can touch a circle, but the two cannot interpenetrate to form a blended philosophy. There are, however, other definitions of religion. One of these is readily seen to have close affinities with the humanism discussed in this paper. The world as described by science is accepted as such and this very description is made the ground for the highest human aspiration. It is surely an invitation to religion which W. Macneil Dixon extends to the reader in these words from his book, *Thoughts for the Times*:

> When I am told that throughout the realm of nature there is "no tendency that makes for righteousness," that justice is nowhere to be found there, that

> in her soil the tree of justice refuses to take root . . . I do not find nature ennobled and man humiliated. . . . Quite the reverse. To me it seems to exalt him to a plane immeasurably far above hers, and moreover to provide him with an aim, a purpose, a cause, an inspiration that fires the blood and hardens resolution. If justice be no concern either of nature or of the gods, it is the more preeminently ours. . . . If this world be without justice it is man's unique privilege to place it there—a superb design, an enterprise the immortals might envy, yet have left to mortal hands.

A similar view of religion has been defended with eloquence and learning by A. E. Haydon for a quarter of a century. Essential religion, in his view, is and has always been the shared quest of a good life in a good world, made ever more possible by advancing knowledge and now especially by science. Says Mr. Haydon in his book, *The Quest of the Ages*:

> In contrast with the great believers who imposed their noblest dreams by faith upon the universe, there have been men in all cultures who clipped the wings of their hopes and built a more modest ideal in the everyday world of fact. Though life might not be altogether lovely, they made the best of life. With no hope of help from gods, and no faith in life immortal, the beauty of human comradeship became more precious.
>
> It is encouraging, therefore, and of deep significance to religion, that a common refrain runs through the writings of modern thinkers. The notes of the melody are freedom, democratic opportunity, co-operative individualism, meliorism, internationalism. The march of religions moves toward the Great Society in which all individuals will have a fair chance for the joy of living, and personal satisfactions will blend with social responsibility and creative power.

An inspired statement of this nontheistic, socially oriented religious attitude is condensed into a paragraph at the end of John Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct*. These four sentences bring the paragraph and the book to end:

> Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies.

Personally, I have never been willing to stop at this point in defining religion, not because of its naturalistic, nontheistic, socially dedicated aspect, but because something seems to me left out which is more profoundly characteristic of the religious mood than any kind of special knowledge, devotion, or service. This is a response to the awesome and

mysterious in life and the world. A positive response to the awesome and mysterious has had a central place in the most various religions throughout religious history. Without it religion seems to me to lose its differentiating quality and to become identical with morality, differing from it, if at all, in emotional tone. In theistic religions and in religious mysticism the response is not so much to the awesome mystery itself as to the Being behind the mystery, even though what this Being is may only be statable in symbols or not at all. In the nontheistic religion with which we are concerned the response is to the mystery as mystery. The difference between these attitudes is deeply significant, but there is at the same time a relationship between them which justifies the application of the term religious to both. At any rate I believe it necessary to add another quotation to those preceding:

> I have not said and I have no intention of saying, that the nontheist must limit his interests to what can be weighed and measured, intellectually delineated, or presented in some embodied form with clear outlines; that he must never allow himself to stray into the land described by Virginia Woolf, where words "fold their wings and sit huddled like rooks on the tops of the trees in winter." . . . We need to keep a window open toward the uncharted.
>
> A conscious awareness of this mystery does healing work on the inward man. It is the healing work of acknowledged ignorance in the revered presence of that which eludes comprehension—the incomprehensible in each other, in the life we are called upon to live, in the great cosmic setting that reaches from our feet to the infinities.

At all events, whether this sense of mystery is a religious indispensable or not, humanists of the scientific persuasion reject the dualism which assigns to religion final authority in the realm of value and to science final authority in the realm of fact. They refuse to divide the experienced world into two realms, one of which is the locus of fact and the other the locus of value; and if they recognize any authority as final, which in a manner of speaking they may be said to do, it is not any religious or scientific interpretation of the cosmos; it is man's unremitting search for a livable life and the stubborn conditioning facts of human nature and the natural and social environment. Scientific humanists share in the "quest of a good life in a good world," and hold steadily to the conviction that progress toward this authoritative end is contingent upon the best kind of objective thinking whether the question is one of fact or of value. Which is another way of saying that in their philosophy the scien-

tific and the religious spirit are united in a common enterprise. Matter and spirit may be enemies, but they may also be allies.

VI

We come to the end of this sketch with whole areas of important endeavor left untouched. Scientific humanistic principles and methods are of course applicable to those omitted areas. Some persons will nevertheless remain unpersuaded. They are sure to complain that scientific humanism is not enough. And the complaint is understandable. Scientific civilization, so widely extolled, still shows glaring faults. Innumerable people get little indeed out of living, and all they are promised in the scheme of life most prominently and alluringly set before them, even could they attain it, is far less than the human spirit craves. Can we take pride in the global strife which scientific civilization has made possible? Are we to enjoy the spectacle of millions of human beings deliberately engaged in killing each other? Is there anything reassuring in a colossal waste of economic goods or in the destruction of the best that artistic genius has achieved through centuries of labor? No, there is nothing unnatural in the conclusion that any view which is allied to scientific civilization is not enough; that to be really adequate a way of life must transcend life, must make good its shortcomings by laying hold upon the realities of a promised experience that is to begin when the earthly experience is over.

The complaint, I repeat, is understandable, but it is a pointless and futile complaint unless a better philosophy can be shown to be available. What if this is a vain hope? What if it is an unrealizable dream? What if scientific humanism, although it does not set before us all that can be imagined, does offer the best we can actually get? "Imposter for imposter," George Bernard Shaw flippantly declares, "I prefer the mystic to the scientist—the man who at least has the decency to call his nonsense a mystery, to him who pretends that it is ascertained, weighed, measured, analyzed fact." Others assert, "There are no atheists in foxholes," as if this were complimentary to God. A gull landing on the head of a man adrift in a rubber boat is supposed to have established theistic cosmology. Well known theological philosophers urge a return to a time when men are said to have preferred spiritual worth and inner peace to physical com-

fort and outer power. But Shaw's irresponsible witticism is not quite a philosophy of life. Foxholes are at best temporary domiciles. Gulls are not unfailingly responsive to prayer. The men on the raft with Seaman Izzi called upon God in vain. Two of them finally died of exhaustion, and the three who survived were not picked up in answer to prayer, so far as one can tell. As for returning to the theism of the past, the clock of experience cannot be turned back. It has never been done in human history.

If wishes could make universes we might have the one we want and exactly as we want it. But we have learned a few things in the last three hundred years, and it is just possible that in the light of what we have learned scientific humanism will have to be enough. Superearthly idealism was once compatible with the best established knowledge of the day. For better, for worse, our ancestors ventured beyond the walls of that knowledge and the gates were shut upon their descendants forever. Truth, goodness, beauty, individual personality, these remain and must always remain among the primary objectives of a life in search of lasting happiness. All of them, however, have had to be sought in a vaster world because our forbears refused to stay at home. And every value of life must henceforth be sought in the strange new world that is shaping itself about us.

One of the foremost educators of our time, Boyd H. Bode, has long been telling college students, prospective teachers, that the supreme contemporary issue is whether the democratic way of life as a moral system can stand on its own feet. The choice, as he sees the situation, is between a naturalistically based democracy or something worse, not something better. Since he began life in Iowa I cannot believe that this is a prejudice to which he was conditioned as a boy. He could scarcely have picked it up during his college days in Michigan or as a graduate student at Cornell. I have not consulted him to find out, but the probabilities are that, trained as he had been in the traditional religious outlook, exposed as he then was to naturalistic modernity, and sensitive to both influences, he grew to appreciate the fact that nothing can in the end save the great ideals of the human spirit but their profound reinterpretation. In setting forth that reinterpretation he became a pioneer of scientific humanism. The persistent theme of his lectures and articles and books has been the many-sided problem of how to increase the meaning and joy of life on earth by

making use of the best intellectual and moral tools. In the educational philosophy of this keen, most clear-headed and mature American we have a striking and happy illustration of the kind of high-mindedness and objective-mindedness that can work hand in hand in the world as it has now to be faced.

So it all comes to this. Scientific humanism is not a bleak materialism and it is not a superstitious or an intellectualized spiritualism. The scientific humanist does not pretend that every experience of life can be forced into a test tube or that every interest can be weighed on a scales. He knows that something in everything always escapes the technique of measurement. It must be directly appreciated or go unnoticed. And when he contemplates the whole of things he exclaims as Heraclitus did when philosophy was young: "Nature loves to hide." He says with Gilbert Murray who belongs to the present age: "The life of man can be divided, like the old maps of the world, into the charted and the uncharted. The charted is finite and the other infinite." But he knows also that there is no way of escaping the new world-order or the new moral and intellectual climate, and that man's aspirational life must adjust itself to these conditions or lose its redemptive power. Scientific humanism is the name for his determination to stand up to the task and the opportunity.

GERMANY AND THE EUROPEAN NATION

By ALBERT GUÉRARD

"THE MAN who imagines, for example, that Poles and Germans in our lifetime will dwell side by side in peace and friendship is either a fool or shockingly misinformed."

Thus Bernard Newman, in his chatty and informative book *The New Europe*. The words have the fine realistic ring that appeals to the tough-minded. May I suggest that Mr. Newman overlooks two facts which are even more palpable? The first is that Poles and Germans do dwell side by side in peace and friendship here in America; and so they did in France before 1939. The second is that Poles and Germans will have to dwell side by side in Europe, unless we exterminate either or both. They may not live "in friendship"; but unless they live "in peace," the war will not be over, as M. de la Palisse might have remarked. Now we are fighting to end, if not all wars, at any rate this war. Our inevitable task is therefore to do exactly what Mr. Newman warns us cannot be done.

What is the way out? We might attempt to create a Europe in which political and linguistic frontiers would coincide: not a Pole in Germany, not a German in Poland. This was to some extent the ideal of three great and good men, Henri IV, Napoleon III, and Woodrow Wilson. Ominously, it is also the ideal of a more dubious personage, Adolf Hitler. Carried to its logical extreme, that ideal is called totalitarianism. It implies that in a given area, all men should speak the same language, obey the same laws, cherish the same traditions, strive for the same goal. A nightmarish fallacy. Some call it hundred-per-centism; but even under that name it is repellent to a nation of rugged individualists. The first of all liberties is the right to be different.

Totalitarianism would turn Europe into a mosaic of states, each self-contained and homogeneous. This condition could be obtained by readjusting boundaries and by transferring minorities. The Germans are using the latter method to create a compact Government General of

Poland; Mr. Newman proposes it for East Prussia; I have advocated it—with malice prepense—in the case of Ulster or "Carsonia," and it was successfully carried out by Greece and Turkey. Let us envisage this Utopia of a Europe neatly parceled out into solid national units. What next? We are told that Poles and Germans, who dwell side by side, can not, in our lifetime, live in peace. We shall then be compelled to erect between them such a barrier as once existed between Lithuania and Poland; we must refuse to allow goods, men, or thoughts to cross the frontier. Goods would ruin the national economy; men would clash; thoughts would inevitably be disloyal and subversive. *Chacun chez soi, chacun pour soi*: let every one stay at home and mind his own business. It is isolationism run mad, autarky on a diminutive scale that makes it a palpable absurdity.

Most rebuilders of the continent, recognizing the futility of unmitigated nationalism, seek a way of escape through local federations—a Czecho-Polish union, a Danubian entente, a Balkan league, a Latin bloc. It is a favorite game, and every one, from Mr. Culbertson to Mr. Newman, fits the pieces of the puzzle to suit his own fancy. But they refuse to fit. Some of the proposed schemes are particularly objectionable: those that would link any one of the minor nations with Germany. For unequal association is an ill-concealed form of annexation. The Netherlands may be the natural extension of the Reich: but the Nazis have created a mountain of distrust and hatred across the level plains. Some of the plans are inspired by superficial resemblances. We constantly hear of a Latin group. Such a vision seems to have flitted through the twilight of Marshal Pétain's thought. It is entertained by far abler men, such as Henri de Kerillis and Count Sforza. As though Paris were not in closer touch with London, Brussels, and Cologne than with Madrid or Rome! Frequently, union between neighbors would be the hardest to achieve. Even when there is no radical difference in stock, religion, or speech, tragic memories may create formidable barriers. It is easier to conceive of Finland, Portugal, and Greece as parts of the same Europe than of Serbia and Bulgaria as members of a workable local league.

All these schemes, irrespective of their details, are open to at least two fundamental objections. They do not correct the insufficiencies of nationalism; they do not assure either "freedom from want" or "freedom from fear."

Freedom from want: not one of the proposed groups would come within measurable distance of economic autonomy. Primitive populations may limit their horizon; on the modern plane of living, this has become an impossibility. Germany is not the only land that imperiously needs supplies and markets beyond her own borders.

Freedom from fear: here we have to face the eternal, the wearisome fact of Germany's potential might. A Europe divided into sub-federations would be in a state of parlous equilibrium, almost as much as a Europe composed of entirely independent nations. Not one of the artificial groups surrounding Germany could hold its own against the concentrated power of the natural German aggregate. Let us brush aside any consideration of fairness or friendliness. The one great question for "realists" is: "Can you get away with it?" You can not. Use the Bismarck-Hitler method, attempt to rule by the sword: Germany, treated as Europe's captive, will have enormous advantages over her jailers. Her central position, for one: the defense of Poland and Czechoslovakia by the Western powers would require an extraordinary degree of co-ordination in policy and strategy. Her sheer mass: chop Germany as fine as you please, you will still have seventy-five million Germans. They will not forget that division imposed by the victors is a badge of servitude. What is to prevent the twenty or fifty German states from preparing secretly for common action? In 1870, when France and Prussia went to war, Germany was not formally united. She only acted as though she were united, and that was enough. The pact of union crowned the common victory.

Discriminated against, dismembered, encircled, manacled, Germany would be one smoldering mass of resentment. Hitler had at first a magic battle cry: *"Gleichberechtigung!"*—equality of status. It united all Germans and divided their enemies, because it was just. That cry, if it could be raised again, would create another Hitler.

All methods based on discrimination and force are bound to fail in the end, as the ruthlessness of Hitler is failing before our eyes, because they are essentially methods of war and cannot breed peace. Do not say that Germany must be curbed until she is reclothed in her rightful mind: the curb itself perpetuates the madness. Any scheme failing to give the Germans full equality of status under a common law is bound to prove unworkable. Any scheme short of a Pan-European Union will be pre-

carious: for a separate and wounded Germany will be an eternal menace. Destroy our enemies we cannot; the remedy is not to cripple but to absorb them. If the victors—and the victims—are foolish enough to fall apart after the victory is won, they will be preparing a third life-and-death conflict. But if they are unselfish and far-sighted enough permanently to unite against Germany, they should not be unequal to the task of integrating Germany into a harmonious Europe.

My proposal therefore is something much more radical than reconstituting a chastened Germany after the war, preserving her in order to keep her humble and mindful of death. My proposal is to consider the German *people* as an indispensable part of a larger whole, the European *nation.* Poles and Germans can live side by side in peace: Poland and Germany can not. Within a Europe which cannot be divided into genuine autarkies, the root of evil is the sovereign military state, for its chief end is war. We can not destroy Germany or Poland as geographical areas, or as cultural groups; we can and must destroy them as armed powers. Let the European *people* organize the European *nation,* with its customs union, its police force, and its single defense system. Let there be no German army and no Polish army. Then Germany and Poland will be impotent for evil; they will cease to exist as threatening overlords.[1] Yet for the first time in two centuries, neither of them will have a grievance. For their *peoples,* individually and collectively, will enjoy that full *Gleichberechtigung* which is their birthright.

II

My proposal then is that instead of a peace conference we should convene a constituent assembly. This assembly, representing directly the people of Europe, not the warring states, will proceed to organize the continent on the basis of its common needs. These needs, beyond immediate material reconstruction, are identical with the four freedoms. Freedom of speech and religion: this means the end, not only of totalitarian dictator-

[1]It may seem bitter irony to speak of Poland as "a threatening overlord." Yet that is exactly what Poland was, under Pilsudski, for a vast number of Germans, Lithuanians, White Russians, and Ukrainians. And her bullying of prostrate Czechoslovakia over Teschen can hardly be condoned. The Polish people must live; but not the Poland of Pilsudski and Beck.

ships, but even of the milder forms of enforced conformity. Freedom from fear, which implies complete disarmament within Europe, and an *entente cordiale* with the other great world units, the United States, China, India, Soviet Russia. Freedom from want, best achieved through a European development program, a European customs union, and a European Beveridge Plan.

This proposal is opposed by many excellent authorities, and particularly by Walter Lippmann. Their objections may be reduced to three.

In the first place, it is impossible to admit the Germans to full and equal partnership; for, between the Germans and the rest of mankind, there are ineradicable differences.

In the second place, equality of status for victors and conquered, oppressors and victims, would imply that "peace without victory" which most of us reject as immoral. A "clean slate," a "new deal," would simply excuse the Germans as such from well-deserved punishment. Even those who hold with Herbert Hoover that "you can not have both peace and vengeance" must admit also that you can not have both lasting peace and the frustration of justice. Any leniency would be a victory for the warmongers.

In the third place, it is feared that a European union including Germany would turn into a European union dominated by Germany, the largest single element on the Continent. Our victory over Hitler would thus lead to the New Order he proclaimed and failed to achieve.

In support of the first objection might be quoted men for whose judgment I have great respect, such as Raoul de Roussy de Sales and Lewis Galantière. We are warned against the Wilsonian delusion that only the governmental clique—imperial or Nazi—and not the German people as a whole, should be held responsible. It is idle to seek for a majority of "good" Germans at present duped or coerced by a handful of "bad" Germans. There are no good Germans except in the grave. You can indict a whole people, and "the guilty nation" is not a myth. Germany must be judged, sentenced, and chastised as a single bloc.

I contend that this is the very totalitarian fallacy against which we are at war. We are asked to believe—with Hitler—that there is something in the German blood that makes all Germans essentially alike, and separates them from the rest of mankind. Translate this statement into defi-

nite terms: is there no appreciable difference between Kant, Beethoven, Goethe, Schiller, Niemoeller, Thomas Mann on one side, and Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Goebbels on the other? To establish such a paradox, you would have to go through rather strenuous mental gymnastics.

I too have glanced at the history of European culture, and I cannot endorse the arrogant claim of the Germans that they are set apart from our common humanity. Every one of their alleged characteristics appears in other peoples. They are the "Chosen," to be sure; but they borrowed that quaint notion from the Jews and from the Romans (*Tu regere populos . . .*), and they share it with the French, the Japanese, the Russians, the British, and the Americans. *Gesta Dei per Francos*—the deeds of God through the French—can hardly be considered a very modest device. The admirers of Louis XIV and Napoleon are not qualified to denounce those of Frederick II and Bismarck. *Une foi, une loi, un Roi,* is every bit as totalitarian as *ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. La terre et les morts* has very much the same ring as *Blut und Boden. France d'abord!* is no less egocentric than America First, Sinn Fein, or *Deutschland über alles.*

The Germans worship the sword. So did, for generations, the Swedes and the Turks, who later were able to learn wisdom. The one people that made soldiering a national industry were the Swiss, before they took to hotel keeping. There is little sign that even the Western democracies have forsaken the cult of the warrior. In 1917, Pershing went to seek inspiration at the tomb of the Führer, Duce, or Imperator, Napoleon.

The literature of imperialistic nonsense, so fruitfully cultivated by the Pan-Germans, is rich in every language. I wonder whether any German could cap the grandiloquent conclusion to Victor Hugo's splendid travel book *The Rhine.* Carlyle was the grand old prophet of the ruthless Hero and of the Master Race. Kipling has become a byword. I should not mention the lucubrations of "General" Homer Lea if the blondest of our Representatives had not attempted to revive them. The Germans learned geopolitics from Sir Halford Mackinder, and that pseudo science is no better in its British original than in its Teutonic imitation. The Boulanger movement is a real memory to me; I lived through the nationalistic hysteria of the Dreyfus case; I was in England when "mafficking" swept the country; I am acquainted through Walter Millis with "the martial spirit" at the time of the Spanish War. So I know that chauvinism or

jingoism is not a *morbus teutonicus,* but a universal disease. I also know that it can be held in check, even though it can not be totally cured in a single generation.

We maintain that the Germans are "different" because of their faith in race. A great example of *Credo quia absurdum,* by the way; for, by all the canons of anthropology, they do not form a race at all; no one would mistake Hitler for a Nordic. Raoul de Roussy de Sales dwells upon the contrast between the universal character of French and American civilization, and the tribal conception of Germanism. He forgets that racialism—and the purest Germanism at that—was taught by authentic Frenchmen: Boulainvilliers in the early eighteenth century, Arthur de Gobineau in the middle of the nineteenth, Vacher de Lapouge a generation later. He forgets that the great apostles of racialism in Germany bear such names as Paul de Lagarde and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. He forgets above all that we in America were the first among great nations to place racial laws on our statute books; and we have not expunged them even yet. In spite of the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution, discriminatory measures still exist against Negroes and Asiatics. The quota system in our immigration laws has a racial, not a eugenic, basis. We made no attempt to attract the healthiest and most alert, irrespective of breed: we sought to strengthen the Northern European element among us, at the expense of the Southeastern. The record of English residents in China and India has a rather Hitlerian tinge. If race prejudice be a sign of barbarism, then Kenya and South Africa stand pretty low in the scale.

It is asserted that the Germans are essentially romantic. Urged by dark "daimonic" forces, they appear abruptly out of the *Ur,* and vanish mysteriously into the *Abgrund;* and all their thoughts are tinged with the baleful glare of a *Götterdämmerung.* Are they all Romanticists, down to Herr Rumpelkammer, the corner delicatessen man? And are they the only Romanticists? When the French succumbed to that disease (for, according to Goethe, it is a disease), they thought they were following Shakespeare, Ossian, Lord Byron, and Sir Walter Scott. The same rebellion of the Dark Powers against the banal lucidity of reason is found in Dostoevsky, Merezhkowsky, Berdyaev. We all have yielded to the fascination of the primitive, the subconscious, the insane. We all have capitulated to the less noble appeal of "the will to make-believe." There are

Americans who can read the *Ring* as a philosophical poem, and spell out its symbols without a smile. And Nietzsche has many followers among us.

I was tempted to say: "I too am a Romanticist—within reason," and was stopped by the thought that only a Hibernian could make such a boast. Dangerous as Romanticism is, I refuse to admit, first that it is exclusively German, and second that it is wholly evil. I cannot accept the reactionary gospel of Charles Maurras and T. S. Eliot, according to which the European tradition is essentially "royalist, classical, and Catholic." That is why I am not impressed by the "Five Revolts of Germanism against Civilization" listed by Peter Viereck in his brilliant and unsafe book *Metapolitics*. The struggle of Hermann or Arminius against the Romans, that of the Saxons against Charlemagne, were not worse sins than the heroic fight of Vercingetorix against Caesar. The third "revolt," Luther's, carried with it a good many Anglo-Saxons, who show no sign of repentance; and Calvin, a thorough Frenchman, used French logic to out-Luther Luther. The fourth alleged "revolt," Romanticism, was not special to Germany, and not unadulterated barbarism. The two world wars in our century were indeed a double rebellion against civilization, if by civilization we mean world order, freedom from race prejudices, and the complete renunciation of imperialism. But there is a Hitler caged in every breast; let us make sure that he will not break loose shrieking: "Manifest destiny!" The thought of every sane man, when he watches the murderous antics of the Nazis, should be: "There, but for the grace of God, went I."

III

The second problem is that of punishment. I have steadily condemned hatred, insofar as hatred is blind fury. Even now, we do not hate, and we spurn the teachings of those who consider hatred an essential element in our morale. What little hate there is in us will evaporate as soon as the last gun is fired. But, if I have deprecated hatred, twenty-five years ago as well as today, I have no less consistently advocated justice. Only the definite promise of justice, swift and thorough, can ward off two great dangers: on the one hand an orgy of massacre, in which the innocent are bound to suffer with the guilty; on the other hand, if the culprits are allowed to go free, a feeling of unappeasable resentment. We, and Ger-

many too, need full justice to cleanse our souls. And justice, however stern, may also be the hope that will break Germany's will to fight. So far, the Germans understand and practice nothing but torture. Assure them a taste of *our* medicine, not of their own, and they will be more ready to surrender.

I agree that the responsibilities go deep. We shall not be taken in by a new version of "Hang the Kaiser!" In the case of Hitler, an exploded demigod, death would be merciful, and I vote for mercy. So far as the Nazi leaders are concerned, their case is clear beyond the utmost reach of legal quibbling. They are known; they have, of their own accord, sought power for evil; they have perpetrated evil with sadistic gusto. They themselves have drawn up the list that we need. No indictment is required besides their own boasts.

Against many of the military leaders, charges of wilful murder can be brought. They have transgressed, not only the laws of humanity, but even the ancient laws of war. But the majority of officers may be able to prove that they were simply carrying out explicit orders, according to the rules of army discipline. Yet we know that the Junker caste, and not merely the commanders in the field, should be held responsible. That caste adopted, nearly two centuries ago, the ideology which gradually perverted the whole country and which in Hitler assumed fanatical virulence. Not the individuals, but the whole class must be sentenced to extinction. It may go hard with certain British gentlemen to punish their Prussian congeners for their feudal virtues: pride of blood, physical prowess, ascetic devotion to their liege. Yet it must be done. Junkerdom can not mend.

It will end automatically, as a class, if it be deprived of all usefulness and means of support. In part payment for the destruction the Prussian lords have caused, their estates should be confiscated. The national army which was their life should be, not merely reduced in size and deprived of certain weapons, but abolished altogether. A Junker, in the European Nation, will have to do honest work, or starve. It might be well if many of them were trained for a useful life in Russian camps, which have attained fame as educational institutions. Let them rebuild Stalingrad, under proper discipline, and in a few years they may graduate into very respectable workers.

There is a wider and more shadowy ring of responsibility, that of the professors and publicists who preached the unholy Pan-Germanic gospel; and beyond them, the innumerable company of jingoes who made that dream their rule of life. The worst and most condign punishment for them would be the irremediable dispelling of their brutal hope. If they are incorrigible, they will be sentenced to eternal humiliation and despair. For the tribal idol they worshipped, Germany as the elect of a fierce war god, Germany as the stern ruler of lesser nations, that monstrous figure will crumble. But if, as I believe, there be humanity in them, they will find a larger hope beckoning: the building of a new Europe, in which the German spirit will have a place second to none.

I demand the death penalty for the guilty—and the arch culprit is German nationalism. I do not want a wounded, a savagely resentful German nationalism to live: it would infect Europe with its concentrated poison, if it could not destroy her by the sword. And nationalism can be overcome only if it be transcended. To push the clock back to 1919, 1870, or to the eighteenth century, would be absurd. We should not attempt to revive Saxon or Bavarian particularism. We may hope—not only in Germany, but throughout Europe—for a healthy development of local autonomies; but the final goal must be larger, more generous than Hitler's *Reich,* not smaller and more selfish.

IV

Here we encounter the third objection. Suppose that, after destroying Hitler, we carry out Hitler's dream of a New Europe, what is to prevent Germany, still the largest single group on the continent, from assuming control?

The radical difference between prewar and postwar conditions will be complete disarmament within Europe. A compact minority can impose its will by force, if it can find the weapons. In peaceful political contest, the minority remains a minority. And the Germans form barely twenty-five per cent of the European population west of the Curzon Line.

Even if they acted as a single body, the Germans could not control European politics. But freed from an iron dictatorship, they will not act as a single body. Neither will any other nation. All Europe is at present in a state of civil war. In all countries, we find people in greater sympathy

with foreigners than with some of their own people. Franco killed Spaniards by the hundred thousand with the help of Moors, Germans, and Italians. The French conservatives said unequivocally: "Rather Hitler than Blum!", and French democrats would undoubtedly say: "Rather Roosevelt than Laval!" *My country, right or wrong!* which once seemed an infallible rule, has now become a tormenting puzzle. Civil wars are more bitter than national wars: we want to end the fighting among ideologies as well as among nations. But we can not ignore the fact that, for a quarter of a century at least, ideological lines have cut right across national boundaries.

I do not expect therefore that, in the European assembly of tomorrow, the Germans will vote solidly as Germans. I wager that, on the contrary, they will vote as Communists, Social Democrats, Bourgeois Liberals, and Conservatives, with perhaps an Agrarian Front and a Catholic Alliance to enrich the picture.

In the European Army and Police, no member of the former Junker class will be admitted: they cannot be trusted with a sword. At first, the officers might be drawn chiefly from the neutral democratic countries, Sweden and Switzerland, and from the least aggressive among the victims, Norway, Holland, Belgium. These armed bodies, which will gradually replace Allied forces in maintaining order, will be trained in a spirit of loyalty to Europe as a whole. On a loftier plane, the same *esprit de corps* found in the French Foreign Legion can be fostered in the European Guard. These men will be retired early, so as to avoid the creation of a new military caste. They will be absorbed into the civil and technical services of United Europe or of the World Commonwealth.

From the economic point of view, the artificial concentration of industrial power in German hands must of course be reversed. European reconstruction must be planned neither for Germany nor against Germany, but for the common benefit. It is not inconceivable that key regions such as the Ruhr may be placed under European control and operated by a personnel drawn from all parts of the continent. Transportation and basic industries will as a matter of course be under European supervision. Under these conditions, Germany will no more rule Europe than Pennsylvania rules America.

In such a free and united Europe, I have no fear for the minor nationalities. It is only on the battlefield that inferiority in numbers is fatal. In peaceful pursuits, Switzerland was much richer than Tsarist Russia; Norway had one of the largest merchant marines in the world, and stood high in the field of literature. Poles, Czechs, and Yugoslavs have repeatedly proved themselves the equals of the Germans in stamina and intelligence. Their birth rate is higher than that of the alleged Master Race. I need not express my absolute faith in the ability of the French to hold their own. If indeed France be underpopulated (I am not thoroughly convinced that such is the case), let other Europeans flock in: they will inevitably be assimilated, as they were in the past. For France is a smiling land, a generous spirit and a rich tradition: it never was a race.

This plan for a United Europe, a people's Europe, turns all boundary disputes into minor matters. It makes it possible to grant autonomy to every region conscious of a separate existence, and to every disputed area. It abolishes at once the distinction between the Haves and the Have-Nots: all the riches of the continent will be equally open to all, and the most effective economic partnerships will be established without any political hindrance.

Above all, United Europe offers the only way of leaving Hitler's Germany behind, a repulsive archaic monster. It punishes with death the criminal desire to hold others in subjection. Never again shall we weep over the poor Germans who were not given enough Poles to oppress. At the same time, United Europe will liberate the German spirit; it will turn that immense power to the service of the European Nation, and of all mankind.

THAT POSTWAR "DREAM" HOUSE

By MAX G. MERCER

WHEN THIS WAR IS OVER, the United States probably will have the greatest building boom in its history, for by that time the demands of the half of the population that is not permitted to build now will have accumulated. Tremendous population shifts have already taken place, and others will occur. A great deal of our war-built housing is temporary in nature. We shall have, too, a heavy accumulation of capital from today's enforced savings. In the industrial area manufacturers are finding the new war plants so much more efficient than their old ones that many plan to build new factories when the emergency is over. New materials, new methods and new skills are waiting to be used. In materials, for example, plastics, plywood, lightweight concrete, and ceramic products will be used in many ways heretofore untried. In design, careful study and research have to a large extent eliminated academic patterns and planning. As for methods, the "bugs" are being worked out of prefabrication, and large contractors are employing on-the-site, mass production processes. The war has given prefabrication a great deal more than a shot in the arm. Factories are turning out houses at the rate of from five or six per day to as many per hour.

All this is a good beginning, but no correlated system of intelligent planning has been developed which considers all the factors. The prefabricated jobs are in large part only temporary solutions. Many have been thrown together with barely adequate materials, a minimum of mechanical utilities, and have been placed end to end in monotonous, desolate rows. They bid fair to become the slums of tomorrow. Clearly, the emphasis, a necessary one for wartime, has been on temporary usefulness. In the future the long-term view must be reintroduced. Just as hundreds of European and Asiatic cities have been bombed into rubble, so many, perhaps most, of our own cities face social and financial ruin, not as devastating as bombing perhaps, but in the long run just as calam-

itous. Here is the opportunity to start anew. We have enough competent experts in the various fields to accomplish wonders. These experts include regional, state, and city planners, county and city engineers, capable architects and engineers in private practice; economists, tax experts, city managers, and others. Since war construction has been largely completed, the majority of these experts are twiddling their thumbs. The United States is justly proud of its industrial progress. We make almost everything bigger, better, and faster than any other nation—or so many of us believe. We have done many things well, but we have done little to provide a standard of physical environment that is planned and intelligent. How better could we employ our experts today?

Among our planners—certain economists, certain maufacturers, certain financiers, certain federal civil servants, and others—there is a growing realization that the rebuilding of our cities, housing, recreational facilities, and highways may be destined to assume the major role of cushioning the aftermath of war. The very size of the building industry, its capacity to absorb labor counted in the millions and to use constructively capital counted in the billions, puts it in the front rank of all industries. Next to agriculture the building industry is largest. But to maintain its place, it must be managed so that it can maintain full employment. It must be less speculative. It must be planned. The crying need of the times is that we begin comprehensive planning *now*.

Other than a few United States Housing Authority (now Federal Public Housing Authority) slum clearance projects, the three Green Belt towns, and a few permanent Defense Housing communities, the surface has hardly been scratched. Hence, let us gather the facts from all over the United States, study them, and make real plans, BIG Plans, because the building industry as it has been organized in the past, has proved inadequate to do the job that has to be done.

Heretofore, excepting in isolated cases and relatively infinitesimal amounts, building has been an almost completely speculative industry, with no consideration for the consumer other than immediate "consumer satisfaction" in the narrowest sense of that term. The requirements of the future have been almost completely disregarded. Witness the overdeveloped suburban areas in many cities where you can find acres of vacant lots—laid off in the conventional, expensive gridiron pattern—

regardless of land contour. The municipal taxpayers have frequently paid for the paved streets, the sidewalks, and the mechanical utilities. And these subdivisions have been located where the developer "guessed" the town would grow—without any knowledge of the proper location of schools, of business concerns employing the heads of families, or of shopping and civic centers. If we want future building to be planned and integrated in the sense that all income groups have a decent place to live, work, and bring up their families, co-ordinated planning on an unprecedented scale is imperative.

Unplanned growth of cities has been as deadly, in many respects, as bombing raids. According to the Urban Land Institute (a nonprofit organization whose objective is to promote redevelopment of our cities), a blight has overtaken one-fourth of the urban United States. Everywhere we face evidence of it: dirty houses crowded into factory districts and drenched with smoke; children on crowded streets darting between cars; litter trailed by overloaded garbage trucks; the family wash hanging in the soot-laden air, and the clamor of industry interspersed with domestic noise. The impact of these facts on the senses is fully appreciated only after a visit to one of the few planned communities, such as Greenhills in Cincinnati, Ohio. One-third of the nation is still living in slum conditions and another one-third of our housing is antiquated, uncomfortable, and ugly.

Witness the tenement districts in all large cities and most small ones. As a matter of fact, the planners of postwar London wish the Germans had done a better job in some areas. The United States is supposed to be a progressive country, but we rebuilt San Francisco, after the great earthquake and fire, according to the old pattern. When Tokyo was rebuilt, after a similar disaster, the Japanese employed new patterns for a large area and at least one eminent American, Frank Lloyd Wright, to help execute them. Many of us hope that we will soon provide them with fresh opportunities for more extensive city planning. In our large cities we see the obvious stupidity of carrying *laissez-faire* to its logical conclusion. A great many cities face social and financial ruin because, as Hugh R. Pomeroy says, "Cities are all cut up in little squares, physically, financially, and legally." Our need is for complete replanning, rehabilitation,

and rebuilding of large areas to make the city the healthy and attractive place it should be for those who logically belong there.

Frequently we protest the quality of public services offered in our communities—the fire and police protection, the garbage disposal, the limited recreation facilities, and the quality of the community schools, but we do nothing substantial to improve them. That we do not is not an indictment of democracy; but it is an indictment of a mistaken idea that planning on a national, regional, state, county, or even an urban scale (any of which, of course, implies some control) is communistic or not the American way. Surely, as a people we have now reached the point of national maturity which no longer will tolerate avoidable wastes of the technical skills, methods, and materials we have worked so hard to master.

The condition of our towns and villages is much like that of the cities. Of course, they are not faced with the problems of industrialization, serious and complicated transportation questions, and the lag brought about by large financial holdings. But resistance to change is prevalent. In numerous small, industrial towns, the factory or mine workers live in jerry-built shacks, without proper sanitary facilities, adequate heating, or any of the facilities of modern housing.

Right now adequate housing is needed in tremendous quantities, not only for the underprivileged, but also for millions who live in quarters and neighborhoods completely below the American standard of living. This is true for those who live in cities, towns, villages, and on farms. Our housing is out of date and rents are too high. How are we to deal with these problems?

The situation is complicated. Basically, we have numerous problems and attitudes that need attention before we can rebuild America on anything like an adequate scale. Nevertheless, during the last few years some progress has been made.

The financing of homes and multiple housing through single mortgage by long-term amortization has added greatly to the financial stability of residential building. The Federal Housing Administration, which guarantees the loan and applies certain needed restrictions as to location, design, construction, and investigation of borrower's credit, has led the way.

Architecture is beginning successfully to apply modern design to meet the new conditions. Notable progress has been made in the small house, the school, the hospital, the factory, and the store. We see the trend toward a blending of function and beauty, although up to the present this has largely been confined to the West Coast.

Less piecemeal planning is taking place. There is a definite trend toward large-scale planning of integrated neighborhoods, especially in large cities. Although a great deal of this has been experimental and temporary, it has been received with open arms, as the waiting lists of the Green Belt towns and other newly built neighborhoods so clearly show. The Green Belt towns are three new communities near Milwaukee, Washington, and Cincinnati which were built by the Farm Security Administration in the early '30's as demonstration neighborhoods and for the purpose of relieving unemployment.

Another major advancement in the building industry has been the increasing use of important new techniques, materials, and equipment.

Further, because of a certain amount of standardization of parts, fixtures and units and because of at least partial prefabrication, particularly for the small house, costs are lower for a better house than they have been in the past. The low-cost field is beginning to be recognized and exploited by capital.

Low-rent housing and slum clearance also have made a start as a national program. A start is really all that has been made so far, because, unfortunately, in many cases, the former slum dwellers cannot afford the slightly higher rents.

Nevertheless, in spite of these signs of progress, the building industry is backward when compared to truly industrialized activities. For example, the design and plan of manufacture of a radio or a refrigerator are not changed or disturbed once the manufacturing concern goes into production. In the building industry, on the other hand, the work is still largely custom building.

As an example of the present-day system, let us consider a typical case of before-the-war construction. An average man, starting out to build his home, is told that if he employs an architect, things will go smoothly. This, sad to say, is not always true. Many architects are specialists; some do commercial work, others ecclesiastical, still others industrial, and a

growing number specialize in residential work. A few have had too little experience in any of these fields. The owner may choose a good general practitioner but the chances are that he will decide that employment of any architect is only adding useless cost. He ends up by buying a stock plan. For the actual construction he can go to a real estate firm, lumber dealer, or a general contractor, or he can be his own general contractor and deal with ten to fifteen subcontractors.

This system leaves the manufacturer of building materials, plumbing, heating, electrical equipment, and so forth, to shift for himself, and frequently the owner does not get a uniform grade of quality (low, medium, or high) throughout his house. Let us clarify this point. If the builder is a dealer in lumber and millwork, the chances are that the owner will have plumbing and the work of the other so-called mechanical trades that are below the standard of the quality of his window frames, windows and doors, flooring and other woodwork. The converse is true if the "builder" is mainly interested in selling and installing plumbing or heating.

But our John Doe is building his $5,000 dream house. He would like it to be just like the one Joe Doaks has, only it must have a larger living room, an additional bedroom, a screened porch, and a few other things that won't cost much. The A. B. C. Material Company built Joe Doaks' house for $5,300. They agree that the changes can be handled for an additional $1,250. After many conferences, discussions, near quarrels, and the passage of much time, the house is finished. Mr. and Mrs. Doe never thought they would live long enough, but it's done and it is just perfect except that it looks as if it were standing on stilts; it doesn't heat very well; John wishes he had used hardware such as his friend, the local hardware dealer, recommended (maybe he can change the hardware later); and perhaps that insulating salesman was right, he should have bought insulation instead of a large living room . . . but it is too late now, and his costs have run up to $7,000. The sad part of the thing is that a carefully designed and well built house would have cost him less money over the usual twenty-year amortization period. This is true because the materials and equipment would last without replacement and with minimum maintenance costs.

Of course, my recommendation would be that the owner select an architect, and do so as carefully as he would choose a surgeon—whether

the building problem is a custom-built job or the proper selection from the fifty or more manufacturers of prefabricated houses. On a custom-built residence, the competent architect knows the materials and equipment that will best meet all the requirements of budget, design, and the hopes of John Doe. If John wants a prefabricated house, the architect is still his best bet because he can better select the house that will most properly meet the requirements of the site, the conditions, the climate, and he can correlate the details that still have to be handled on the premises, such as the foundation, plumbing, heating, and so forth.

Although the following outline is oversimplified, it illustrates the necessity for comprehensive planning before beginning construction. In order to accomplish a better organized building industry, these improvements seem necessary:

1. *Research*: The entire building industry must be exposed to intensive research.
2. *Zoning*: An effective control of land use must be devised.
3. *Planning*: We must define our objectives and PLAN toward their fulfilment.
4. *Standardization and Integration*: If we are to gain genuine economies, we must apply standardization to the building industry; and integrate all operations among those who plan, build, finance, deal in land, and those who make and supply building materials.
5. *The Low-Cost House*: It is now possible to build a "good" low-cost house.
6. *Codes and other Restrictions*: Out-of-date building codes and their lack of uniformity between states hinder progress and economy. Trade associations and trade unions must mend their ways.
7. *Appraisal and Taxation*: These must be modernized.
8. *Public Works*: It is essential that we substitute order and public need for the haphazard "system" of public works building that prevails.
9. *New Materials and Methods*: We must be ready to accept and employ new materials and methods.
10. *Labor Problems*: The inconsistency of high wages and low annual income prevailing in the building trades must be solved.
11. *Government*: When we learn how to manage our governments, local and national, and learn to work with them, we shall have solved many of our problems.

Research. For its own improvement, the entire building industry must be exposed to intensive, broadminded research covering not only technology but a thorough investigation of *all* the major factors that will improve the quality of its services to the public and add stability to the industry. Part of this research is well under way in a few of our large

cities in the form of the Real Property Inventory. The R.P.I. was originated by Howard Whipple Green, Director of R.P.I. of Metropolitan Cleveland. It consists of finding out every possible economic fact in every housing and business unit in every city block. How much income does the renter earn? What is his rent? What was the original cost of the property? What is the present condition of the property, cost of maintenance? How much are taxes, insurance, and cost of utilities? When all the significant physical facts of the building—its age, kind of construction, its physical condition, amount and kind of plumbing, heating, electrical wiring—are assembled, and it has been learned where the tenant works, his method of transportation to and from his job and how much time this transportation consumes and whether or not he owns a car, the city planners and other experts have a basis to begin the physical plan.

Zoning. An effective control of land use must be devised. Zoning ordinances should be made adequate and possess real legal teeth. For example, high-assessed land in the central area of cities might be efficiently used for housing the white collar workers who work in central office buildings, instead of holding the land for a probably never attainable price for more skyscrapers. Large central areas of most cities also contain a fringe of slums. Before anything effective can be accomplished along this line, a flexible master plan of the metropolitan area must be made. For instance, certain areas should be left for business buildings, and if this area proves too large the extra space may be used for extra parking or just plain "elbow room." Most cities have too little open space. We have sufficient land in this country to provide open, green spaces throughout our cities. Such spaces should be severely regulated in order to secure privacy and ventilation. If the area allotted for business proves too small, some of the more than adequate "elbow room" may be used. Traffic will be rerouted around the business, residential, and school districts, making these areas safer, quieter, less congested, and aiding travel and motor transport.

Planning. As I see it, we do not do any planning until we are forced to for two reasons: 1) We are afraid of government control; 2) we are afraid that in the process of comprehensive planning some toes (perhaps our own) will be stepped on.

Americans seem to be afraid of the term "planning" and it consequently suffers from much abuse. Unfortunately it has become a handy

fetish for dictators seeking such talking points as trains that run on time or conquest in search of more *Lebensraum*. To the building industry, however, there is nothing foreign or sinister about the term. Without planning of some kind it cannot function. Stripped of associations, planning simply means, according to an excellent definition in the September, 1941 *Architectural Forum*, "1) the anticipation of needs and 2) the coordination of means toward 3) the development and execution of a pattern whereby the means meet the needs."

Any definition of planning is incomplete that fails to cover the dimensions of space and time and to recognize the need for control so that each activity may be planned as an integral part of an harmonious whole. There are several good examples of such broad planning in successful operation: Ford's industrial empire; T.V.A.'s great power project; Authority of the Port of New York; Rockefeller Center's towering commercial center; Hitler's crack military machine—and the military machine we are building to crack it.

A very important consideration is that any comprehensive plan must be geared to mesh with the changes that come with advances in science and technology. For instance, prefabrication has been delayed, at least a decade, by vested interests.

I have been in only one privately built city in this country, Radburn, New Jersey, where the entrance highway was not a clutter of billboards, gas stations, garages, beer joints, hot-dog stands, miscellaneous stores, residences, and apartments, and all the less attractive appurtenances of urban civilization. And yet we do practically nothing about these conditions. Central deterioration has set in; and the total environment has been permitted to run down, to become crowded, noisy, dirty, and generally inefficient; the income from real estate taxes has dropped below the point needed to support the cost of maintaining public services. It should be obvious that just as the art of design has improved our buildings, planning can improve our neighborhoods, communities, and regions.

Since the primary purpose of the city is to afford a place to live, it should be comfortable, orderly, healthy, and attractive. Our city patterns served the horse and buggy era fairly well. We have not brought them up to the requirements of modern auto traffic—and the day of private ownership of planes may be at hand!

In order to make a master plan, a city must decide on what it wants to be. To quote Pomeroy again, "What kind, how much, and where." A college town has a different objective from a manufacturing town. For example, the former should plan for the orderly development of residential and recreational areas, reroute the through-highway around these, provide for the people who desire to move to a college town; and, in general, so plan and develop the whole community as to reflect the education center it claims to be.

Standardization and Integration. The building industry will be forced to adopt rational standardization to gain economies. For example, prefabricated houses of exactly the same design would present more *real* difference than the monotonous rows of "different," conventional houses which now fill our middle-class suburban areas, provided the proper use of materials, color, land planning, and landscaping were employed. There is no real difference because in the average "Colonial" suburban area, there are probably no more than four or five different plans. The difference is artificial in that the jungle of roofs, porches, and dormer windows are so arranged that they do not express the floor plan. The same floor plan will have diametrically opposite roofs, porches, and so forth.

Another example, and one that would probably gain immediate acceptance, would be that bathrooms and kitchens be built in sections at the factory. These rooms could be built in multiples of so many inches so that the architect could plan to accommodate them in any house—custom built and factory produced. For example, a kitchen would have all cupboards, sink, stove, and refrigerator truly "built in" so that the impossible job of trying to clean back and around the stove and refrigerator would be eliminated. The counter top would be of one piece, waterproof and easy to clean. Similarly, the bath fixtures would be a part of a monolithic wall. It should be possible literally to clean a bathroom with a hose. At present, even in expensive houses, the baths and kitchens are built up of so many pieces and different kinds of materials that they soon begin to leak, are expensive to maintain and practically impossible to clean.

On low-cost houses and large-scale housing developments, the work of all must be integrated to make standardization effective. The most intelligent solution so far advanced suggests that housing for the great majority can best be produced by a super-developer who employs planner,

architect, engineer, builder, and prefabricator; and correlates all of these to produce a complete neighborhood. Ideally, the idea amounts to homes of good design and construction for sale at the most economical price in a neighborhood designed to make a future blight impossible.

The Low-Cost House. The building industry must solve the problem of the low-cost house, not by producing a cheap, expensive-to-maintain box, but a well designed, solidly built unit that affords the amenities our American living standard boasts, and at a lower cost than has ever before been effected. The war has speeded the development of prefabricated houses, which should be available when high priorities come to an end.

Partial prefabrication may be the majority solution. In either case, however, unless there is co-operation all along the line, they will be neither adequate nor low cost. For example, the design must be flexible enough to permit orientation of rooms to sun and view, their equipment and gadgets held to a sensible minimum in number and quality, their distribution handled by experts, and their sites restricted intelligently so that new blights will not result.

There will be mistakes, "interests" (capital and labor) will be out to kill them, but prefabricated single houses are here.

Codes and other Restrictions. We must remove every restrictive practice from every branch of building. This purge should include obsolete building codes. The late Albert Kahn, the great industrial architect, said a few months before his death that most existing codes aid the poor designer, add needless costs to buildings, and waste materials. To replace codes which require minimum sizes of stressed members, Mr. Kahn recommended codes that require capacity to handle the loads placed on those stressed members, thus putting the skill and initiative of the architect and engineer to the job they were trained to do. For the layman's information, building codes for state and municipal statutes specifically state the sizes of wood beams for various spans, the stress limitation permitted for steel (modern manufacture and research have produced stronger steel than the antiquated codes permit); and the same can be said for concrete, brick, and many other materials. Reactionary trade associations and labor unions have added unnecessary millions to construction costs. The reader is referred to Thurman Arnold's work in restrictive trade practices. This

is a long story, and it will take time and effort to convince both sides that they are pursuing an unbusinesslike and unprofitable policy.

Appraisal and Taxation. A scientific method of property appraisal and a rational system of property taxation is needed before significant progress can be made on any of these suggestions. The tax experts will have to demonstrate whether ultimately we employ the Single Tax system or remodel and improve the present "system." But if the present tax and appraisal methods were brought up to the highest standards we now know, instead of the hit-or-miss methods prevalent in most towns and cities, the result would produce more income and a more equitable tax for all property owners. In too many towns and cities the property appraisal amounts to little more than a guess—not even a scientific guess! These appraisals are frequently made by amateurs with little or no connection or familiarity with the building industry. Municipal officials might well investigate the services of reputable professional appraisers.

Public Works. We should further the study of public works as a means of shockproofing depressions, by providing steady employment for men, materials, and capital. This study should be receiving attention from municipal, county, state, and federal officials *now*. How can we justly criticize leaf-raking and other W.P.A. make-work projects when as a people we are either indifferent or fearful of the public research and planning necessary to gain more efficient results? We hear considerable complaint against tax-exempt, slum clearance housing, for example, but in most cases the facts do not justify the fears of private realtors. For instance, the former houses and tenements of the slum area rarely paid taxes, and the costs of maintaining municipal services more than offset the take. The housing projects under New York City's Metropolitan Housing Authority pay the city a flat five per cent of their rent income for public services which in some cases represents a clear gain for the treasury. Surely, the last depression and the great problems of the postwar period have demonstrated the need for properly conceived public works.

New Materials and Methods. The building industry will be forced to recognize that new materials and methods will come more rapidly in the future and it therefore must provide less expensive and more flexible buildings. The approach must gradually shift to the most modern standards possible. The building industry must advocate what industry has long

practiced—a willingness to depreciate structures before the period of obsolescence has been reached. This recognition of new materials and methods, more flexible buildings, a willingness to depreciate out-of-date and nonconforming structures, will to a large extent follow automatically once we apply modern taxation and appraisal methods. Further speed can be developed through the wider use of professional planners and designers, and the advent of full-scale prefabricated housing.

Labor Problems. Contractors must solve their labor problems. Building labor needs a higher annual income but a lower hourly rate. In normal times the building-trades mechanic averages six to nine months employment per year. Clearly he should be offered steady employment at a somewhat lower rate per hour to the mutual advantage of both employer and employee.

There are many scattered instances where contractors have solved this problem. It takes the co-operation of customer, contractor, and his labor. Where this co-operation is prevailing the workmen earn a higher annual income and building costs are lower. The three principal drawbacks have been 1) that the contractors have not gone to labor with a plan; 2) that labor leaders have "kidded" their membership by falsely advocating high hourly rates, and 3) by sticking to the outmoded craft system. The solution of this knotty problem will be tough; but with the co-operation and sincerity of all concerned, it can be licked.

Government. A great deal can be said of the need for improving city governments. In most instances their legal powers are insufficiently developed to cope with their increasingly large responsibilities. Their tax systems are out-of-date. Their personnel is largely incompetent in technological areas. If we develop intelligent, flexible city plans our government will improve in the process. For example, New York City under La Guardia has made great highway and park plans; and Park Commissioner Moses, who was educated for civic affairs, has carried out these plans so well that he has achieved national acclaim.

The building industry must learn that only through effective collaboration with government can private building reach its maximum capacity. It can further be said that as the national and world picture develops, all private enterprise will, of necessity, have to learn to work with government in order to secure its own life and lasting peace.

It is encouraging to note that the Urban Land Institute is at this time urging Congress to consider their redevelopment program for cities. Several of the Institute's basic points for urban redevelopment follow:

1. The establishment of a Federal urban land commission, to be provided with the funds and powers (A) to extend grants to cities for the purpose of preparing master plans for metropolitan areas, with detailed plans for the redevelopment of blighted areas, and (B) to extend credits to local land commissions for the purpose of acquiring land in blighted areas for redevelopment by private enterprise, as well as for public use.
2. The creation of local land commissions for metropolitan areas authorized to acquire land for redevelopment by private enterprise, as well as for public uses.
3. Redevelopment of land so acquired by private builders shall be under regulations of local land commissions and federal authorities.
4. Local taxation of redeveloped areas based on assessed values related to income-producing power of the properties.

Although I am fearful of bureaucrats and realize that many well-intentioned people will yell, "Red," there must be national co-ordination and some control by the federal government. Unfortunately, Congress has cut off funds from the organization that was laying the foundation for this co-ordination, the National Resources Planning Board, organized in 1933 as the National Planning Board of the Works Progress Administration; its personnel was essentially the same as that of ex-President Hoover's Committee on Recent Social Trends. It was a good foundation, for its presidentially appointed members were not representatives of the various narrow interests which enter into community life, and objectivity was possible. It had been doing very important work: co-operation and consultation with other federal agencies, states, municipalities and public and private planning research institutions toward the preparation of plans for the orderly development and use of land, water, and other natural resources. It was purely advisory in character, making its report to the President and having no legal and formal rights. I believe the N.R.P.B.'s activities should have been expanded rather than curtailed. If an Office of War Mobilization is needed in wartime, a Jimmy Byrnes in peacetime is also needed to co-ordinate and integrate the various governmental activities that are concerned with planning and building for the nation.

In conclusion let us attempt to consider the conditions necessary for successful planning on an adequate scale. To achieve the kind of plan-

ning required, we must understand its scope, its cost, and the need for public education to bring it about.

Since a well planned building industry will absorb a large part of those who will be unemployed in the aftermath of war, the urgent problem of finding jobs for our returning soldiers and armament workers will be well on its way to a solution. At the present time, the only federal agency that is doing anything for actual postwar work that will involve employment of men and capital is the Public Works Reserve established under the Federal Works agency which consists of a file of P.W.A.-like, pump-priming projects for postwar execution. This haphazard collection of jobs will be a drop in the bucket compared to the needs. And with W.P.A.'s dissolution, even this terrifically inadequate stop-gap will cease.

I would envisage in this new "Office of Peace Mobilization" an agency with certain defined controls over the projects it assists. But in general its function would be one of research, experimentation, and guidance in the planning field co-ordinated with similar programs covering building design, construction, finance management, and razing of obsolete structures. We must develop a more intelligent collaboration between government and those who plan, those who build, those who finance, those who deal in land and those who supply materials and equipment.

It goes without saying that such a program requires big money. Where is it coming from? By the very nature of its program the funds would have to be federal, but with sufficient foresight the savings that would result from elimination of the wasteful, poorly planned W.P.A.-type jobs would save billions in relief expense. And with the aid of a high national income it is believed adequate taxes would support this program.

It is obvious that America cannot be rebuilt in a year or two. It will take a generation or two at least. Some people say that the taxpayers are getting tired of "postwar dreaming," that the cost of most of the postwar dreaming is so great that the citizenry are becoming fed up, and in too many cases, determined to have none of it. But the cost of blight with its attending decrease and finally the complete breakdown of real estate values; the cost of slums and crime; and finally, the unaccountable loss in deterioration of living and working conditions—these are immeasurably greater. If we can finance this war (at many times the cost of peaceful planning) surely we can finance the gradual rebuilding of America.

To achieve any measure of success for postwar building an informed public opinion is necessary. In fact, it cannot be even successfully begun without public support. The public must become familiar with the high costs and results of the lack of planning, with the social, aesthetic, and profitable possibilities of looking to real plans and with the necessity of equipping their plans with legal teeth. We should organize citizen groups which would interest themselves in planning for a postwar world and set about seeing that we start these plans.

As everyone knows, plans are only a means to an end. Cities are more than nice arrangements of buildings, parks, and transportation facilities. Architecture is not mere plans and "pretty pictures" but buildings placed on good sites that serve well the functions for which they were designed. Any good plan is more than a mere map. It must frequently take into account its immediate and final objectives, both social and economic.

So in our plans let us be cognizant of the tremendous amount of work that needs to be done to make order from all the separate units, city planner, architect, builder, dealer, manufacturer, and so on down the line. Many of these units are fairly efficient as separate organizations, but taken all together from the view of John Doe, the consumer, they form a heterogeneous structure. The efficiency demanded by war has forced new arrangements that will be employed after the war.

War is producing new factories that are the latest in efficiency; these provide excellent lighting, air conditioning, and good working conditions. It is producing housing projects that are well planned as communities with "loop-circulation" roadways and cul-de-sacs to discourage through traffic, planned shopping centers, adequate recreational facilities, parking space, and so forth. War demands efficiency.

The lack of over-all planning, standardization, and integration which has characterized the building industry in the past has now become a wartime problem and must be solved before victory can be won. But after victory is won, let's turn our objective from speculative building as in the prewar days to the social objective of serving the people. The building industry must plan for peacetime living *now*. The peace of tomorrow as well as the war of today demands efficiency of the building industry. It is for this that we must plan.

LITERARY LIFE IN THE TROPICS

By LILO LINKE

No surroundings could seem more hostile to intellectual and artistic activities than those of the Ecuadorian port of Guayaquil, and it is difficult to understand how a place of its kind could give birth to a literary movement that has gained renown among the intellectual vanguard all over the continent and is now also becoming well known in the United States.

A single glance from the air reveals it as a small and insignificant town crouching at the foot of low hills at a point where two rivers and their many branches join to form the broad, mud-brown Kuayas. During the rainy season, from December till the beginning of May, the country round shines in luscious tropical green, from which the initiated may pick out the different shades of rice fields, pastures, cocoa, banana, or sugar plantations, brushwood, and virgin jungle-lands. During the rest of the year, when for seven months not a drop falls from the sky, the earth is slowly being scorched into dead grey and yellow, only along the riverbanks retaining signs of life.

The town itself, though founded more than four hundred years ago and therefore among the oldest on the continent, has only begun to lose its improvised air since modern technique allowed the defeat of the swamps and the gradual elimination of the low old-fashioned wooden buildings, easy victims of fires and the tropical climate. Today concrete structures are rising in their place to the unaccustomed height of six stories, but they have become unpopular since they suffered worst in the earthquake last May when two of them collapsed and buried dozens of people.

Most of Guayaquil's 150,000 inhabitants make their living by trade and commerce. Almost without industries, Ecuador has to import the greater part of the manufactured goods she needs and pays for them with agricultural products, with balsa wood and gold dust, all of which come floating down the rivers toward Guayaquil as the central market. With the tidal waves arrive and depart in launches, canoes, or on primitive

rafts hundreds of people from the backward hinterlands, the only ones to whom the town appears rich and colorful and immensely attractive.

Foreign tourists take one hasty look at the broad main street, the "Ninth of October Boulevard," leading down to the river, another at the palm trees along the quay, buy an Ecuadorian straw hat, falsely called "Panama," and retire to the air-conditioned lounge of the American-styled Hotel Metropolitano, or to Fortich's, where the pretty girls of Guayaquil's upper class add Latin grace to northern fashions.

There are only about eight miles of road leading out of town that can be used all year round. For the rest, there is a railway to the coast, another up to Quito, the capital on top of the Andes, there are the airplanes, and there is the river which serves as the highway of the poor. Nobody else seems to care much about it, apart from the few who go away on one of the big United States or Chilean liners, nor does any one heave a deep sigh to take in a breath of sea air. People live as on an island, and are content.

In the dry season, life is not altogether unpleasant. Whilst nature is writhing in agony for lack of water, man returns to relative vigor under the influence of refreshing winds that blow down from the mountains or from the Pacific. Yet even then people are pasty-faced and jumpy. Malaria and hookworm disease respect no season, though they usually get worse in winter when clouds of mosquitoes fall out of the steaming air, accompanied by millions of other winged tormentors—crickets, sandflies, cockroaches—that suck man's blood, nibble at his food, eat holes into his clothes, an unholy army of destruction.

Literature was perhaps discovered here some thirty years ago by the sensitive few as the only means of escape from a then even more restricted life. It started with a bit of poetry, imported from France or produced at home, and published in the Sunday edition of one of the local papers. Tropically voluptuous young ladies recited the verses they had read with dark luring eyes at house parties or at excursions to the big plantations. The first European war brought a note of discord, intensified by the economic disaster that befell Ecuador's coast as a result of the cacao blight. Too far away from the centers of historic decisions, uncertain of a direction in which to turn, and dissatisfied with the gap between their ambitions and their possibilities, Guayaquil's writers and

artists stimulated their flight into lofty heights by the use of drugs. Morphine, heroin, or opium became the hallmarks of the intellectual, so that even the sober ones pretended to be addicts in order not to lose prestige.

In 1920, the 19-year-old poet Medardo Angel Silva shot himself. Ecuador claims to have lost a genius. One of the reasons for his despair had been his humble social and racial origin. As his dark skin revealed, there was a good deal of Negro blood in his veins, and it is only of late that tropical society has started to do away with prejudices.

The spectacle which the feverish and decaying "odd ones" offered was viewed with little sympathy by the generation that followed them. The news that reached them from the outside world came from Russia and across the Pacific, rather than from a romantic Greece transplanted to Versailles. Their spirit was hopeful and aggressive, and they were bent on getting closer to reality, not on escaping it. When in 1922 hungry workers and jobless farmhands who had drifted into town rose in the famous revolt of the 15th of November, the writers who today are known as members of the "Group of Guayaquil" observed with the excited eyes of school boys how brutal force caused hundreds of victims in the streets of their town. The memory of that day has stayed fresh with them. Hardly a book by any of them omits at least a short reference to that tragic event.

In 1930 three of them set to work together and published *Los que se van* (Those who go away). None of the authors was much over twenty then. The book was crude, but a forceful step in the right direction: toward the description and interpretation of Ecuador's tropical coast. At about the same time, all over the continent, a similar movement had started. In Spanish and Portuguese, jungle and highland valleys and arid mountains, Mulattoes, Indians, and Mestizos were giving voice. Four hundred years after Columbus had reached the Western Hemisphere, the Latin Americans at last set out to discover their own continent. Nobody else could have done it for them.

Thus the Group of Guayaquil represents no isolated growth, but is intimately linked to all the other places where an autochthonous culture has started to develop. For many reasons, national frontiers form less important barriers than the differences of geographical, racial, social, and psychological conditions that exist within each of the countries. Espe-

cially are the West Coast countries fatefully divided into rigid Andean region and tropical or semitropical lowlands that have only in exceptional cases been tied yet into a true national unity. Ecuador could serve as the classic example.

In their work and ideas, the Guayaquil writers are typical of Latin American young intellectuals. Where less than twenty years ago disdainful eyes saw nothing but lack of refinement, primitiveness, dirt, and disease, the new generation discovered one of the last great fields of humanity still waiting to be explored. And they dug into it, at first clumsily, with all the fervor of novices who may throw away as worthless the greatest treasures, picking up some glittering potsherd instead. But even the worst of authors could claim the glory of a pioneer.

Many of the novels they turned out lack cohesion, balance, a central theme, break all the elementary rules of the craft. But the one thing they rarely lack is a profusion of unusual and fascinating characters: bandits, assassins, revolutionaries, impassioned women, Indians and Negroes rising in blind revolts, ruthless landowners and politicians with their fast-shooting henchmen.

It is a chaotic world where lawlessness abides and everybody including the *petit bourgeois* is full of destructive passions. Rape, murder, violent death crowd the pages, and the reader is spared no detail of the horrors that may befall man in his fight against his fellow human beings, or against nature, from the moment of birth till he returns from where he came from, through blood and darkness.

The first published work of the new Latin American school showed plainly that its authors had outgrown the romanticism which was so characteristic of the great Latin American novels of the past. They turned instead toward a dramatic treatment that put more emphasis on breadth of vision than on psychological depth. Often the authors' political ideas turned final chapters into descriptions of uprisings and revolts. Communists and others easily discovered that in the social confusion still reigning all over Latin America, only two clearly distinguishable groups of people existed: exploiters and exploited. The writers of today, and those of Guayaquil among them, made the most of the clash between the two groups, though in the absence of a proper working class the scene could rarely be set in the industrial field. Thus the underdog of the continent

found his passionate defenders before he himself became aware of the misery of his own position.

The brotherhood of Latin American writers and intellectuals is based on the similarity of their working material and of their general psychological and political outlook. From early youth onward experience has driven them to the left, has forced them into opposition to their governments, and has made them antifascist, antifalangist, and antinazi not since yesterday only, but ever since these muddled mortal ideologies were invented. In the majority of Latin American countries it would be difficult to find outstanding intellectuals that would not support the three-point program of "leftist, antigovernment, and anti-Axis."

In the religious field, the writers of Guayaquil like those of the rest of Latin America might be described as indifferent rather than antagonistic towards Catholicism. The victory of liberalism nearly everywhere on the continent has terminated the era of open interference by the Church in the affairs of the state, and as a result the religious issue has lost interest. On the other hand, customs are so strongly based on Catholic tradition that even the most rebellious leftists rarely dream of not getting married by a priest. It is either the mother or the wife or both who will make sure that heaven's blessings are properly asked for.

It is against this double background, their native town and the new literary movement of Latin America, that Guayaquil's young writers have to be seen and judged. The birthday of the Group of Guayaquil is usually fixed by the publication of *Los que se van* in October, 1930. The youthful authors were Enrique Gil Gilbert, Joaquin Gallegos Lara, and Demetrio Aguilera Malta. With Alfredo Pareja and José de la Cuadra, four and seven years their seniors, they drew together to form what later became known as the "Group."

The five were, in Enrique Gil Gilbert's plastic words, "as united as fingers in a fist." The youngest (he was born in 1912), he is the one who has most attracted the eyes of the outside world since he won the second prize in the Latin American novel contest, organized by Farrar and Rinehart for the first time in 1940. Unlike *Broad and Alien Is the World* by the exiled Peruvian author Ciro Alegría, who won first prize, Gil's *Nuestro Pan* (Our Bread) has not yet been translated in full and published in an English edition. (The Spanish edition sold 3,000 copies in six months,

a record for any Latin American book. Even well-established authors have usually to content themselves with less than half that number.)

The translation of *Nuestro Pan* is an almost impossible task. No other book by the Group of Guayaquil and few by Latin American authors from elsewhere have revealed that same poetic force. It could only be written by someone continually making use of all his five senses in order to capture every color, every sound and smell, every innermost feeling of the tropics, its landscape and people. Gil's imagery is intimately tied to the world around him and like a poet's always throws new light even on the humblest things. *Reader's Digest,* on its page "Picturesque Speech," printed an example: "He went out of the house to see the night face to face." It is neither the most typical nor the best.

Elsewhere in the same book he speaks of "music sad like a clouded afternoon, like the music of a sea shell, like the bleating of an orphaned calf." But who will understand this who has not lived here under the heavy hopeless sky of the tropics when time seems to stand still and damp air and sweat drench the shirt that sticks to the listless body; when coolness and energy and satisfaction seem so endlessly far away and utterly unobtainable? Who can capture the melancholy meaning of that reference to the single sound of the big spiral shell which the fishermen and the humble traveling vendors blow when they paddle down the rivers in their canoes to offer their catch or their fruit to the poverty-stricken, malaria-haunted inhabitants of the tropical coast? And the lowing of the calves, too, has a tone of special anxiety in the tropics, where the seasons change from one torturing extreme to the other, where there is always either too much rain or none at all, where ticks and vampire bats and snakes and vile flies fall on the innocent and unprotected.

Enrique Gil learned his craft on his father's and uncles' plantations, where the illiterate country people talked unspoiled by vulgar reading, under the tongue-loosening influence of *aguardiente* and the stimulus of popular songs brought to them from Castile or invented by the playful Negroes. Enrique himself undoubtedly has some Negro, and maybe also Indian, blood in his veins. He is pleased about it. How else could he be *un americano*? From his mother's side he is a "Gilbert." Captain William Gilbert came to Guayaquil from Liverpool and never sailed home again. There is no trace of him in Enrique's mop of black hair, his

swarthy skin, and the easy grin of his flashing teeth. Some whim of nature made him resemble Joseph Stalin, though one without a moustache. Enrique Gil could wish for no happier coincidence: for years he has been an active and enthusiastic member of the Communist Party.

It was his boundless optimism rather than his cold reasoning which drove him that way. He takes a generous pride in being a "comrade" and in putting his fraternal arm around a workman's shoulders. At times he will even go as far as calling himself a proletarian, not in order to deceive, but to be all the more sincerely one of them. He works as a teacher of literature in the country's biggest secondary school for boys, is married to the tropically handsome Alba Calderon, a very talented young painter, and has an eight-year-old son, who said he would write "Our Sausage" as a continuation to *Nuestro Pan.*

In 1941, Enrique and his wife went abroad for the first time. As a premium for his prize-winning novel he had been invited to the United States. He had known of and talked about "U. S. imperialism." Now he met the Good Neighbor and the man in the street, and he discovered that there was a sincere understanding, a far-reaching collaboration possible, after all. "We have heard too much about the newspaper boy who came to be a millionaire. It's about time we were told that there are millions of people in the U.S.A. struggling like us. They and we have a common cause."

Joaquin Gallegos Lara, second member of the original writing team, is also a Communist, but he is one of the dogmatic, relentless type. Where Enrique would try to settle things amiably, just by sheer pressure of the majority and the convincing power of the inspired word, Gallegos Lara is ready to shoot. Even his friends, if need be, in case they should refuse to toe the line. They feel neither offended nor threatened, but look on Joaquin Gallegos with tenderness. He was born a cripple. His short legs dangle down helplessly like the clappers of a silent bell. When he wants to move, he jumps on the back of a stocky little man—"my pair of legs," as he calls him—who carries him around like a big-headed goblin. Since the days when *Los que se van* was published, Joaquin Gallegos Lara has written little, but now at last has finished a long novel, *Cruces sobre el Agua* (Crosses on the Water). The title refers to the bodies of the dead

workers which floated down the river Guayas to a nameless grave on that November day of revolt twenty years ago.

The third of the one-time collaborators, Demetrio Aguilera Malta, has little interest in politics. Even when the Spanish Civil War caught him in Madrid, he did not pick up a gun. His wife and little daughter were with him, and he had to think of their safety. Yet he is a man of the left, like all of them. He has traveled a good deal, first with his father, later alone. One of his earliest recollections is that of having got lost in Chicago, where the police mistook him for a new Caspar Hauser since he bawled at them in a queer tongue and did not understand a word of what was said to him.

At the age of 20 he went adventuring on his own in Panama and Cuba, wrote, painted, made friends with everyone. In 1935 (when he was still only 25 years old) he published the result of some of his experiences in his novel *Canal Zone,* with the subtitle that betrayed his doctrine: *Los Yanquis en Panamá.* In it he explained that out of the clash of interests between North and South only the white man would rise triumphantly. For the others, there could only be defeat and hatred. "It seemed to him that everything—in Panama—was the fault of the Canal." But 1935 is now a long way off, perhaps longer than those days when nobody understood him in Chicago.

The Yankee spirit seems to have influenced him sufficiently, at any rate, to make him try his luck in a business of his own. Together with his brother he is now running a small flour mill and maccaroni factory in his native Guayaquil. Most of the people who discuss with him the price and delivery of a dozen sacks of *harina de primera* have no idea the young man in front of them sits up at night bent not over his accounts, but over another novel in which their faces, their way of speaking, their hidden thoughts may all reappear with some strange new meaning.

His best known work so far that has recently also been translated into English, most representative of his own ideas and that of the Group of Guayaquil, is *Don Goyo.* It is a story of the fishermen and woodcutters along the tropical rivers that flow through jungle-land toward the Pacific. Man and nature are one, joined by a pantheistic mysticism that is nourished rather than combatted by a Catholicism perverted into a mixture of superstition and idolatry. Yet both the pagan and the Catholic are

slowly fading. What is going to take their place? Almost certainly not the Communism Gil Gilbert and Gallegos Lara are hoping for. The old social order is falling to bits. For the time being there is little but resignation, malaria, and fatigue.

Demetrio is not a sociologist, and so far has taken no part in the discussion of the "things to come." Though he continues writing novels, his life's obsession is the theatre, and his life's tragedy that his own country is too small to have a stage, a first-class theatrical company, an appreciative audience. If people say that they go to the "theatre," they refer to the cinema. It is the one and only never failing entertainment.

Added to the three authors of *Los que se van* were two more to form the "inner five": Alfredo Pareja y Diez-Canseco and José de la Cuadra. Pareja's father and his whole upbringing are Ecuadorian, but his mother is of Peruvian origin; in Latin America, nations get as mixed as races. He looks a pure white, lean as a greyhound, but it is impossible to assume that among his ancestors he had neither Negroes nor Indians. The most solid of the lot, the most levelheaded, most realistic, he has learned to give even to his dreams a firm manly outline:

"I want to make plenty of money in as short a time as possible," he explained. "After that I'll retire and lead the life of an intellectual, writing, reading, studying. Here in Latin America you can't live decently merely by being a servant of the spirit."

Yet writing is too much in his blood ("Those young fellows of Guayaquil produce novels the way ordinary people sweat," the Peruvian literary critic Luis-Alberto Sánchez declared some years ago) to be left aside for more than a few months. At the age of 34, Pareja has published eight books and innumerable articles, has another book in the press and a tenth under his pen. He was almost pleased to be taken a prisoner in 1938 because it gave him a chance to write, and his experiences and observations provided him moreover with material for his technically and psychologically most accomplished book *Hombres sin Tiempo* (Timeless Men).

Imprisonment might be considered a normal occurrence in the life of an intellectual in a good many of the Latin American countries, since few of them could be found outside the ranks of the opposition, and opposition is a punishable offense. Pareja was twice in prison, once exiled. It is not always a comic-opera affair, though he and his friends may make

light of it. In 1938 he was captured, for having defended, in his role of deputy, the constitutional rights of Congress against a President turned dictator. An infantry regiment promised support, there was some shooting, Pareja himself fired four times in the direction of the "enemy," and after a flight across the hills, after days of hiding and excited discussions, came the arrest.

In 1941, after the Peruvian invasion, which was only feebly resisted by the almost unarmed Ecuador, a group of people set to work to build a new party, destined to take a big broom and sweep out dirt and corruption. Pareja, a convinced Socialist, thought it his duty to contribute to its organization. Like so much that springs up in the tropical heat overnight and withers before the evening, it all came quickly to nothing. So Pareja returned to his office and his nocturnal writing.

He is the owner of a prosperous import business that deals with big United States firms and Ecuadorian doctors and hospitals. And though he disclaims any interest in the workings of the capitalist machine, he likes its bustle and the activity it forces upon him. Far back in 1930, he spent some time in the United States, in that dark age when the Good Neighbor Policy had not yet been invented and a Latin American could rarely boast of banquets given in his honor. Pareja worked as a dishwasher, casual laborer, Spanish teacher, and nobody gave him a cent for being a writer.

José de la Cuadra was just old enough to stand halfway between the "odd ones" and the Group of Guayaquil which accepted him as one of its own, and he had traits of both. His country seemed too narrow to him, and he fell a victim to many of its vices. His participation in the political life of Ecuador was fitful and without a strong central creed. In front of him he saw nothing but decay and corruption. In his writings he used the purest Spanish style of them all, in his short stories he came closest to world standards of perfection. The men and women from the coast and his hometown about whom he wrote with such measured affection frequently reached a significance and classical simplicity that make them stand out unforgettably. But de la Cuadra found no complete escape in writing. His whole body seemed to ache from the pressure of restraint. Only alcohol could offer him relief. His recent premature death from heart failure at the age of thirty-six had all the appearance of a suicide.

Today it looks as if his place might fall to Angel F. Rojas, a comparative newcomer to the group and a "foreigner"—his soft voice and pleasant accent betray him at once as a native of the south of Ecuador. In the eyes of his friends there exist two Rojas—one with his hat on, the other as God made him: though only thirty-two, the tall, slender, long-limbed young man has hardly a hair left on his head. He and the wild-mopped Enrique Gil form a strange enough couple when they walk down the Boulevard at night, the street resounding with their heated discussion of literature and politics or their laughter at themselves and the world around them.

Rojas is a member of the Socialist Party, in which he has acted for several years now as regional secretary. He, too, has been made to suffer for his political ideas, and the fact that he is a lawyer by profession whose job it is to keep people out of prison adds an ironical touch to his own incarceration. Rojas would be the first to be aware of it. He possesses that sense of irony which is so rare a characteristic with the men of the tropics. An air of loneliness and melancholy surrounds him, and he does not seem easily swayed by passion. His comments are feared and appreciated by his friends.

It came as a shock to them when at the end of his imprisonment early in 1942 he got married to a beautiful young woman who for many years had formed part of Guayaquil's intellectual circle. Pouring mockery over himself and his wife, he pretended to have embarked on another absurd experiment. The birth of a child ended his "marriage affair" and brought forth the whole tenderness of his character .With the most unusual common sense his wife accepted along with her own child two offspring of his from a former illegitimate relationship, keeping well apart from the two extremes of dumb resignation and fiendish jealousy which other Latin American women reveal when they find themselves confronted with the not at all exceptional role of having to foster their husbands' other children.

These five, then, represent the core. Round them and their wives are grouped several more novelists, three or four poets of whom the much-traveled Abel Romeo Castillo is the most polished, painters, journalists, architects, with the mulatto elements gradually ascending. Two years ago they all joined to form the Society of Independent Artists and Writers,

an association that has been and still is extremely active in all the fields corresponding to it. It has received and made friends with all the North American intellectuals that have come to Guayaquil—Thorton Wilder, John Dos Passos, and many others.

They are held together by a profound feeling of unity, a unity that would be exceptional in such circles even in more objective-minded countries than those of Latin America. It is stimulated, of course, by their being so close to each other in age and general philosophy. But there is also in it the generosity and lightheartedness of the tropics in their best form, the comradeship existing among Latins that permits the show of affection among men without fear of appearing effeminate. So genuine is their friendship that the triumph of one is that of all. Professional ideas are pooled till one of them turns them into a new work that is at once marked down as another achievement on the Group's long register.

But perhaps the difference between the writers and artists of Guayaquil and their colleagues elsewhere, including their own capital, is most marked in regard to their married lives. Whereas the general tendency among Latin American men is to stay single as long as possible and marry only after the saturation point for sexual promiscuity has been reached, the members of the Group of Guayaquil and their friends chose their wives as soon as they could modestly support them. More surprising still: they have remained faithful to them in surroundings where marital loyalty is generally considered a sign of "softness." All over Latin America it is the rule that evenings out are purely a man's affair. Only in Guayaquil do young women sit down beside their husbands at the *café* or restaurant table, their dark eyes shining with pride and laughter. In consequence alcohol consumption is exceptionally low and excesses and scandals are completely unknown. Among the intellectuals of Guayaquil there are no Bohemians.

Yet, as time goes on, a growing restlessness can be felt. Intimately in contact with the outside world through all the channels open to them, these young men know right down in their hears and minds that everywhere on earth history is being made now, that the outline of a new world is slowly rising out of the smoke of battle. Ecuador, for many reasons, is holding merely a passive post so that it seems as if she had been pushed aside by the hand of fate.

With ever increasing insistence the best of young Ecuadorians therefore complain that there is no room, no immediate task for them at home. Several have escaped already: José de la Cuadra into death, Pablo Palacio into insanity, Gerardo Gallegos to Central America. The others are thinking now of packing their trunks to go to Argentina, to Brazil, or, best of all, to the United States, which is exercising an increasing power of attraction. The young men and their wives speak of leaving, maybe for a year, maybe for two, maybe forever.

Thus the process of a rapprochement between the Latin American countries themselves and the growth of an Andean culture has been interrupted. Ten or fifteen years ago it was necessary and daring to turn the eyes away from Europe toward the life and conditions of the people in their own town or country. Now these appear once more, thanks to Hitler, insignificant and without interest; the young men feel ashamed and apologetic for not being in the midst of the fighting. Conditions at home may require profound changes, but they seem less urgent, and in any case, the ideas and collaboration of the young are not welcomed by those in power.

So much is certain: Ecuador would profit well by journeys of her young intellectuals abroad. They are the best propagandists she could hope for. When Nelson Rockefeller passed through Guayaquil, he praised the landscape and the painters. Mt. Chimborazo cannot be exported. The artists and writers can. On the part of the United States they merit every support. Former hostility has melted away under the influence of a more generous spirit in the North and the clear recognition by the South and its vanguard that in the big struggle of today they must stand side by side.

Yet it must also be kept in mind that as time goes on the pressure of war will lessen while northern economic influence all over the continent will continue growing. How can the small countries hope to hold their own? Only by preserving the independence of their spirit and a sound individuality in their cultural achievements that would foster their pride in the right way. It is in the interest of both parties concerned that such achievements should be encouraged.

THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN

By J. SAUNDERS REDDING

THE EXIGENCIES OF THIS WAR and the kind of war this is have focused belated interest on the problems of minority, exploited, and underprivileged peoples. The Negro in America has come in for a large share of this attention. As much has been said and written about America's number-one social problem in the past eighteen months as in the five years preceding Pearl Harbor. Humanitarian liberals have taken great encouragement from this. They hope that in the process of readjustment—which this war is and which will go on when the military phase is done—the Negro's place in America will be finally established on an equitable, democratic basis. But before this can be accomplished, certain fixed ideas must be rooted out.

Much as this war may tend to promote it, as great as it is as a social revolution, and as broad as the promises it holds for the forgotten peoples seem to be, there is nothing in it to indicate a permanent dissolution of old stereotypes that condition so much of our national and racial thinking. However much we admire and however great our feelings of gratitude toward Russia, we still look askance at her and wonder aloud if the recent liquidation of the Comintern is not some dark, "Bolshevik" trick. However much we shower Madame Chiang Kai-shek with courtesies and applaud her speeches, we still think down our noses of the Chinese people as Chinks or Chinamen, and it is still possible for some members of the Congressional Immigration Committee to say, as they did recently, that they are willing to have the Chinese Exclusion Acts wiped off the books but are not willing to permit the immigration of Chinese to this country. Our sympathies for Gandhi and the people of India have been touched, but we still divorce from our thinking India as a country of people very much like ourselves. And more immediately, however much we decry the attitudes in our own country that split us on race lines so that production in war industries slows down or stops altogether, the morale of our Negro troops falls to zero, and sporadic out-

bursts occur even in northern cities, we still think of Negroes as niggers, darkies, and subhuman.

Such fixed notions as we commonly employ to save ourselves the labor of thinking and the pain of discarding the old for the new are usually very simple and stated in apothegms. In the case of our concepts about the Negro problem, however, our fixed ideas have such an accretion of intorted thinking that, in simple truth, they might have served as models for the ethnic thinking imposed upon the German people since Hitler. The process of accretion is old. It has had material help from the Book of Genesis, history, literature, folkstuff, the movies, and radio. Behind the stereotypes are hidden the real issues.

Meeting in Durham, North Carolina, in October, 1942, for the purpose of re-establishing a basis for interracial cooperation, a group of representative southern Negroes found it necessary to make the following statement:

"We regard it as unfortunate that the simple efforts to correct obvious social and economic injustices continue, with such considerable popular support, to be interpreted as the predatory ambition of irresponsible Negroes to invade the privacy of family life."

The statement was an attack upon the concept—the most vicious and widespread of all—that the Negro wants something commonly called "social equality." The term is a bugaboo, its meaning lost in a miasmic fog of passion. And this, of course, is what the demagogues in public office and those seeking public office in the South want, for by this means the real issues in the Negro question are lost sight of. The real issues are themselves so clear-cut and simple and so loaded for just solution that the men who play their own game with the Negro question cannot afford to face them squarely or to let them be seen. So they hide them, as Eugene Talmadge did in his re-election campaign last fall: "As long as I am your Governor no Negro foreman will give orders to white men and women in the mills of this state"—when the issue was merely the federal government's fair employment practices order. And as Ellis (Boy Wonder) Arnall did in the same campaign when he said, "There is not a decent white man or woman in Georgia who believes in social equality among whites and blacks," when the issue was merely a more equitable distribution of tax-raised school funds.

What is meant by social equality? Reduced to this, the Negro problem becomes almost a problem in semantics. But no one reduces it to this, not because it is irreducible, but because reduction would immediately destroy the potency of the false postulates upon which the racial thinking of the common people is founded. There would be no argument (and no vote-getting power) left in "white supremacy" if this were done. The stubborn, almost psychopathic attachment which the South has for its "social structure," its "race integrity," and its "culture" would be irreparably weakened, and the warm, egoistic feelings of race superiority, which is the reward of the believers, would be done away with.

To an outsider the ease with which these postulates are maintained and the disruptive force they have in a time that calls for national unity and forecasts deep social change are altogether amazing. Even the English, who seldom wonder at anything, wonder at it. Reporting from London, Raymond Clapper, a well-known American columnist, says that the Negro problem in America is "the subject of widespread interest" in England, "because it is regarded as one of the *big minority problems of the world.*" (Italics added) "For 20,000 workers to stop production over the employment of three American citizens of dark skin does not make sense abroad. . . ." But it makes sense in America where the postulates are accepted, and where the governor of a state can solve the whole great problem by telling a howling mob of his felt-hat boys, "Yes, the Negro has a place, and that place is at the back door"; and where, from a more sedate but scarcely more intelligent audience of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, Mississippi's Senator Eastland can lift prolonged applause by declaring, as he did in early summer, that the South stands for a "system which deals honestly, fairly and with justice to all peoples regardless of race, creed or color, but which maintains that the white race must rule supreme to protect its purity, integrity, and creative genius, and which holds that these things are necessary to protect the future of America."

Of course no one really knows what white southerners mean by "social equality"—nor by race integrity, which seems to have nothing to do with race morality; nor by sacred social structure, which has one attribute of sanctity, inviolability—nor does the South itself know. Most southerners, even the liberals of the Etheridge-Dabney-Daniels stamp, are

content to use the phrase as an incantation to conjure up the picture of some lovely specimen of white womanhood wedded to a Negro. This is the short, effective view that terminates any discussion of the term as soon as it is uttered. It is also an indefensible view. The truth is that that kind of social equality cannot be brought about by fiat. And who would want it if it could be? No matter what comes in the wake of or concurrent with the social revolution that this war is, no one expects a breakdown of the tradition of segregation that will take this immediate direction. No government regulation or intercession could do it, and only a mad Nazi or Fascist government would implement laws prescribing a peoples' choice of associates and lovers, for only a mad Nazi or Fascist government would think it so important. As a matter of fact, all social contacts must be on a plane of equality, else they are neither social nor satisfying.

In so far—and it is considerably far—as the Negro problem lies in the range of interpretations and meanings of concepts and postulates that surround it, education is at fault. Perhaps it would be better to say that the men and women who write the textbooks and do the teaching are at fault. Textbooks used in the South, and especially in the lower grades, are undoubtedly written with a racial slant, and undoubtedly also the great majority of teachers are textbook teachers. Time and again Negro groups have protested at the twisted knowledge handed out even to their own children by their own Negro teachers. These protests have done some good. No longer in use is the once widely-studied textbook which declared: "Mississippi is the only state in the South where there are said to be more Negroes than white people. This is a situation full of danger. . . ." Much of the reading, however, still abounds in such concept-building words as pickaninny, darky, shine, and tarbaby, and in humorously degrading stories of the Negro. As Dr. Howard Odum points out in his monumental *Southern Regions,* in the colleges the emphasis is still upon the South's culture, the South's social structure, the South's economy, the South's politics, as if the South were a country totally foreign to the United States.

It is because of this sectional habit of thought that the popular mind in the South conceives of the Negro problem as a strictly Southern problem and resents any show of interference from the North. And if, as

Professor Avery Craven said in a University of Chicago Round Table program last spring, there is a "constant assumption in certain quarters that the only reason the Negro has not progressed in the South is southern stupidity, southern brutality, and a refusal to face the honest question," then the South itself has diligently fostered that assumption. But of course the Negro problem is not exclusively a southern problem. It has always been national, and now, patently, the war has given it international implications of great scope.

One must take a long view of that phase of the Negro problem lying within the range of education. The process of learning that built up the ruinous concepts and the false postulates was a long one. The destruction of the intellectual and emotional force of these concepts may be even longer. It is re-education that is needed. Of necessity it would be a re-education of the whole people, North and South, for the North, too, has been falsely taught. Under our present system of education, it would have to be largely voluntarily undertaken, and this, as Pearl Buck says, would make it a "deep and difficult process." Its design would be to change the behavior of the people, their emotions and convictions. To do this the process should embrace a program reaching from the primary school through the high school and on into college. It would begin by discarding men, women, and textbooks and replacing them with others whose zeal for the program, whose courage in the face of human inertia and opposition would not falter, and whose democratic liberalism had no blind spots. It would have to go as ruthlessly toward its ends as a nation at war; but it would have to go quietly, without the beating of drums. In short, both the process and the result must be good and true and altogether a fine thing for the world. It should be begun at once.

II

But there is another phase of the Negro problem that has a certain clear immediacy. This phase has to do with such matters as discriminatory practices in our public social institutions, the arbitrary infringement of the Negro's fundamental rights, as in lynching (of which there have been nine this year up to mid-October), the customary denial to the Negro the chance to pick his own spokesmen or to be his own spokesman. The distribution of public school funds, for an instance, is notoriously in-

equitable. The poll tax and the lily-white primary are but two of several practices that effectively throttle the Negro's vote. The laws of interstate travel are broken every day in deference to the custom of segregation.

This phase of the problem is in the realm of public government, but there has been so much temporization and compromise by the Federal authorities on the one hand and so much chicanery and blatant noise by the average southern politician on the other that nothing effective has been done. Administrative forces have played politics with the southerners on an antilynching bill in three consecutive Congressional sessions. The Wages and Hours legislation was neatly riddled (and was permitted to be riddled) so that benefits which should have accrued to southern Negro labor were blocked. The announced policy of the Fair Employment Practices Committee was set aside when Mark Etheridge, its first chairman and a southerner, denied that policy in a speech at Birmingham, and when Frank Dixon, then Governor of Alabama, told it off by refusing for his state a federal contract which stipulated that Negroes were to be employed on the same basis as whites and in whatever capacities they could serve. Judge William T. Hastie, Special Assistant and Consultant for Negro Affairs to War Secretary Stimson, was forced to resign when southern opposition formed solidly against the policy of permitting Negroes to enter all branches of the military.

In ordinary times this cynical treatment of the Negro's democratic aspirations is bad enough, but in this time of world crisis when social crusts everywhere are cracking and the heave of the world is the spasm of change, it is a national shame. The Negro is not blind to the effects of his situation on the world situation. Axis propaganda has not missed the point. Axis agents certainly had a hand in the "Eleanor Club" rumors, and probably have at least a finger in the work stoppages, the military camp disturbances, and the zoot-suit riots, when these have a racial basis. The failure of the federal administration to wield effective control over the undemocratic elements in our society is a potent weapon against us. Its potency is nowhere better shown than in the growing apathy of the Negro citizen on the home front and the admittedly low morale of Negro troops.

For what one must take as democratic necessity, the federal administration admits of no policy that sets the Negro off for special treatment on

the basis of color. The administration holds that ideally under democratic statutes and processes there is no necessity for this. But the realities of the situation are different, and in actual practice the administration does what ideally there should be no need to do. This, of course, is riding a horse both ways at once. The result is bucking and confusion.

The hard reality of the situation is acknowledged by the administration in the number of "experts" and "consultants" on Negro affairs employed by various government agencies and offices. There are such experts in the War office, the Interior office, the Agriculture office, the Labor office; in O.C.D., W.M.C., O.W.I., and F.H.A. What these men's jobs are is in some doubt, but they have a certain propaganda value among a small fringe of knowing but relatively unimportant Negroes. They do not touch the mass. It is no criticism of them to say that they formulate no policies. A few of them admit that their jobs are sops to political expediency. They carry out orders. They sometimes issue orders under the general directives of emergency policies created in emergency situations—and this is wrong, for it tends to keep Negroes and their problems on an emergency status. These experts propagandize. They investigate. When they try to formulate policy they are smacked down hard, as was William Pickens. Or, if they are strong in courage and sick with disgust, as was William Hastie, they resign.

In spite of the opposition of an articulate Negro faction to the proposal, mentioned by Carey McWilliams in his *Brothers Under the Skin,* that there be set up in the government an Office of Negro Affairs, the suggestion still seems good. The N.A.A.C.P. decried it fiercely. According to its lights it had every right to. The whole theoretical policy of the N.A.A.C.P. is against any commitment that seems to set the Negro apart for special treatment. Yet it is evident that there is a total lack of consistency between its policy and practice. It has been largely through the influence of the N.A.A.C.P. that specific appointments of consultants on Negro affairs have been made in various government departments. William Hastie himself was their man, both as a Federal Judge in the Virgin Islands (a clear case of special treatment) and as Special Assistant to Secretary of War Stimson. It was one of the N.A.A.C.P.'s best known men who insisted that the national office of U.S.O. employ a Negro consultant on Negro affairs. One is hard put to understand the N.A.A.C.P.'s attitude

on the proposal discussed by McWilliams. There seems little harm in openly sanctioning what it has secretly abetted.

And the Negro must be set up for special treatment, for in a very real sense it is special treatment he wants. He is a source of sickness in a sick body politic. He is like the lung in a tuberculous body, though, also like the lung, his affliction is not of his own making. The point that his affliction is not of his own making should be emphasized. But just as the physician, while treating the whole body, gives special attention to the lung, so he who would cure our sick democracy must give special attention to the Negro. This is what England must do for India in order to cure the vast sickness in the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is what the Allies are doing in regard to Italy. It is what must be done for Germany to wipe out the recurrent plague of Europe.

The argument, also advanced by the N.A.A.C.P., that the setting up of a government office to deal with Negro affairs would make Negroes the mere ward of the government seems to beg the question. It assumes that the sick member of the body politic will never get well. Or perhaps a definition of terms is needed. In the strictest sense, any people is the ward of its government. Wars have been fought because of the government's obligation to protect its nationals. And what the Negro wants exactly is that the government recognize a sense of obligation to him and to extend its wardship to him on terms of equality with all other people. The Negro has been trying in haphazard ways to get this extension of wardship. Now the proposal is to channelize these haphazard activities and energies; and the proposal seems good.

As Carey McWilliams has pointed out, the setting up of a racial minority for special treatment is no new thing in this country. Two precedents have been established. One of them, Reconstruction, failed dismally, but the failure was in men and method rather than in idea. The second precedent, and the one upon which McWilliams dwells, was and is an important success for the idea, in spite of sometimes sorry men and deplorable methods. There are pages of its history full of chicanery and blood, but the Office of Indian Affairs has done its work extremely well under great difficulties. And it must be remembered that for a time the Office of Indian Affairs functioned for three races—Indian, Negro, white —among the Five Civilized Nations.

An Office of Negro Affairs would no doubt encounter greater difficulties because the problems are greater and because too many years have elapsed during which nothing has been done. Properly established, however, it would almost certainly have some success, and even a little success would be a great benefit. Though, like the Office of Indian Affairs, the Office of Negro Affairs could be established under a department already existing, it should be no mere appendage. Nor should it be a refuge for strutting bureaucrats. It should represent a sincere, co-ordinated effort to make democracy work for the country's most important minority. It would be incalculably more effective than the experts in Negro affairs who function independently in scattered government departments. It would cost a lot of money perhaps, but it would cost considerably less than the $30,000,000 a year that 350,000 Indians now cost. The Office of Negro Affairs would have to maintain no Negro reservations, no federal territories on which schools and roads, police and courts and other services would have to be kept up. It would not be a permanent fixture in the democratic structure any more than the Office of Indian Affairs is permanent.

The function of such an office would be administrative, and legislative in that it would propose and shape legislation. It would co-ordinate activities in behalf of the Negro. It would fact-find, opinion-find, will-find. It would serve as a clearing house for those race problems in the field of public government that have gone unsolved because sheer human inertia solves nothing. It would help to interpret one people to another and it would help to shape the will of the democratic whole. Properly staffed, it would go a long way toward taking a major kink out of American democracy. It would require men of the finest tact in a situation so unused to diplomatic delicacy.

But there are strong and brilliant men, white and Negro, North and South. Indeed, even now there may be hidden away somewhere in the government a man big enough to take the terrible responsibility of directing an agency so far-reaching in its possibilities for social reformation and so important to steady growth toward the democratic ideal.

VIRGINIA WOOLF AND THE EMPTY ROOM

By EDWIN BERRY BURGUM

IN 1924, when her reputation had become secure, Virginia Woolf issued an oblique justification of her work. It was in the form of a demand that the English novel recover its traditional simplicity of purpose. A novel, she insisted with refreshing common sense, is essentially a story written to widen the circle of our friends and acquaintances. It is intended to satisfy our natural curiosity about the Mrs. Browns we chance to meet in railway coaches but are forced by the circumstances of travel to leave as anonymous as their names. It breaks through the limitation of our actual relationships to people by extending them on the level of probability. Unfortunately, popular novelists like Arnold Bennett, she said, instead of finding out more about Mrs. Brown herself, were distracted into collecting the thousand and one irrelevant details about what had come to be known as her "background"; while others, like Mr. Wells, swept her negligently into a boisterous picture of human progress. Mrs. Woolf rejected both of these prevalent conceptions of fiction which in academic circles are called the naturalistic novel and the novel of ideas. She pointed to the rise of a group of younger writers, including James Joyce and herself, as proof that the restoration of purpose she demanded was already taking place.

In contrast to her novels, Mrs. Woolf's essay was a casual performance, reflecting only one aspect of her practice. A reading of her fiction shows that she drew back as definitely from the excesses of a different sort that developed among the writers whom she admired. She agreed with Joyce, for instance, that "internal monologue" and unconscious motivation deserve attention. But she refused to burrow so deeply into the inner life of her characters that their contact with the external world became obscure. In her best work, in *Mrs. Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse,* she fixed as the center of interest that area of the personality where the unconscious elements mingle with awareness of the world outside. But if her focus

was similar to that of Proust, she refused to distract her reader by his long analyses of the complex relationships behind its apparent clarity. She wished to keep uppermost the sense of movement, of constant shift of actual content, at this focal point. Proust's absorption in philosophy and aesthetics might be infinitely more profound than Mr. Wells's flashy dabbling with politics, but both were open to the same theoretical objection. Philosophy of art and philosophy of life she accepted as inescapably the concern of modern man, but the novel should present them as such, as part of the social intercourse of sensitive intelligent people, matters that they talked about when they came together. It was this coming together that she emphasized. Whatever philosophy she needed would be determined empirically by her observation of living men and women, and emerge as the structure of her novel. Form was to be discovered in life and not deduced from airy speculation. The plot of the novel was its discovery, and the theme its general statement. Mrs. Woolf took for granted, like an educated Englishman of her day, the existence of a law of order and sanity in the external world. It was the novelist's privilege to be able to give a sharp direct representation of human relationships free from the indirection of abstract statement.

Mrs. Woolf did not articulate these critical ideas partly, it is to be presumed, because their very nature led her to be rather absorbed in the application of them and they developed gradually in the process of her writing. But she did not express them, I think, primarily because she could not bring into her own consciousness the difficulties a writer of the '20's faced when he sought only to tell a simple story. The superficial gaiety of her essay is as much a keeping up of her own spirits, as its negative approach is the distraction of an amiable polemic against those writers who had taken the easy way. For certainly, though she is elsewhere a master of the ironic, this paradox here escaped her, that her writers of simple stories were much more esoteric and difficult to follow than Mr. Bennett and Mr. Wells with all their irrelevancies. Even though we accept (as I for one do) her definition of the novel, she never squarely faced the question why writers from Flaubert down to herself who sought to follow it had done so only at the cost of the most excruciating effort. The history of pure fiction shows a constant increase of unintelligibility.

Before she reached this point she let theory go and buried herself in practice. But once more her practice furnishes a clear answer. The recur-

rent theme in all her fiction is the hostility of life itself to her ideal. The flaws in the conceptions of fiction she opposes are unfortunately found to be only reflections of similar flaws in society at large. When the writer centers his attention upon that area where the inner life of the personality meets the impact of the external world, the focus of co-ordination he seeks can hardly be said to exist. The consciousness has not only lost touch with the unconscious within; it has secured no more than the conventional co-operation of other persons for the achievement of its external contacts. Having thrust the rich human interest of love and friendship into the background, our personalities have shriveled into the dimensions set by professional ambition, and our relationships to the external world have been debased into professional rivalries and shallow social conformities. The order the novelist achieves is the clarification of this actual disorder, and he best attains it when he stands at this focal point where the integration should most strikingly show itself. Consequently, Mrs. Woolf's novels, like her essay, take the negative approach of concern with an ideal that has disappeared, that perhaps (as Proust believed) had never existed on the level of actuality. But there could be no doubt, nevertheless, that it remained the central need of the human personality.

The recurrent theme of her fiction is therefore the loss in the modern world of the Renaissance ideal of the well-rounded man, what our psychology terms the man of well-integrated personality, a loss which affords the novelist the melancholy opportunity to depict people groping for human contacts they are unable to make. What Wells and Bennett were doing as professionals in fiction, substituting the bandying of facts or ideas for human contacts, she realized had become the prevalent practice in the world at large. In place of men and women, conscious of the need for love and the amenities of culture, men, at least, had come to take nothing but business seriously, and to regard business itself as a hostile competition. Mrs. Woolf's interest in feminism was not at all a demand that women get the privilege to shrink their natures within these bourgeois limits, but an assertion that women, bereft as they were of their rights, still retained a more adequate conception and practice of the true ends of living as an older and healthier tradition had understood them.

Her position is an unmistakable inference from the most autobiographical of her novels. In *To the Lighthouse* she accepts Mrs. Ramsay's attitude toward her husband's research as a literary critic. While granting

it a measure of respect (for, after all, he is not selling beef), she does not, as he does, conceive it to be the most important of life's concerns. There is more irony than Mrs. Woolf's sheltered position enabled her to be aware of in her making her hero a specialist in culture who worries, like any businessman, lest some competitor surpass his output and take over control of the market of ideas. Mr. Ramsay lives, as she puts it with a revision of Browning, in a mood of vexation because he has only reached the letter "Q" in the dictionary of literary knowledge and somebody else may get to the letter "R" ahead of him. But as a Victorian woman (here the paradox of her feminism enters), his wife can only submit and repair the damage to the social fabric from his irritability by a pressure of vigilant tactful suggestion under rebuff, which ultimately exhausts her and causes her untimely death.

I can only take Mrs. Ramsay's death as Mrs. Woolf's unconscious symbol of her own failure to reach her objective. The ideal of right relationships was an obsession with her. Our inability to establish them is, in one variation or another, the theme of all her important work. Early in her career she nurtured the hope that since the tradition of culture had never lost this aim, it might be restored to society. But the longer she writes, the more certain she becomes that society is moving further away from such decencies, and, unlike Proust, she cannot renounce her fealty to the actual world for any compensation in the ideal world of creative writing. She cannot renounce the necessity, that is, for right relationships, too, between the ideal and the actual. If the objective world drifts further from the amenity of these insights, she cannot herself escape the knowledge that she remains a part of that world. The accident of death is the sole escape the inexorable nature of things permits. While her consciousness continues to be absorbed by this problem of human contacts, the idea of death lies more deeply concealed in her unconscious than her habits permitted her to explore. But it was only waiting to come to the surface, when other ties had been broken, as man's final relationship to nature itself.

II

Mrs. Woolf's initial attempts at fiction had not been promising. Her experience in both living and writing seems to have been inadequate. The value of *The Voyage Out* is the illumination its rather startling failure

sheds upon her subsequent writing. If the book escaped without difficulty the fallacy of Mr. Wells, its effort was painful to avoid the temptation of Mr. Bennett. The theme was clearly the hesitation a girl of spirit and breeding felt at yielding in marriage to one of the traditionally dominant sex. It is probably the most important theme for the novelist who wishes to write from a woman's point of view. But Virginia Woolf was unable to accept its challenge. She failed to go within her heroine's personality where the struggle was taking place and where alone her vacillation between marriage and independence could be solved. With so repressed and sensitive a heroine, everything on the surface was either trivial or misleading unless the novelist obtruded an interpretation. Unwilling to inject an evaluation, she was as yet unable to relate her introspective theme to the objective level on which she persisted in standing. She did not give even so much of the subjective struggle as would have rationalized her heroine's falling prey to tropical fever by associating the weakening of her physical system and the impact of her spiritual dilemma. The reader can scarcely sympathize with a girl who from the outside seems merely eccentric and self-willed. Under such circumstances the accident of sudden death was invoked to create a meretricious sympathy for her and a meretricious solution of her problem.

It was to remain insoluble: Mrs. Woolf never returned to so troublesome a theme as love, which, according to her conventions, demanded either marriage or rejection. Henceforth her locus is middle age when the necessity for decisive action has receded into the past and her heroines need only accept the comfort afforded by conformity to routine. Her theme becomes the regret that persists beneath this placid surface for the intimate contacts which have been refused or the possibility of making which has not been recognized in the past, and the feasibility of which in the present is beyond both one's energy and imagination. The regret itself, furthermore, tends to be transferred into a sphere where the desired contacts if they are normal, should be less close and passionate than love, the recollection of friendships among children or that love, sublimated beyond sex, a mother feels for a son or a daughter for her parents. And in this more tepid region it involves unwittingly the dilemma of women who have drawn back from love, that they seem to expect from other types of contact a parallel intensity. Mrs. Woolf treats these conflicts as though they were the fatalisms in which time enmeshes us; as though the in-

experience and the inversions of our early years deprive us of the insight that alone can produce intimacy while the insight of the years has lost the opportunity to apply it. Keen as she is in recognizing the Victorian responsibility for reducing men to a state where they do not even see the existence of the dilemma, she is not similarly aware, until it is too late, that the dilemma itself is the imposition of Victorianism upon the well-bred girl of a later era.

In *Jacob's Room* sex fades into the background, where it strikes a note of no greater intensity than the pathos of being misunderstood. Jacob's mother, lonely in widowhood, consoles herself with the innocent friendship of another villager with an invalid wife; and is criticized by public opinion. But the main theme has shifted into another region. In Mrs. Woolf's code, widows do not have affairs with some new man, or marry again, or fall in love with their sons, as Freud supposed. Having nothing but their children to focus their emotion upon, however, they feel the insufficiency of the maternal relation with a helpless poignancy which they must conceal and children are in no position to recognize. They have no choice but to watch their sons grow out of the obtuse dependency of childhood into a closer relationship with strangers. They see them leave for Oxford, and strive to share by letter and occasional visits the new world their sons are unaware they desire to enter. If before the estrangement of maturity is complete, war cuts sons off in sudden death, what a mother has left is the physical contact with their now useless personal possessions. Jacob's room, which she has never before seen, is empty. On the floor a discarded shoe (symbolizing the careless rejection of intimacy) brings into full consciousness the fact that she has never really known her son, and whatever of palliation there may be in the knowledge that death has put a stop to the vanity of her desire.

But, within the limitations of her insight, Mrs. Woolf has become for the time being capable of flawless execution. Since the reader sees the mother as much from the outside as she her son, his own emotional reactions to the theme are neutralized this side of sentimentality. The mother has lost what she discovers too late she has never possessed. But since the reader has accepted the postulate from the beginning of never possessing at all, of being content to view from the outside, the book leaves him with only an echo of the mother's desolation. He has not presumed the more intimate contacts the mother has found more and more

eluding her. This method of letting a few details symbolize emotions which cannot be directly presented is reinforced by dividing the material into a few large panels of exterior description whose relationships can be subsumed. The acceptance of the convention of the surface as a technique frees the reader from any disturbing identification with the impossible demand of the theme that surfaces ought to be penetrable.

In *Mrs. Dalloway* the relationship is reversed. An objective technique is discarded in favor of the introspective method, while the theme accepts the conventionality that to live upon the surface of the proprieties is at all events to keep living, to repress the fear of sudden death (although one's heart is weak), to attain at least a mutuality of superficial contact with others through poise and graciousness. Mrs. Dalloway is an aristocrat trained in self-control. But contrary to the tendency of modern fiction, Mrs. Woolf has given her a richer personality than the widow living on a modest income in a provincial town. On the surface less dependent upon others than Mrs. Flanders, she is more so underneath. And now that Mrs. Woolf has worked out her own conception of the focal point, these more profound meanings can be more precisely expressed.

The theme is stated at the outset as literally as is possible to the stream of consciousness method. When a debutante, Mrs. Dalloway had the choice of marrying the clever, reckless Peter Walsh or the well-connected but stodgy Mr. Dalloway. But she has never been able to free herself of a vague dissatisfaction with her choice of security and convention. Her husband's neglect of her and his contentment with his sinecure in the government, where he has no real responsibility but meets all the important people, have become less and less endurable. She has supported herself through the knowledge that she might have made a different marriage and the fantasy that it probably would have been a more rewarding one. When she reminds herself on the first page that Peter Walsh is back in England and calling upon her that afternoon, she is eager to renew her youthful pleasure in his company with the sense of latent possibilities in her own personality it carried with it. But when Peter actually sits before her fingering his jacknife in the old vulgar, nervous way, admitting that his life in India has been wasted, weakly asking her sympathy for his divorce after an impulsive marriage, she realizes that her alternative choice would have been worse. She becomes aware that a faith necessary to her life has proved a delusion.

But Mrs. Woolf decides to intensify her heroine's despair. At a reception that evening a psychiatrist casually remarks upon the suicide of a patient in the afternoon, while Peter Walsh was calling upon her. He was an ex-soldier, shell-shocked in the war, of the odd name of Septimus Smith. Though she has never heard of him before, the doctor's tone seems both shallow and cruel. He has built a wall of convention around himself which shuts him off from understanding either other people or himself. She feels in the indifference of this fashionable doctor an intensified version of her husband's indifference to her. To reject sympathy, it now seems, is to continue to live in illusion, to remain unaware of the bitter lesson of experience. She now senses a spiritual contact with a man she has never seen. It may be another illusion; it is certainly a contact of despair, but it goes deeper than proprieties into the reality of things. Septimus Smith in his act of madness was responding to an insight such as hers, only more penetrating and more intolerable. Her defenses are temporarily shattered by this emergence of her unconscious need of a similar suicide, and she disturbs the social pattern by leaving the drawing room. After an interval, habit reasserts its power and she returns to the shallow safety and the apparent reality of polite conversation. But the reader is not certain for how many more years she will be able to endure its futility.

Such is the story that is told with a technical mastery unparalleled in English fiction. Her use of the method of interior monologue is more pure and subtle than that of Joyce. It is also more economical because she never loses sight of the importance of external contacts, of our normal demand for the elimination of conflicts between the inner and the outer world. The theme of the novel, it is true, is the growing consciousness of an inability to eliminate such conflicts. But interior monologue in Mrs. Woolf is never a static mélange of images, from which the protagonist (unlike the reader) learns nothing. It reflects a process of development within the personality, not a retreat from life, even though the development of this relationship between the individual and society be an awareness of the impossibility of an adequate and desirable one, leads, in fact, to its opposite, a dissolution of the bonds quite as disastrous as the illusory integration of escapism. The end desired may not have been reached, but one has the negative assurance that illusion has been torn away.

Mrs. Dalloway proved that the society novel need not remain within the shallow limits of Henry James's deceptive circumlocutions. But

Virginia Woolf seems to have felt that there was a limit beyond which it could not pass. Interior monologue used very freely remains the method in *To the Lighthouse,* but it is distributed among several persons so that the whole picture has an objective focus in the social life of a family and its friends. The new story repeats the same theme in a locus less aristocratic and more intellectual. Since this is the social milieu where Mrs. Woolf was at home, the style is no longer that of cool ironic contrast and ominous undertone, but of a uniform seriousness which is afforded variety by the astonishing breadth of serious allusion, and relief by overtones of ironic counterpoint. The entire range of modern sophistication (save in the sexual sphere) is represented. She did not forget that her brother-in-law was England's leading advocate of pure form in painting, nor that her father was one of the great Victorian literary critics. Within these areas she was as sensitive as Proust: indeed, more so, for she forbade herself the indulgence of satisfying any one of them at the cost of irrelevance. She sought never to lose the sense of the irresistible movement of life in a scene. To Lucy, the painter, watching from the shore, the trip to the lighthouse shows a sailboat with the hard outline of a Manet against the blue sea. But to the reader this trip taken too late is the very heart of the theme, and Lucy's absorption in its pure form and color a proof of how outside our vital experiences our friends remain.

With the shift of the theme from the aristocracy to the intelligentsia of the middle class, there follows a shift in the nature of the new heroine's defenses. If Mrs. Dalloway was buoyed up by the necessity for complying with a code of perfect manners, Mrs. Ramsay is supported by the Victorian conception of the family. Her first duty is to safeguard its integrity as a social unit. She, it is, who must stem the invasion of bourgeois irritability and Philistinism within the family circle. Since men presume to have more important matters on their minds, the obligation is hers to keep people compatible so that there may be a real interchange of ideas and affections and the possibility of growth of personality. *To the Lighthouse* is therefore virtually a series of tableaux, Proustian in length but not in content, in which Mrs. Ramsay repeats the same function of liaison. She must check her husband's tendency to dominate the conversation; she must see that the young couple's courtship runs smooth and ends in an engagement; she must forestall the crotchety guest's complaints about the food; she must sit patiently on the lawn (since nobody else pays atten-

tion) so that the composition of Lucy's painting is not disturbed. It is not the ridiculousness or the futility or the outrageousness of such concerns that commands our attention but the desperate need for somebody to take them seriously. Mrs. Ramsay must continually sacrifice herself to an ideal of genuine human relationship that everybody else is too self-centered to keep in mind.

This positive theme dominates only the first section of the book. After Mrs. Ramsay's death its negation becomes part of a larger theme of too late and too little. What Mrs. Ramsay has been trying to do, it becomes apparent, has not simply caused her death, but turns out to have been an illusion for which she gave her life. We learn too late not to try the impossible. The present demolishes whatever fantasy of the past was not then exploded but the memory has kept sentimentally alive. Meaningful human communication must always remain a fantasy. Mrs. Ramsay has been striving by exhausting effort to palliate a situation which her near-sightedness (as a symbol) made her fail to recognize was hopeless from the start. She had (when she put her glasses of experience on) a suspicion of the truth. But her brilliant intellectual husband (the feminism is not vindictive) has torn through life in complete ignorance. He had predicted with unction that rain would come to spoil the children's boat ride to the lighthouse. Like Nature herself, he had obtusely enjoyed demolishing their childish illusion of fine weather which his wife had been indulging. And the rain had come. But now, ten years later, he is still victim of the larger illusion which even his children have outgrown. Without Mrs. Ramsay, there can be no completion of the unfinished plan. When their father insists, with old-time wilfullness to do as he pleases, upon carrying it through, he seems to them to be sadistically willing vitality into a dream that is dead. They are all in the boat together, but they are farther apart in spirit than ever.

Mr. Ramsay had been partly right. There was no use in indulging illusions of fine weather. What he did not see was that it was of no use to oppose them either. It was the decree of nature that we are born in the ignorance of hope and happiness, of which experience may be trusted gradually to denude us. For all her sophistication, Mrs. Woolf, bred in the English tradition, could not surrender her English fidelity to nature, her belief in the reality of the objective world. She had begun, as Burke and Wordsworth had taught, by believing in the order of nature, to which

men may freely submit because it reveals itself empirically in the established circumstances of living. When the facts made her doubtful of this order, she could not like Proust escape to a realm of ideal values existing only in the artist's representation of the external world. Her conception of Nature might change with experience of life, but her fealty must remain. And more and more as the orderliness and beneficence of Nature and Nature's reflection in the human society became an untenable concept, she accepted Nature as necessity. The process that began in the delusion of hope and produced the melancholy knowledge that human contacts are never vital ended in the annihilation death offered to the individual passion and desire. But she would not break her rule of aesthetic form to obtrude such reflections into her narrative where they did not belong. They were powerful enough, however, to demand expression. And the interim of ten years that must be filled in by her giving her reader some awareness of the passage of time afforded her the opportunity. There such reflections prepare the reader to take with less personal involvement the concluding section of the novel by the retreat for the time being into a cosmic perspective, too impersonal to be sardonic, and more definite, more tactful, more cumulatively impressive than the pompous afflatus of Hardy's pessimism.

After Mrs. Ramsay has died and the family moved back to London, night takes over the empty house, concealing its authority in the impish tact of gradualism. It restores a fictive sense of life to things. The wind sets creaking the door that Mrs. Ramsay once had opened, and rustles through her abandoned dresses in the closet. Finally the darkness, like death, wipes out benevolently the individuality of everything. But daylight restores the facts and provides a melancholy insight. To walk along the beach no longer induces the Wordsworthian inspiration. Nature does not complete what man has begun, but with equal complacence buries the illusions that man has discarded, the hopes he has not yet found illusory, the crudities of statement and of conduct through which he has disclosed his fatal unawareness of the problem. "With equal complacence Nature saw man's misery, condoned his meanness, and acquiesced in his torture. That dream," Mrs. Woolf asks, "then, of sharing, completing, finding in solitude on the beach an answer, was but a reflection in a mirror, and the mirror itself was but the surface glassiness which forms in quiescence when the nobler powers sleep beneath—to pace the beach was

impossible; contemplation was unendurable; the mirror was broken."

She had answered her own question. Death might mean the escape from the need for an answer. But Nature could not satisfy the active demand. The mirror it offered was another fantasy. Men who could not make contact with one another could not make contact with whatever plan or deity might exist behind it. Men must rely upon themselves. They must act, write stories, since to contemplate was fruitless. The restless wind, by breaking the glassy surface of the mirror, negated even the apparent validity of its temporary reflections. But Mrs. Woolf is still able to return to her customary defenses: better than this inhuman callousness, any human contact, however shallow, by use of which men can hide from themselves its more profound deficiency. The frivolity of the unknown old women, who have entered the house to clean it after its ten years' closing, is better. Their presence brings life back, even though it is not the life desired. Nor is it, on second thought, a new life healthily imposed by youth and vigor. These old women, down at the heels, their own lives factitious, are nevertheless wise (like Hardy's peasants) in comparison to their betters in their shrewd recognition of the unexpected demands of Nature and their submission to them. They are real in contrast to the death in movement of the night when the house has been in Nature's gently destructive hands. Their grotesque submission is better than the futile mockery of the boat ride they play their unwitting part at long last in making possible. And yet, by delineating the boat ride that follows (as well as by the suggestion of disdain in their description), Virginia Woolf rejects Hardy's solution. We cannot undo our sophistication and, like peasants, live in the twilight world of platitude. Lucy has the satisfaction of knowing that her picture is fit only to be hung in attics. She has the acrid consolation of the truth.

III

The truth, however, when it accumulated in all its terrifying bulk, was overwhelming. Believing with the English tradition in the reality of Nature, but believing also from her acceptance of humanism that man, though related to Nature, could not be subservient to it, her bourgeois empiricism afforded her no explanation of connection. She sensed that man should dominate the objective reality of Nature by understanding it, and she saw that a purely scientific understanding was not sufficient, since

it shed no light on the important problem of human relationships. She felt obscurely that men could not understand their relationship to Nature while they remained unable to achieve and to understand their human contacts with one another. But she saw the problem as one of individual relationships, as the English evangelical tradition has always seen it, subsuming without inquiry the propriety of class gradation under the dominance of the educated minority, Matthew Arnold's "saving remnant" and Plato's elite. But the times were changing, and the longer she lived, the more apparent it became that the elite no longer counted.

She found herself borne down by the disintegrating forces. The war and the postwar disorders seemed to her to show not so much that this class or this political system or this aggressor was to blame, as that the whole humanist tradition might be the fantasy of human egoism. Perhaps her aesthetic love of order, of relatedness, though it had seemed guaranteed by the tradition of culture, was itself a delusion which Nature was even now in process of corroding. As she saw social distinctions vanish and vulgarity by its sheer bulk impose disorder (so it appeared to her), breeding and intellect counting for naught (since she continued to define them wrongly and look for them in the wrong places), her pessimism deepened. In her aesthetic devotion to the sharp image, the waves became a more adequate symbol than the night or the wind or the mirror. We see them gathering off shore in apparent integrity and relatedness; one vast breaker after another rolling in rhythmic succession to dominate the waiting land. But when they get closer, they collapse neurotically into froth, and all we can follow are the thin sheets of water evasively scattering back whence they came over the sand. You look at the dry sand later, and the waves have left patterns. But one who has tried to follow their actual movement knows that the patterns are the static deceptive recordings of an active degenerative movement. They will soon be wiped out again. It is not the power of Nature that is a delusion, but her plan. Art in sanctifying upon the urn the apparent order of the movement becomes the final illusion.

She was still enough the artist, even so, to insist upon a pattern for her pessimistic admission that dynamic integrated patterns do not exist. *The Waves* followed *To the Lighthouse*. But the cost of her stubbornness was that ingenuity took the place of insight. Like Proust and Joyce, her attention now became absorbed in what she would have earlier called the irrelevant. But she concealed the fact (as they did), by reproducing with

all the more precision the pattern that was lack of pattern which she had found upon the shore. A new finesse in the use of interior monologue now gave a static form of exterior juxtaposition to the casual fickle reality of human intercourse. If in *Jacob's Room* she used a few simple panels of observations from the outside, now she would cut her panels thin and compose them of introspections which show our interior monologue to be as defectively integrated as our external contacts. We begin to see that we are composed of conflicting impulses which scarcely add up to a personality. But the possibilities of this theme remain an allusion. The stress continues on the theme of individual isolation. We now see that each one of us is from birth a hopelessly separate person. Betty Saunders had once thought that her son escaped her own disillusionment in their relationship; now we learn that for the children also there is no escape.

The panels are etched with a precise and delicate stylus, and afford an insight into the child mind which (like Mrs. Woolf's best work invariably) is without parallel in English fiction. But each interior monologue of the half-dozen children in the group discloses that he is seeking to pursue a private end (though with greater wilfulness than accomplishment) while, like any outside observer, he assumes the intimacy of friendship with the others from the fact of physical proximity. Only the shy child is aware of the illusion, and from her penetration into the pretense of the game she gets the reputation of being the one who is unco-operative. As she grows up, she gathers further proof that she was right. Maturity is to strain and to break even the specious tie of being physically together. It is to accept in practice an alienation our social conventions are perhaps instituted to conceal. We leave for the remote ends of the earth; we develop special interests and professions; we marry persons unknown to the group: so that our chance reunions (our American college reunions, could she have known them) only prove by their hollow ring that we have never really known each other.

The structure of the novel makes the disillusionment almost physically painful to the reader. The thin panels flow in rapid succession, but instead of her weaving them, as Joyce did, into an intricate pattern of confusion, she allows them to scatter in manifold directions which it exhausts the eye to follow. Such a structure, however justified by her theory of the correspondence between life and art, is bound to be aesthetically distasteful. By its very consistency it reinforces the abstract idea of futility

with the unpleasant accompanying emotion of scattered effort and disintegration. The ordinary plot of tradition begins with ignorance and confusion and attains integration. This structure reverses the normal. Beginning with the appearance of order, it leaves us exhausted by the effort to follow the winged seeds blown from the physical unity of the pod farther apart in every direction by the indifferent wind.

But events, impinging upon her Victorian respect for the reality of nature and the external world, were tempting her to supplant an individual by a social approach to her theme. Unlike her great contemporaries, there was a limit, which had been reached in *The Waves,* beyond which she refused to pass in her use of interior monologue. She would not employ it to set up an elaborate structure of solely interior imagery to distract attention from the objective disorder. Her one gay and reckless excursus into fantasy took the curious form of an apparently objective history of English culture. But the social awareness that had grown strong enough to produce this *tour de force* of optimism in *Orlando,* now dictated a rewriting of *The Waves* into a sociological novel, to correct the fantasy of triumphant feminism in *Orlando. The Years* was the new testimony that Mrs. Ramsay's generation had gone forever. The specious security of the Victorian family (like the children's intimacy in *The Waves*) had disappeared with the obvious dissolution of the once stable, prosperous Victorian society on the shores of the present.

Daughters of men of title, now dead, their houses sold, accept the situation candidly enough in *The Years,* and try to adjust themselves. They work with such energy as their breeding has left them to earn their living, and live in dirty, noisy Soho. But they cannot effectively adapt themselves to new circumstances. They have neither the energy nor the philosophy. The values they had accepted on faith from Mr. Ramsay, without ever bothering to read his books, are not practicable in the new environment. And they have, like Virginia Woolf, on other grounds than theories of fiction, rejected the daring suggestions which Mr. Wells had been so noisily and eccentrically proclaiming. They have been used to finding their philosophy practiced in their conditions of living, and these have left them stranded among other conditions from which their training has too successfully protected them. They are unable to draw a different kind of stability from their new contacts with the working class. They feel no possibility of communication of strength and friendliness

from the way the working class bands together and takes the hard knocks of life. Indeed, their intellectualism, their respectability, the limited gamut of their values, distort the crude energy of clerks and charwomen into a menace where it might have become an ally and a protection.

And so, when the second world war developed into a catastrophic climax to this confusion, Mrs. Woolf did not find the story of her dog Flush more than momentarily distracting. There were still new facts to be faced, of a kind that could not be ignored. To spiritual disorder was added the stark physical destruction of the London that was as real and loved as flesh to her: St. Paul's bombed, into which she had sometimes sent her characters for a moment's meditation; Buckingham Palace, whence some royal personage had driven in *Mrs. Dalloway* to symbolize the permanent decency of the English tradition, struck by a German bomb. She took her own trip (did she not?) to Hampton Court, like those the children remembered with unalloyed pleasure in *To the Lighthouse,* even though she had then preferred to recall the trip not taken. Here once Elizabeth had held court to heroes in the great serene rooms or talked to poets in the gardens along the Thames. Now there were only a few pensioners hidden in obscure servants' quarters, widows of men who had once increased the greatness of England, now in chill obscurity of exile from useful activity. But no fires burned in the huge ovens. A chill emptiness hung everywhere within, while the old English flowers blossomed in indifferent profusion of beauty outside along the Thames. The faultless Gothic fabric of the building was intact and spotless, but unused. Its dead perfection must have seemed to her to mean that only the dead past could any longer seem to live in England, like the illusions of childhood her novels have bravely torn apart. But destruction willed by human savagery defied Nature's beneficent palliation. The time had come to try that final act of communication which Mrs. Dalloway had pondered but the sanity of Septimus Smith's madness had dared. The time had come to asseverate her ultimate recognition that Nature remains tranquil and dominant in the end. This congruity between her life and her novels she would, as an artist, secure. She would leave her problems for someone else to solve.

SUBSIDIES; OR, VITAMINS ARE GOOD FOR YOU

By HERMAN SCHNURER

The Scientific Approach

SOME TIME BEFORE H. R. 3477 came up for consideration, Mr. Albert B. Goss, Worthy Master of the National Grange, was addressing the annual meeting of his organization at Grand Rapids, Michigan. Now, Mr. Goss is no amateur. He represents the employers of farm labor, who thoroughly dominate that organization. He represents them with great dexterity. That is why his long speech was relatively reticent on the one subject which was uppermost in his mind as he led the *putsch* on subsidies —which he has never before opposed. The objective of Mr. Goss is simply to smash price ceilings. What he wants is uncontrolled prices.

He was among friends, however; and somewhere in this twelve-thousand-word oration, tacit understandings and implied purposes were bound to come out in plain language. We have to produce, he was telling his cohorts; that is our chief concern. But subsidies are artificial. They cannot get at the root of our difficulties, and "any attempt to cure the cause by price ceilings will fail, just as it has failed throughout history, for economic reasons that cannot be changed by man-made directives."

Viewed in this lofty manner, objectively, scientifically, the whole subsidy question is reduced to "a simple law of economics that cannot be brushed aside. If you want to increase the supply of anything, you increase the price. . . . A compensatory price will produce an ample supply of most commodities, making ceilings unnecessary."

You see, a little profit might incidentally accrue to big farmers and to food processors, but the main objective is achieved. We obey the teachings of history, show our scorn for man-made directives, comply with natural economic law, and increase production. As for inflation, well, "the theory that inflation can be controlled by freezing all prices has never worked because it is impossible to freeze all prices." As fancy footwork goes, this isn't just good. It's professional!

What the reactionaries avoid carefully when they talk about price rollback subsidies is the slightest reference to the last war, when there were no ceilings, when sugar was 36 cents a pound, onions 19 cents, butter $1.02; when a chicken sold for $5.00 and eggs for $1.25 a dozen.

But let us go to the Bureau of Labor Statistics for what happened during a five-month period when serious controls began to be exercised in this war. Here is what happened between May 12 and October 13, 1942:

Controlled foods	*Per cent*
Bread	No change
Round steak, pound	Up 0.7
Chuck roast, pound	Up 4.5
Pork chops	Down .2
Sliced bacon, pound	Up 5.1
Milk	Up .7
Potatoes	Down 3.6
Canned corn	Up 3.1
Sugar	Down .2

Uncontrolled foods	*Per cent*
Butter	Up 18.2
Eggs	Up 42.8
Oranges	Up 41.7
Green beans	Up 24.6
Carrots	Up 22.7
Lettuce	Up 51.1
Spinach	Up 31.1
Prunes	Up 30.1
Roasting chickens	Up 17.5

The total rise in food costs since Pearl Harbor, placed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics at 23 per cent has been challenged by La Guardia, among others. He says it is closer to 30 per cent. Speaking for the average New Yorker, but especially for white collar workers, the Mayor went on to say that they can take a 20 per cent tax or a 30 per cent rise in food: they can't take both.

The Moral Approach

"Subsidies," says Representative Plumley of Vermont, "are an insidious sop to soak up the support of those who never have contributed any real effort toward the uplift of mankind or the benefit of themselves (*sic!*). What you get as a subsidy you pay for tenfold as a tax, and those

who have to, pay the bills, while the bloodsuckers on the body politic grow fat at the expense of the multitude.

"Subsidies are wrong ab initio and always. . . ."

Thus, too, spoke Mr. Zach Lamar Lobb, Los Angeles attorney, in a broadcast on station KFAC, on October 31, 1943:

"Subsidies are a fake that only conceal increases in prices, just as manipulation in hours and overtime are a fake to conceal an increase in wages. Such fakery is contrary to American character, and unworthy of our great Nation. . . . Control of producers and consumers through subsidies would be destructive of American independence in private enterprise and a menace to the very liberty of our people."

"Oh, Mr. Chairman," says Mr. Wolcott of Michigan, "let me tell you there is a moral question involved here. Where is the American with blood so thin, may I say yellow, that he would pass on to posterity, that he would pass on to his sons and daughters, that he would pass on to the men fighting our battles . . . the payment of any part of the grocery bill for the food which you and I are eating today. . .?"[1]

The moral wags urge simply that subsidies should subside; the more austere philosophers call the monstrosity by its real names: bounty, monetary raid, handout, bribery, vote buying, regimentation, and socialization.

It is the tragedy of the lofty and intransigent moralist that in the rough and tumble of practical politics he is grievously misunderstood. Mr. Gifford of Massachusetts was shaking a stern finger at the supporters of the administration, when Mr. Fitzpatrick (New York) interjected:[2]

Mr. F. A few years ago the gentleman was fighting for subsidy for the fishing interests in his district.

Mr. G. Was I?

Mr. F. Yes, sir.

Mr. G. I do not recall that.

Mr. F. You do not recall that? It involved a couple of million dollars that you wanted to help out the fishing interests up there, and you took the floor here, and made a speech for it.

Mr. G. Perhaps the gentleman may be mistaken. Anyway, I am sometimes like you fellows; sometimes I have a convenient memory.

Mr. F. Oh, no. [I wonder at the intonation here.]

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[1] *Congressional Record*, 78th Congress, p. 9805.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 9824.

Mr. G. No. Perhaps I ought not to recall it. So seldom do our fishing boys get anything.

Mr. F. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCormack] was very much interested, and you and other delegations, both Republicans and Democrats.

Mr. G. Did we get it?

Mr. F. Yes; you got part of it.

Mr. McCormack. Yes. I introduced a bill and we got an appropriation, first of $1,000,000 and then we got more.

Mr. G. Well, that is right. The gentleman from Massachusetts takes all the credit. But I told you I liked some subsidies, did I not? I am glad to be reminded of that. I can now really have something to remind my[3] fishermen of next year and can claim a part of Mr. McCormack's share of the credit. Fishermen have had a hard time. They are an independent group. They are and will be up against harder times under O.P.A. treatment. When the O.P.A. held a meeting in my city, they soon learned how the fishermen regarded them. They walked out of the hall saying, "The hell with the O.P.A." You cannot regiment my fishermen. Do not try it. The farmers are now awake and joined up.

Mr. Gifford's dilemma is indeed painful. Railroads, steamships, airlines; housing; coal and oil transportation; copper, zinc, bauxite, aluminum; parity outlays, crop insurance, removal of agricultural surplus, conservation payments, the conveyance of agricultural workers to areas where manpower is scarce; rapid amortization on defense plants, lowered interest rates, readjustments of contracted indebtedness—a dozen more examples could be cited to illustrate the truism that tariffs and subsidies have always been with us and are ubiquitous today.

H. R. 3477 itself does not abolish subsidies—to farmers. If Mr. Plumley really objected to subsidies *ab initio,* as he says, he couldn't vote for the bill which his party is supporting practically to a man. For the bill retains, guarantees support prices. It allows the government to relieve the farmer of perishable foods, for example, and to resell them at a loss. What the measure does is to *forbid the use of funds* to keep down price ceilings.

Indeed, few of the advocates of the bill as it stands take an absolute position. They do not say that ceilings cannot be made to work. Like the scientific Mr. Goss, they do not even deny that subsidies might be desirable. All they do is to withhold the means, the money, with which to render ceilings effective.

[3]Note the pronoun.

Here we enter the realm of *distinguos,* of logic chopping, of hair splitting so fine as to confound the most cunning schoolman. The argument runs like this: a subsidy to a rancher, to a fisherman, to a zinc manufacturer is a producer's subsidy. It is a Good Thing. The war cannot go on without production. The producer must make a profit, must derive a decent income in order to do his best. On the other hand, a subsidy which helps the consumer is a Bad Thing. It is a handout, destroys character and things like that. All legislation penalizes somebody. Let the other fellow make some sacrifices. Sacrifice is noble.

Thus we have created, for example, a metaphysical beet grower. As a producer, he is to be helped by the collective resources of the country; as a consumer, he is to be ruined with high moral intent.

I deliberately omit another little difficulty in the path of the homiletic school in subsidies: the provisions in the act which exempt vegetable oils and fats from the operation of section 3. Such a discussion would take us too far afield. I think, however, I should say something about the bill to subsidize country newspapers, which came up in the Senate at the time when H.R. 3477 was being debated in the House. It is closely related to the rollback question and presents some very diverting facts.

Newspapers have done their share of moralizing about consumer subsidies. (Mr. Roosevelt has admonished us to quit referring to any subsidies today except as war subsidies.) By and large, the press has been much more liberal on this question than the present Congress: powerful papers are largely supported by urban readers.

It is the small paper, however, which has had a rough time in this unfortunate debate. All papers are subsidized. They enjoy reduced mailing rates and highly privileged intracounty distribution at public cost. However, the same rural publications which wax indignant about price rollbacks want subsidies of their own. They are hard up: materials and labor are higher. They aren't getting their share of advertising. They want thirty million dollars in direct government money for the war bond drives they publicize.

The metropolitan press which only gets three million dollars in direct advertising (Army and Navy) smells competitive advantage and comes up with its automatic cry: "Freedom of the Press." The little fellows point out that the War Advertising Council has placed $580,000,000 of corporation advertising which is charged to the government; all this money goes

to city papers. These concerns sell the "blue sky" and patriotic slogans. They also sell their brand name, since they have nothing else to sell.

There is no freedom involved here, say the country folks; just a hidden subsidy. Let us all have a cut.

Mr. Bankhead, who is the spokesman for the measure in the Senate, was naturally reminded of his inconsistency. What can the Senator do? He represents the politically effective farm vote in Alabama; he must watch the small newspaper, which carries much weight in his state. He is also a Democrat. The poor fellow couldn't fall back upon the chestnut that he was sponsoring a producer subsidy without which the war effort wouldn't proceed: radios and small newspapers have carried bond slogans anyway, without pay. Nor could he forget that Alabama produces cotton, tobacco, peanuts and vegetables. He did his best. He joined the Republicans and came out with his own pet name: selective subsidies. He never explained how they can be selected to go in opposite directions at one and the same time.

The sad case of Senator Bankhead illustrates one of the mechanical weaknesses of our representative system. A Plumley or a Gifford, whether elected at large, or in a constituency of their choice would still be a Plumley or a Gifford. Bankhead is certainly better stuff. But forced to choose between the picayune interests of local pressure groups and broad national policy, he finds himself immured in Alabama. That is the tragedy of the dominant coalition. Their own limitations, the political and economic bankruptcy of their thinking, is enhanced by constitutional flaws: between high adventure and low prudence—they split hairs.

LEST WE FORGET!

These are the Senators who voted to deprive soldiers of their right to the ballot in 1944 by putting responsibility for creating election machinery in the hands of each of the 48 states:

DEMOCRATS

John H. Bankhead	Alabama
Lister Hill	Alabama
Hattie W. Caraway	Arkansas
John L. McClellan	Arkansas
Charles O. Andrews	Florida
Richard B. Russell	Georgia
John H. Overton	Louisiana
Allen J. Ellender	Louisiana
Millard E. Tydings	Maryland
David I. Walsh	Massachusetts
Theodore G. Bilbo	Mississippi
James O. Eastland	Mississippi
Bennett Champ Clark	Missouri
Pat McCarran	Nevada
James G. Scrugham	Nevada
Walsh	New Jersey
Josiah W. Bailey	N. Carolina
Peter G. Gerry	Rhode Island
Ellison D. Smith	S. Carolina
Burnet R. Maybank	S. Carolina
Kenneth McKellar	Tennessee
Tom Stewart	Tennessee
W. Lee O'Daniel	Texas
Harry Flood Byrd	Virginia

REPUBLICANS

Eugene D. Millikin	Colorado
John A. Danaher	Connecticut
C. Douglass Buck	Delaware
John Thomas	Idaho
Raymond E. Willis	Indiana
Arthur Capper	Kansas
Clyde M. Reed	Kansas
Wallace H. White	Maine
Henrik Shipstead	Minnesota
Hugh A. Butler	Nebraska
Kenneth S. Wherry	Nebraska
Chas. W. Tobey	N. Hampshire
Albert W. Hawkes	New Jersey
Gerald P. Nye	North Dakota
E. H. Moore	Oklahoma
Rufus C. Holman	Oregon
Chapman Revercomb	W. Va.
Edward V. Robertson	Wyoming

WE NOTE . . .

WE TAKE THE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE

The Nazis unfolded their political offensive in three phases. Munich divided the Right from the Left to the point of paralyzing national sentiment. The second phase of the blitz forced Russia into a desperate bid for time, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. It divided the Left: what remained of the Popular Front became a wild melee in which progressives clawed each other, and were in turn attacked by the reactionaries, who were delighted only less than Hitler himself. The third phase came with the invasion of Russia. "Save the world from Bolshevism" was intended to be a political blockbuster of new design. This bomb, aimed at splitting the conservatives, was relatively ineffective. We were beginning to see through Nazi strategy. We were beginning to react.

The Atlantic Charter and the Casablanca declaration were the answer of the United Nations. The first foreshadowed the might of the resistance which was gathering in the West. It held out the promise of a people's war. Casablanca and the slogan "unconditional surrender" promised a departure from dubious deals; it held out the prospect of a people's peace.

* * *

But we were talking almost entirely in generalities; and our actions often gave these generalities an ironical turn.

What is new about the Moscow Pacts is the greater scope of concrete political commitment and political action.

The most pressing issue—aside from those military—was the basis of surrender which was tendered to Germany, by Russia on the one hand and by the western allies on the other. What was the meaning and intent of the Free Germany Committee in Moscow? Was it an integral extension of the Russian Foreign Office or was it a trial balloon? Did the offer to set up a "strong Germany" mean that the *Wermacht* was to be preserved? What was to hold it together? There were some who feared that the Russians would inundate Germany by combined military and ideological action; there were some who feared the Russians would stop at their own borders. There were even some who feared both possibilities simultaneously.

On our side, we spoke of unconditional surrender. Did that preclude dealing with a "good" government? (Some of the American officials of the A. T. & T. referred to Franco territory as "liberated" territory.) As long as there was no full and direct exchange of views and no express resolution of the differences among the United Nations, the Nazis could still hope to extricate themselves by a skillful defense move comparable to their skilled political offensive.

The Moscow meeting settled that. The rage of German propaganda is a measure of our success. The meeting at Teheran, the erection of the European Advisory Committee in London; the provisions for consultation and joint

action following the armistice and pending a definite peace settlement, all present concrete evidence that a separate peace is out.

But while the United Nations have multiplied and extended administrative points of contact all over the world, the scope of a great deal of this machinery is still something that lies in the future, when we finally skin our skunks. The Czech treaty and the declaration in regard to Austria will mean more when the Russians actually occcupy the territories in question.

How did the Moscow conference affect our relations to those portions of Europe which we held or which come within our orbit? Here a mere series of names are immediately evocative of differences which had plagued us: Darlan, Giraud, Michailovitch, Badoglio, Victor Emanuel, Paul, George of Greece.

Let us avoid detail and see what actually happened immediately after Moscow. Giraud was dropped from the French Committee of Liberation. The six parties in Italy quickly developed militant and antimonarchist majorities and Sforza's hand was strengthened vis-a-vis Badoglio: General Wilson gave the Chetniks the dressing down they so richly deserve; we protested Franco's brazen violations of neutrality. We even checked Carol and his press agents ("Monarchy is like a big, happy family"). We haven't yet interned or deported Otto, but perhaps he isn't worth the trouble.

There are shadows in the picture; but the record of concrete achievement on the European scene is already impressive. We cannot say the same for the Asiatic front. The meeting at Cairo wasn't entirely sterile; but it represents only limited gains and some very harrowing risks.

* * *

With respect to their treatment of the enemy, the Moscow and the Cairo Declarations differ radically. The former does not envisage the Germans as a solid mass. It accentuates the quarrel between decent Germans and Nazis and between Germans and Austrians. The Cairo document ignores the divisions within Japan proper. Our ammunition is directed principally at the millions in the rear of the Nipponese army.

Where resistance has already developed, we are likely to have some success. The Koreans, the Manchurians, the Filippinos will feel heartened. Their situation is clearer. Their incentive is real. The Chinese themselves may take courage from the renunciation by Britain and the United States of extraterritoriality within the borders of continental China. Italy, France, Portugal must perforce follow us there.

So far, so good. Some of our hand grenades are very likely to go off where we want them to explode; some might well be thrown right back at us and blow up in our own faces.

The English have never given up their claim to Hong Kong. The Churchill pronouncement, made in the flush of victory, right after El Alamein, still stands ominously: he wasn't going to preside at the liquidation of the British Empire.

We think immediately of India and of the relation of a hundred million Moslems to the Mohammedan world. We think of Burma, Siam, Indo-China, of the rich and teeming immensity of the East Indies. Where is our Navy in all this? What is to be the character of

white colonialism? The tin, rubber, oil —and the cheap labor of these Oriental regions—are there to lure us into the old game of sordid exploitation, devious intrigue, and ruthless rivalry.

We launch resonant slogans, but political warfare is a great deal more than lush propaganda. From the Mediterranean to the Pacific and from the Indian Ocean to Siberia, the Common Man, to whom we have called with the blare of trumpets, is going to watch us; he will note what we say and what we do. And the cynical may well be tempted into launching still another slogan: the white man is trying to free Asia from the Asiatics.

The political risks of a new imperialism stand out more clearly than ever. They assume a striking and novel context when we consider even for a moment the relations of Russia to China and of both—especially the latter—to India. These three nations, contiguous not only geographically, but in so many other effective ways, constitute a natural bloc which takes in more than half the population of the world. They can play for time, accelerate the technological potential which the war has already brought to them. They can cement their ties and exploit fully the political weapons which we give them with one hand and stand ready to take back with the other.

One generation is a short time in the experience of Asia. We cannot divide and push these people around indefinitely. There are two things we can do. We can swashbuckle our way into a devastating war which will dwarf this one; or we can patiently set to work and give explicit and convincing evidence of our good faith. The Cairo declaration does nothing of the kind.

H. S.

A MYTH OF THE 1920's

Experts on evidence maintain that an eyewitness account of an event is more untrustworthy than indirect and circumstantial evidence. Similarly in history the most garbled and distorted views are found where the memory of living men is relied upon to supply the public with its knowledge of the past.

The decade of the 1920's is subject to misinterpretation because present-day writers rely upon their memories in reporting the happenings of this very significant period in American history. Probably no decade in American history is so badly understood as the ten years following the end of World War I.

An outstanding example of this misreporting of the period is found in a recent column by Walter Lippmann called "Republican Strategy." In this article Mr. Lippmann takes the Republicans in Congress to task for their obstructionist tactics. Destroying the controls over inflation, he says, will embarrass not the present administration but the one in power after 1945 and there is a good chance that it will be Republican. For, Mr. Lippmann argues, the controls over inflation now operating are likely to hold fairly well until 1945. Then he presents his historical analogy:

> If the Republicans will remember what happened to Mr. Hoover they will realize how dangerous to their party is their negative attitude toward the wartime controls. President Hoover was the victim of President Coolidge's failure to control the inflationary forces of the '20's. It was President Coolidge who let them run wild, and escaped all the blame for the result; it was President Hoover who got the crash that was prepared by his predecessor's failure to see what was happening and to take positive measures.

What are the economic facts of the 1920's? Any superficial examination will disclose that we had no inflation during the period. True, stock market prices were rising but more important indices indicated a static or a falling price level. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Index of Wholesale Prices was virtually constant during this period although it was slightly lower in 1929 than in 1924. The B. L. S. Cost of Living Index showed a similar trend. The studies of the Brookings Institution point to a 20 per cent underutilization of our productive capacity during the decade. It is true that real wages were rising but at no time did the increased purchasing power of the employed laborer threaten inflation. Indeed, with the swollen profits of the time (they were equal to 25.1 per cent of the national income in 1929) it is clear that wages did not rise fast enough to prevent the depression and deflation of the early 1930's.

The facts of the 1920's show underutilization of productive resources, lack of sufficient purchasing power, inadequacy of investment—in general a condition pointing to deflation rather than inflation. Indeed, Keynes, Hansen, Currie, and other economists in their reexamination of the decade have concluded that deflationary rather than inflationary forces brought on the depression of the early 1930's.

How shall we account for Mr. Lippmann's complete misreading of the facts of the 1920's? He is one of the most economically literate of the syndicated columnists. Furthermore, during the period in question he was editor of the old New York *World,* at the time one of the outstanding liberal papers in America. If any journalist should be able to interpret the 1920's correctly that person is Walter Lippmann.

Unfortunately Mr. Lippmann relies upon his memory to inform him of what took place. The dramatic event of the stock market crash in October, 1929 promoted the popular belief that inflationary forces were responsible for the ensuing depression. This popular folklore is shared by writers who, like Mr. Lippmann, accept this myth instead of investigating the facts of the period. This editorial misinterpretation is not unimportant, for our understanding of the past does influence contemporary policy.

V. C.

Lincoln R. Gibbs

It is with a deep sense of personal and social loss that we have to announce the sudden death of Lincoln R. Gibbs on December 13. Easily the dean of the Editorial Board in point of years, Mr. Gibbs never seemed the dean in his detailed, neatly worded comments on manuscripts nor did he ever act the part in editorial meetings. His learning in religion and literature was great and his standards of excellence the very highest, yet he carried both learning and standards with good humor and with a modesty which sometimes seemed excessive. We should like to pay tribute, too, to the remarkable flexibility of his social views. A man of strong convictions, he withheld nothing he considered true from the repeated rays of re-examination. Thus, always reinterpreting his social intent with the changing times, he remained young and vigorous all his 75 years. We shall miss particularly his constant strength and his social wisdom.

THE EDITORS

CONTRIBUTORS

It is doubtful that anyone understands better the facts of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada or could write about them more intimately than DAVID LEWIS. Active in the political aspects of the Canadian labor movement since 1927, he has been secretary of the Federation for the past seven years. He has also been a Rhodes Scholar, and at the time he attended Oxford University (1932-35), he became well acquainted with British labor.

EATON MAXWELL is a Canadian barrister and writer on economics and political affairs. His articles have appeared in *The New Republic*, *The Yale Review*, and *The Christian Science Monitor* in this country, and in *The Canadian Forum* and other Canadian periodicals.

JAMES RORTY is well known for his work on advertising (*Our Master's Voice: Advertising*) and the medical services (*American Medicine Mobilizes*). He has made his living variously as advertising copy writer, newspaper and magazine writer and editor. It is not so well known that he is also the author of two volumes of verse. He is at present working on a book which will attempt to bring together "the nutritional, economic, and political dimensions of the feeding problem for comprehensive analytical treatment."

WALTER JOHNSON, who tells how a Senatorial bloc sabotaged the peace in 1919-1920, is at work on a one-volume history of the United States for Ginn and Company. He is an assistant professor of history at the University of Chicago and is director of the American history phase of the Army Student Training Program there.

The formulation and defense of Scientific Humanism has been for many years one of MAX OTTO's major interests. As head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, he has been an outstanding teacher and one of the dominant leaders in American pragmatism. Among his books are *The Human Enterprise* and *Things and Ideals.*

Few American writers have so cosmopolitan a background or write so brilliantly of European affairs as ALBERT GUÉRARD. For more than a year he has been connected with the Free French section of the Office of War Information. The present essay is part of a book to be published under the title, *Europe, Free and United.*

MAX G. MERCER is a registered architect and is Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds for Antioch College. Mr. Mercer learned the carpenter trade, and he has been a construction foreman and general construction superintendent for building contractors. He engages in a wide variety of private architectural practice in addition to his college work.

LILO LINKE is a young woman of German descent who lived for some time in England and who for the past several years has been teaching secondary school in Guayaquil, Ecuador.

Author of "The Black Man's Burden," J. SAUNDERS REDDING, has published two books, *To Make a Poet Black* (1939) and *No Day of Triumph* (1942), now in its third edition. For the past ten years he has taught in Negro colleges.

EDWIN BERRY BURGUM will be remembered for two previous articles in *The Antioch Review,* "Aldous Huxley and His Dying Swan" and "The Sense of the Present in Thomas Mann." He is an associate professor of English at New York University.

HERMAN SCHNURER teaches French at Antioch College. He is an editor of the *Review.*

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